
# TOC Eco-Pessimism K



## 1NCs

### 1NC (Structural Violence) – Get off the Human High Horse

#### Welcome to the Anthropocene, where extinction lurks behind every corner. Human rights discourse and modern liberalism seeks to preserve the same notion of human excellence that has set us on the path to our destruction. The aff is an attempt to incorporate more people in the modern way of life of consumption that has created these conditions. The aff’s humanism is idealist and fails to see the forest through the quickly disappearing trees.

#### Cohen 12

Tom Cohen (Professor of Literary, Cultural, and Media Studies at University of Albany), “Murmurations—“Climate Change” and the Defacement of Theory”, Telemorphosis: Theory in the Era of Climate Change, Vol. 1.

**Warnings regarding the planet earth’s imminent depletion of reserves or “life as we know it” arrive today more as routine tweets than events** that might give us pause, particularly as the current wars over global “sovereign debt” and economic “crises” swamp attention. The intensifying specter of megadebt—**at a time of “peak everything”** (peak water, peak oil, peak humans)—dumped into a future despoiled of reserves and earning capacity has a specific relation to this white-out—**the “economical” and “ecological” tandem shifts all attention to the first term** (or first “eco”). In a post-global present consolidating what is routinely remarked as a neo-feudal order, the titanic shift of hyperwealth to the corporatist few (the so-called 1%) sets the stage for a shift to control societies anticipat- ing social disruption and the implications of “Occupy” style eruptions— concerning which the U.S. congress hastily passed new unconstitutional rules to apprehend citizens or take down websites. **The** Ponzi scheme **logics of twenty-first century earthscapes** portray an array of time-bubbles, catastrophic deferrals, telecratic capture, and a voracious present that seems to **practice a sort of** tempophagy on itself corresponding with its structural premise [is] hyper-consumption and perpetual “growth. The supposed urgencies of threatened economic and monetary “collapse” occlude and defer any attention to the imperatives of the biosphere, but this apparent pause or deferral of attention covers over an irreversible mutation. **A new phase of unsustainability appears in which a faux status quo** ante **appears to will to sustain itself as long as possible and at whatever cost;** the event of the twenty-first century is that there will be no event, that no crisis will disturb the expansion of consumption beyond all supposed limits or peaks.In such an environment other materialities emerge, reference systems default, and the legacies of anthropo-narcissm go into overdrive in mechanical ways. Supposedly advanced or post-theory theory is no exception**—**claiming on the one hand ever more verdant comings together of redemptive communities, anddiscretely restoringmanyphenomenological tropes that 20th century thought had displaced. This has been characterized as an unfolding eco-eco disaster—a complex at once eco- nomic and ecological.1 The logics of the double oikos appear, today, caught in a self-feeding default. The present volume, in diverse ways, reclaims a certain violence that has seemed occluded or anaesthetized (it is a “present,” after all, palpably beyond “tipping points” yet shy of their fully arrived implications— hence the pop proliferation of “zombie” metaphors: zombie banks, zom- bie politics, zombie “theory”). It departs from a problem inherent in the “eco” as a metaphoric complex, that of the home (oikos), and the suicidal fashion in which this supposed proper ground recuperates itself from a nonexistent position. The figure of an ecology that is ours and that must be saved precludes us from confronting the displacement and dispossession which conditions all production, including the production of home- lands. Memory **regimes have insistently**, silently and anonymously **prolonged and defended the construct of “homeland security” (both in its political sense, and in the epistemological sense of being secure in our modes of cognition),** **but** these systems of security have in fact accelerated the vortices of ecocatastrophic imaginaries. If a double logic of eco-eco disaster overlaps with the epoch in deep time geologists now refer to as the “anthropocene,” what critical reorientations, today, contest what has been characterized as a collective blind or psychotic foreclosure? Nor can one place the blame at the feet alone of an accidental and evil ‘1%’ of corporate culture alone, since an old style revolutionary model does not emerge from this exitless network of sys- tems. More interesting is the way that ‘theory’, with its nostalgic agendas for a properly political world of genuine praxis or feeling has been com- plicit in its fashion. How might one read the implicit, unseen collabora- tion that critical agendas coming out of twentieth century master-texts unwittingly maintained with the accelerated trajectories in question**? The mesmerizing fixation with cultural histories, the ethics of “others,” the enhancement of subjectivities, “human rights” and institutions of power not only partook of this occlusion but ‘we theorists’ have deferred addressing biospheric collapse,** mass extinction events, or the implications of resource wars and “population” culling. It is our sense of justified propriety—our defense of cultures, affects, bodies and others—that allows us to remain secure in our homeland, unaware of all the ruses that maintain that spurious home. The rapacious present places the hidden metaphoric levers of the eco or oikos in an unsustainable exponential curve, compounding megadebt upon itself, and consuming futures in what has been portrayed as a sort of psychotic trance—what Hillis Miller calls, in this volume, a suicidal “auto-co-immunity” track.2 Yet the “Sovereign debt crisis” corresponds to a credibility crisis as well. The latter applies not only to the political classes of the post-democratic klepto-telecracies of the West but seems to taint the critical concepts, agendas, and terms received from twentieth-century itineraries that accompanied the last decades and that persist as currency. Far from opening beyond the propriety of the oikos theories of affect, living labor and critical legacies have doubled down on their investments, created guilds as reluctant as Wall St. to give up cognitive capital. All the while there is attention paid to ‘saving’ the humanities or a critical industry that might be extended for a while longer (as if with “sovereignty” itself). Bruno Latour [2010] presumes to call this recent and ongoing episode the “Modernist parenthesis” of thought. In his conjec- ture, the very pre-occupation with human on human histories, cultural- ism, archivism, and the institutions of power were complicit with a larger blind that, in his view, the ecological crisis belatedly discloses.3 At the moment of writing it is common to point to the 2011 “occupy” movement, viral and cloud-like, as the Bartlebyesque counter to a total- ization of the systems of this control. Bartleby has become the figure for a rejection of end-fixated production. Were one able to speak of an occupy movement applied to critical concepts and twentieth century derived idioms one might imagine a call to occupy critical theory and conceptual networks—but with what interruption of received programs (“Sovereign debt”), what alternative materialities, what purported “ethics” involving commodified futures (and the structure of debt), what mnemotechnics, and with resistance to what power, if it is the oikos itself, the metaphoric chimera and its capture of late anthropocene imaginaries that is at is- sue? This is one of the implications of what this volume terms telemor- phosis, the intricacy by which referential regimes, memory, and reading, participate in these twenty-first century disclosures. The occupy motif, at the moment, sets itself against a totalization or experience of foreclo- sure—political, mediacratic, financial, cognitive. Various strategies ap- pearing in this volume involve what could equally be called a disoccupy logic or meme. Such a logic of disoccupation assumes that the domain in question is already saturated, occupied in the militarist sense by a program that, un- wittingly, persists in the acceleration of destruction and takeover. Critical thought of recent decades would have walked hand in hand with the cur- rent foreclosures. The explication of ecocatastrophic logics, accordingly, are not found in Foucault nor, surprisingly, Derrida. Timothy Morton’s Ecology without Nature is one such effort at disoccupation—seeking to void the two terms of the title, and in the process disrupt the “revised organicisms” of contemporary critical schools which, he argues, have managed to lapse into sophisticated pre-critical modes not unrelated to a more general inertia. **The meme of disoccupation resonates**, for instance, **with** what Robert Markley in this volume proposes as **a practice of “disidentification**,” and is implied by Timothy Clark’s tracking of a “derangement of scale**” in the perpetual cognitive disjunctures that come up against the ecocatastrophic present. One would disoccupy the figure of subjectivity,** refusing not only the comfort**ing commodifications of “the other”** in cultural theory, but also the later moral appeals to other redemptive beings, such as the animal (as Joanna Zylinska argues with regard to post-humanism and its “animal studies”). What might be disoccupied would be the meta- phorics of the home, even where the latter would sustain itself today in cherished terms like trauma, affect, alterity, embodiment, or even culture. Yet a refusal of supposed redemptive ‘outsides’ to capitalism does not lead to a place of critical purity beyond the implied moralism of ‘occupy’ but the return of, and orientation to, a violence before which no model of sovereignty can be sustained. To imagine that one might disoccupy by refusing all the supposed redemptive ‘outsides’ to capitalism is not to find a place of critical purity beyond the moralism of ‘occupy.’ Occupation is never simply takeover and appropriation, but always involves destruction of what it claims. The viral migration of the “occupy” motif involves a premise of disoccupation covertly. In the present volume this takes different forms. If one is now beyond tipping points in a zone of irreversibility, what corresponds to this as a critical injunction? Catherine Malabou sets aside the entire way the figure of trauma and the “always already” have organized time. Claire Colebrook affirms, rather than accepting as tragic, extinction as a point of departure for thought, which can be used to work against the organicist ideologies of the present (such as sexual difference). Martin McQuillan shifts the referential spectrum of discourse to “other materialities” in the hypothesis of a post-carbon thought, while Robert Markley tracks the in-flux of geological times that displace human narrative matrices. Bernard Stiegler voids the biopolitical model, which he sees as exceeded by “the third limit of Capitalism” (when it impinges on the biosphere). From that point of excess he strategizes a counter-stroke to the capture of attention by telecratic circuits, initiating a noopolitics. Joana Zylinska disoccupies, to continue this motif, the covert model of soft “otherness” by which animal studies has invented itself as an anthropo-colonianism. Like post- humanism generally, Zylinska argues, animal studies sustains its sub- jectal hegemonies. Hillis Miller locates a source for the ecocatastrophic imaginary in the blind insistence of “organicist” models of reading that sustain the comforts of the oikos. Against this hermeneutics of security Miller posits an “ecotechnics” that is at once machinal and linguistically based (where language is not communicative, but literal and inscriptive in a manner exemplified by Kafka’s Odradek). Justin Read displaces any biopolitical model, again, by relinquishing trauma, the oikos, survival and interiorities of any manner, instead describing the circulation of data (or the “unicity”) from which the only remaining political gesture would be oriented to the ecocatrastrophic. Jason Groves shifts the refer- ential screen from, again, a human-centered index to the viral textualism of (alien) species invasion, the global rewriting of bio-geographies. Mike Hill transitions to the alteration of atmospherics under the imaginary of climate war technologies in a new horizon of invisible wars (and wars on visibility), which today include not only nanotechnologies but also the “autogenic” turning of wars without discrete (national) enemies into suicidal rages against the “homeland”—a sort of, again, auto-occupation that is accelerating.

**Banning handguns is a liberal reform that masks the underlying violence and criminality produced by capitalism and the Anthropocene—the aff is the opposite of rigorous social science**

**Hall 15**

Steve Hall (Professor of Criminology in the Social Futures Institute and co-founder of the Teesside Centre for Realist Criminology), “Revitalizing Criminological Theory: Towards a New Ultra-Realism.” Routledge. Pages 126-132. May 22, 2015. https://books.google.com/books?id=ZVasCQAAQBAJ&pg=PA128&lpg=PA128&dq=handguns+anthropocene&source=bl&ots=vuqcGOu0lo&sig=V0d\_VPMJAuiM6dcK0YPpg1YRszc&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiGmKekuK3MAhUit4MKHd0pCHAQ6AEIMjAD#v=onepage&q&f=false

**How do we approach the reality of our times?** Our brief synopsis of the empirical realm and what we can glimpse of the underlying real reasons for the so—called ‘crime decline’ tells us quite clearly that most of the factors behind it cannot be assumed to be positive or progressive. Are we therefore compelled to be dystopian? In a recent book on what he calls ‘realist criminology’, Roger Matthews reminds us that **‘[c]riminology has a long history of pessimism, impossibilism and dystopian images of the future**’ (2014: 52). However, pessimism, impossibilism and dystopian daydreaming are three very different terms, which, depending on how we interpret them, can be quite contradictory. **Dystopian thinking**, for instance, if it is in some way connected to a realistic appraisal of reality, **can negate impossibilism and** shake off **pessimism to spur the degree** and form **of social transformation required to prevent** the arrival of real **dystopia. Think,** for instance, **of** our **‘dystopian’ but** probably **realistic predictions of the terrible effects of global warming in the near future.** On the other hand, **liberalism's** peculiar **teleological** form of **utopian thinking — the idea that no matter what we see before us we are on the road to a good future anyway, so we should just carry on as we are — can relieve the pessimism and impossibilism we feel about social transformation** by dispelling it from our minds without having to make it real, which leaves our destiny hostage to fortune. **The current politics of crime data in the Western world** constantly ‘define down’ crime and harm and **understate underlying criminogenic conditions in order to maintain the mood of optimism** and political pragmatism. Thus, **we are to believe, the world can be transformed for the better without altering** the **fundamental structures**, processes and norms that constitute its economic, psychosocial and cultural foundations. Criminology is limited by the dual commands ‘don't look up, don't look down‘ (see Hall, 20l2h), which means that, in order to maintain optimism and pragmatism whilst avoiding realism and the return to real politics, it systematically avoids too much critical examination of the harm inflicted on others by the powerless ‘down there’ and the powerful ‘up there’, **The ‘global' network of criminal shadow-markets consists of global arteries of illegal trade** organized largely in cyber-space arid locale nodes that contain real people and markets. Let’s call the global markets the criminal cloud and the local markets criminal vortices. Ultra-realist **criminology should be driven by an acknowledgement or the need for rigorous investigations of the symptoms and the micro-causes in both realms, and the underlying macro-causal context they share.** There is a vast constellation of vortices that can be found in any impoverished town in poor debt-ridden developing countries, or any impoverished residential area in **the deindustrialized zones, where criminal markets are so seamlessly woven into everyday life** that very little activity registers on the statistical radar screen (Hall et al., 2008). The postmodern liberal—left have lived in hope of both the cloud and the vortices as the organic wellsprings of new communicative networks of people and new politics. Unfortunately both **are** post-political, neither immaterial illusions nor unyielding material reality but spaces **structured entirely by the ‘rules of the game‘ that capitalism lays down for everyone** (Coley and Lockwood, 2011). Capitalism thrives in the shadow—worlds or the clouds and the vortices, pushing security and profit and discarding those who are in any way dysfunctional to either. Coley and Lockwood (2011) posit the cloud as a monstrous machine or control, but this is a one-dimensional Deluezian analysis. Control simply prevents the libidinal economy, which has recently been further provoked and structured by capitalist markets and diffused throughout cyber-space, from going supernova. **On the dark web a vast array of commodities are instantly available, in reality for those who can afford them and in an endless procession of images for those who can’t; everything from sex and handguns to fake medicines** (Hall and Antoriopoulos, 2014: 2015). Rules change as they modify themselves to the expanding and proliferating libidinally-charged desires that energize the cloud and turn everything imaginable into commodities, business and profit. The cloud seeks the total conversion of all singularities into pure abstract exchange value. **However, the ‘rules of the game’ may exist in a third space beyond reality and illusion, but, because they structure and limit human action and politics, they produce very real consequences on a scale that ranges from material luxury for the wealthy elite down to a harmful existence of poverty**, debt, insecurity, depoliticization, enforced competitive individualism **and various forays into risky and alienating criminality for the ‘losers’ stranded at the bottom.** **In the Anthropocene age the problems we face are too big for our current liberal-democratic political and cultural systems to solve** (Zizek, 2010b). **Burgeoning criminal markets seamlessly woven into everyday life number amongst these problems, direct results of the marketization of labour and the struggle for status in the privatized economy** and post-social world or competitive individualism and revived tribalism. Redhead’s (2004) motion of claustropolitanism — based on Virilio's (2005) claim that **humanity increasingly wishes to get off the planet and leave behind the depleting, overcrowded, gridlocked and corrupt** neoliberal **world of mega-cities, resource wars, clamorous markets and petty consumerized struggles for social status** — contextualizes Atkinson’s (2014) notion of the ‘metropolitan cloud’ as the first actual step, both metaphorically and in some ways literally, in this process. In the vortices, the retreat of younger generations into subjectivity and fantasy is the pallid substitute for what the rich are beginning to do in reality. Jean Baudrillard (1993) might have been right when he said that it‘s all turning out like the script for a very bad science-fiction novel. Some of **the hyper-idealist frameworks currently emerging in criminological theory are little more than symptoms of that reaction. In essence this reactionary radical liberalism is a symptom of the hypermodern yearning for escapism, which, paradoxically, advocates not transformation but new modes of adaptive conformity to our inherited social, politico-economic and material circumstances.** Alain Badiou (2002) said something similar — at the moment, judging by the way we think and what we desire, **as disembodied subjects running away from reality we all**, as Redhead (2004) implies, **want to be ‘out of this world’** (see Hallward, 2006). One minute something is forbidden, the next permitted, the next celebrated and normalized. This constant bending of the rules is what passes for ‘transformative praxis' in late capitalism. Once feeding on resistance to the Ancien Regime, liberal—capitalism’s pursuit of freedom and enjoyment now feeds on innumerable disconnected moments of fleeting resistance to its own rules, and this incoherent resistance becomes hyper-conformity and, more importantly, motive energy. The rules adapt themselves to allow through, hopefully but never assuredly in sublimated forms, the constant exploitation, duplicity and criminality that saturate the new virtual and real criminal markets. But some forms of crime that require real harms for the consumer's enjoyment, such as child abuse and fake pharmaceutical distribution, cannot be permanently sublimated because the gratification of the drives and desires behind them at some point demand acting out in the physical world. If Marx (1990) was right that in the market of exchange—value commodities are ungrounded insofar as they can establish their values only in relation to die market values of other commodities, and if Veblen (1994) was right that the conspicuous consumption of such commodities defines group status, the game jouissance reaches new extremes as limits are transgressed and rules are relaxed to the extent that they might as well not exist. The pseudo-pacification process must now operate at peak efficiency to contain the explosion of libido, the modulation of affects in what John Wyndham once called the ‘wild riot of pointless imaginings’ (in Coley and Lockwood, 2011: 86). This is not pointless to consumer capitalism, though, as the ‘wild riot’ of desires is systematically and relentlessly commodified. Currently establishing themselves down there in the vortices and up there in the cloud, and largely off the statistical radar, pure, unregulated, criminogenic and zemiogenic libertarian marketplaces await our new orders. In this simultaneously seductive and threatening climate, control and security become desires not imposed on free individuals but motivated by the subject's fear of its own libidinal excess, of just how far the individual — and, he suspects with great trepidation, everyone else too — is willing to go in the pursuit of jouissance, the pleasure that in its excess becomes painful and destructive. Biopolitics, the management of the system and its politically inert yet libidinally active bodies, is not the malign yet productive force or Foucault's (1998) biopower. Foucault’s term is redundant. Biopower no longer exists, if it ever did; it was the fundamental and impossible control fantasy of a bygone age (Baudrillard, 2007). **We now see the anxious post-disciplinary subject** (see Berardi, 2009) **actively seeking the comfort of the biopolitics regime. The majority actively solicit the system‘s symbolic order, the order of exchange value and its attendant security systems, as they sense themselves as vulnerable, isolated individuals in a competitive market.** They remain inspired by capitalism’s consumerist imaginary, yet scared of failing to compete and win or, if they do, having their rewards taken away from them by those who do not play strictly by the rules of the game. In this psychosocial energy trap (see Hall et al., 2008), realism is about neither optimism not pessimism, utopia or dystopia, impossibilism or the naive idealism and realism which, as we have seen, are two sides of the same liberal coin, Realism is about identifying and analyzing the human drives and activities behind the abstract forces that structure the capitalist system, and evaluating their consequences with as much integrity and honesty as possible. Whether the picture is inclined towards utopianism or dystopianism should not matter to a genuine critical realist. Empiricism is used by liberal-capitalism’s powerful ideological forces to convince us that there are problems but nothing too difficult to manage within the political limits set by our current system of parliamentary democracy and social administration. The system’s elite spokespeople are lauded and remunerated well for giving this established form of utopianism as much credibility as possible. For instance, the Harvard linguist Steven Pinker, in a best-selling pan-historical work called The Better Angels of our Nature (2012), blends dubious empiricist pseudo-science with teleological prophecy to stop only just short of telling us that liberal-capitalism is leading us into the Promised Land at the End of History. To manifest this dream all we have to do is carry on as normal and keep trying to be as nice as possible as we communicate with each other. Pinker's professional liberal optimism is founded upon an aversion to universal authority, which must be opposed, we are told, by a love of individual freedom and diversity. Ever since cultural pluralism and pragmatism were established as the foundations or American liberal thought in the early twentieth century, the aversion to universalism has been a motif in liberal thought (Hall, 2012a). Existentialist criminologist Ronnie Lippens (2013: 65) avers that ‘Paul's universalism, admired by 21st century critics such as Slavoj Zizek, engendered a life denying, very rigid, very divisive form of life’. Zizek’s riposte to this standard liberal-postmodernist critique is well-known — such universalism actually gives positive permission for forms of life to flourish and negate rigid structures, whereas liberal-postmodernist negates the negation to leave the current divisive order intact. Of more direct interest to criminologists, however, is Dews’ (2008) response. He counters this sort of quintessential liberal-postmodernist sentiment — born of the deep fear of order and what it might impose upon the morsels of conditional freedom we believe we have won — by asking why we have to tolerate the destructive forms of life that consistently emerge to ‘affirm' and establish themselves at various points in the social order. We have to take this issue further. Why do the majority of individuals actively collude in the maintenance of a supposedly liberal system that reproduces the rigid, divisive and destructive forms of life that Dews points out, and why do they tolerate the harm it has caused and continues to cause across the generations? Perhaps this is the fundamental political question ultra-realism can begin to answer. To do this would require nothing less than a paradigm shift, a new sociological and criminological paradigm founded not on moral constructivism, relativism, radical indeterminacy and idealism, but on universal notions of harm and ultra-realist representations of the operational actualities and consequences of the subject’s disavowed drives and desires, which activate the abstract structures, forces and processes that are the dynamic foundations of our lives in the liberal-capitalist system. Such a project would require international ultra-realist ethnographic networks to challenge and displace the statistical survey industry, and a collective theory project based on the principles provided by transcendental materialism. It would **leave no stone unturned in the intellectual project of representing to the best of our ability where we are right now, historical point A, which would give us clues as to what we need to do to move to historical point B. The social technicians and reformers of the biopolitics regime who now dominate liberal intellectual life simply tell us how to make life more comfortable at point A. This is neither true philosophy nor true social science**, and it maroons us in a position where all criminology is in one way or another administrative criminology.

**The apocalypse is not something to be prevented but recognized as ongoing – we need to cut our losses and ensure we don’t harm the biosphere more than we have already. This new context of the anthropocene means we have new political responsibilities towards the non-human world that come before ourselves**

**Swyngedouw 13**

Erik Swyngedouw (Professor of Geography at the School of Environment and Development at University of Manchester Lewis), “Apocalypse Now! Fear and Doomsday Pleasures,” *Symposium on Apocalypse*. Published 02/06/2013.

Against this cynical stand, the third, and for me proper, leftist response to the apocalyptic imaginary is twofold and cuts through the deadlock embodied by the first two responses. To begin with, **the revelatory promise of the apocalyptic narrative has to be fully rejected. In the face of the cataclysmic imaginaries mobilized to assure that the apocalypse will NOT happen (if the right techno-managerial actions are taken**), **the only reasonable response is** ‘‘Don’t worry (Al Gore, Prince Charles, many environmental activists....), you are really right, the environmental apocalypse WILL not only happen, it has already happened, **IT IS ALREADY HERE.**’’ **Many are already living in the post-apocalyptic interstices of life**, whereby the fusion of environmental transformation and social conditions, render life‘‘bare.’’ The fact that the socio-environmental imbroglio has already passed the point of no return has to be fully asserted. **The socio-environmental Armageddon is already here for many; it is not some distant dystopian promise mobilized to trigger response today. Water conflicts, struggles for food, environmental refugees**, etc. **testify to the socio-ecological predicament that choreographs everyday life for the majority of the world’s population.** **Things are already too late**; **they have always already been too late.** There is no Arcadian place, time, or environment to return to, no benign socio-ecological past that needs to be maintained or stabilized. Many already live in the interstices of the apocalypse, albeit a combined and uneven one. It is only within the realization of the apocalyptic reality of the now that a new politics might emerge. The second gesture of a proper leftist response is to reverse the order between the universal and the particular that today dominates the catastrophic political imaginary. This order maintains that salvaging the particular historical-geographical configuration we are in depends on re-thinking and re-framing the human environment articulation in a universal sense. We have to change our relationship with nature so that capitalism can continue somehow. **Not only does this argument to preserve capitalism guarantee the prolongation of the combined and uneven apocalypse of the present, it forecloses considering fundamental change to the actually existing unequal forms of organizing the society-environment relations.** Indeed, **the apocalyptic imaginary is one that generally still holds on to a dualistic view of nature and culture.** **The argument is built on the view that humans have perturbed the ecological dynamic balance in ways inimical to human** (and possibly non-human**) long-term survival, and the solution consists broadly in bringing humans** (in a universal sense**) back in line with the possibilities and constraints imposed by ecological limits and dynamics**. A universal transformation is required in order to maintain the present. And this can and should be done through managing the present particular configuration. This is the message of Al Gore or Prince Charles and many other environmental pundits. A left socio-environmental perspective has to insist that we need to transform this universal message into a particular one. The historically and geographically specific dynamics of capitalism have banned an external nature radically to a sphere beyond earth. On earth, **there is no external nature left**. It is from this particular historical-geographical configuration that a radical politics of transformation has to be thought and practiced. Only through the transformation of the particular socio-ecological relations of capitalism can a generic egalitarian, free, and common re-ordering of the human/non-human imbroglios be forged. Those who already recognized the irreversible dynamics of the socio-environ mental imbroglio that has been forged over the past few centuries coined a new term to classify the epoch we are in. ‘‘**Welcome to the Anthropocene’’ became a popular catch-phrase to inform us that we are now in a new geological era, one in which humans are co-producers of the deep geological time** that hitherto had slowly grinded away irrespective of humans’ dabbling with the surface layers of earth, oceans, and atmosphere. Noble prize-winning chemist Paul Crutzen introduced ‘‘the Anthropocene,’’ coined about a decade ago as the successor name of the Holocene, the relatively benign geo-climatic period that allegedly permitted agriculture to flourish, cities to be formed, and humans to thrive (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000). Since the beginning of industrialization, so the Anthropocenic argument goes, humans’ increasing interactions with their physical conditions of existence have resulted in a qualitative shift in geo-climatic acting of the earth system. **The Anthropocene is nothing else than the geological name for capitalism WITH nature**. **Acidification of oceans, biodiversity transformations, gene displacements** and recombinations, **climate change**, big infrastructures effecting the earth’s geodetic dynamics, among others, resulted in knotting together **‘‘natural’’ and ‘‘social’’ processes such that humans have become active agents in co-shaping earth’s deep geological time**. Now that the era has been named as the Anthropocene, we can argue at length over its meaning, content, existence, and possible modes of engagement. Nonetheless, it affirms that **humans and nature are co-produced and that the particular historical epoch that goes under the name of capitalism forged this mutual determination**. **The Anthropocene is just another name for insisting on Nature’s death.** This cannot be unmade, however hard we try. The past is forever closed and the future including nature’s future\*is radically open, up for grabs. Indeed**, the affirmation of the historical-geographical co-production of society WITH nature radically politicizes nature, makes nature enter into the domain of contested socio-physical relations and assemblages**. We cannot escape‘ ‘producing nature’’; rather, it forces us to make choices about what socio-natural worlds we wish to inhabit. It is from this particular position, therefore, that the **environmental conundrum ought to be approached so that a qualitative transformation of BOTH society AND nature has to be envisaged. This perspective moves the gaze from thinking through a ‘‘politics of the environment’’ to ‘‘politicizing the environment’’** (Swyngedouw 2011; 2012). **The human world is now an active agent in shaping the non-human world**. **This extends the terrain of the political to domains hitherto left to the mechanics of nature. The non-human world becomes ‘‘enrolled’’ in a process of politicization**. And that is precisely what needs to be fully endorsed. **The Anthropocene opens up a terrain whereby different natures can be contemplated and actually co-produced.** And the struggle over these trajectories and, from a leftist perspective, the process of the egalitarian socio-ecological production of the commons of life is precisely what our politics are all about. Yes, the apocalypse is already here, but do not despair, let us fully endorse the emancipatory possibilities of apocalyptic life. Perhaps we should modify the now over-worked statement of the Italian Marxist Amadeo Bordiga that ‘‘if the ship goes down, the first-class passengers drown too.’’ Amadeo was plainly wrong. Remember the movie Titanic (as well as the real catastrophe). A large number of the first-class passengers found a lifeboat; the others were trapped in the belly of the beast. Indeed the social and ecological catastrophe we are already in is not shared equally. While the elites fear both economic and ecological collapse, the consequences and implications are highly uneven. The elite’s fears are indeed only matched by the actually existing socio-ecological and economic catastrophes many already live in. The apocalypse is combined and uneven. And it is within this reality that political choices have to be made and sides taken.

**The alternative is to learn how to die gracefully. The end is near with no tinfoil hats in sight, we either die in fear or live authentically and try our best to leave Earth intact. That starts with rejecting the shortsighted human-centric politics of the aff.**

**Scranton 13**

Roy Scranton (Served in the United States Army from 2002 to 2006. He is a doctoral candidate in English at Princeton University, and co-editor of “[Fire and Forget: Short Stories from the Long War](http://www.fireandforgetbook.com/).” He has written for The New York Times, Boston Review, Theory & Event and recently completed a novel about the Iraq War), “Learning How to Die in the Anthropocene”; November 10, 2013; <http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/10/learning-how-to-die-in-the-anthropocene/?_r=0>

**There’s a word for this new era we live in: the Anthropocene**. This term, taken up by [geologists](http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/369/1938/835.abstract), [pondered by intellectuals](http://www.livingbooksaboutlife.org/books/Extinction) and discussed in the pages of publications such as [The Economist](http://www.economist.com/node/18741749) and the [The New York Times](http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/05/19/the-age-of-anthropocene-should-we-worry), represents the idea that we have entered a new epoch in Earth’s geological history, one characterized by the arrival of the human species as a geological force. The Nobel-Prize-winning chemist Paul Crutzen coined the term in 2002, and it has steadily gained acceptance as evidence has increasingly mounted that the changes wrought by global warming will affect not just the world’s climate and biological diversity, but its very geology — and not just for a few centuries, but for millenniums. The geophysicist David Archer’s 2009 book, “[The Long Thaw: How Humans are Changing the Next 100,000 Years of Earth’s Climate](http://www.amazon.com/Long-Thaw-Changing-Climate-Essentials/dp/0691136548),” lays out a clear and concise argument for how huge concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and melting ice will radically transform the planet, beyond freak storms and warmer summers, beyond any foreseeable future.¶ The Stratigraphy Commission of the Geological Society of London — the scientists responsible for pinning the “golden spikes” that demarcate geological epochs such as the Pliocene, Pleistocene, and Holocene — have adopted the Anthropocene as a term deserving further consideration, [“significant on the scale of Earth history.”](http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/369/1938/1036.full)Working groups are discussing what level of geological time-scale it might be (an “epoch” like the Holocene, or merely an “age” like the Calabrian), and at what date we might say it began. The beginning of the Great Acceleration, in the middle of the 20th century? The beginning of the Industrial Revolution, around 1800? The advent of agriculture?¶ The challenge **the Anthropocene poses** is **a challenge not just** to national security, to food and energy markets, or **to our “way of life”** — though these challenges are all real, profound, and inescapable. **The greatest challenge the Anthropocene poses may be to our sense of what it means to be human**. Within 100 years — within three to five generations — we will face average temperatures 7 degrees Fahrenheit higher than today, rising seas at least three to 10 feet higher, and worldwide shifts in crop belts, growing seasons and population centers. Within a thousand years, unless we stop emitting greenhouse gases wholesale right now, humans will be living in a climate the Earth hasn’t seen since the Pliocene, three million years ago, when oceans were 75 feethigher than they are today. **We face the imminent collapse of the agricultural, shipping and energy networks upon which the global economy depends, a large-scale die-off in the biosphere that’s already well on its way, and our own possible extinction. I**f homo sapiens (or some genetically modified variant) survives the next millenniums, it will be survival in a world unrecognizably different from the one we have inhabited.¶ Geological time scales, civilizational collapse and **species extinction give rise to profound problems that** humanities **scholars** and academic philosophers, with their taste for fine-grained analysis, esoteric debates and archival marginalia, might **seem remarkably ill suited to address.** After all, **how will** thinking about **Kant help us trap carbon dioxide?** **Can arguments between object-oriented ontology and historical materialism protect honeybees from colony collapse disorder?** Are ancient Greek philosophers, medieval theologians, and contemporary metaphysicians going to keep Bangladesh from being inundated by rising oceans?¶ Of course not. **But the biggest problems the Anthropocene poses are precisely those that have always been at the root of humanistic and philosophical questioning: “What does it mean to be human?” and “What does it mean to live?”** In the epoch of the Anthropocene, the question of individual mortality — **“What does my life mean in the face of death?”** — is universalized and framed in scales that boggle the imagination. What does human existence mean against 100,000 years of climate change? What does one life mean in the face of species death or the collapse of global civilization? How do we make meaningful choices in the shadow of our inevitable end?¶ These questions have no logical or empirical answers. **They are philosophical problems** par excellence. Many thinkers, including Cicero, Montaigne, Karl Jaspers, and The Stone’s own Simon Critchley, have argued that studying philosophy is learning how to die. If that’s true, then we have entered humanity’s most philosophical age — for this is precisely the problem of the Anthropocene. **The rub is that now we have to learn how to die not as individuals, but as a civilization**.¶ III.¶ **Learning how to die isn’t easy. In Iraq, at the beginning, I was terrified by the idea.** Baghdad seemed incredibly dangerous, even though statistically I was pretty safe. We got shot at and mortared, and I.E.D.’s laced every highway, but I had good armor, we had a great medic, and we were part of the most powerful military the world had ever seen. The odds were good I would come home. Maybe wounded, but probably alive. Every day I went out on mission, though, I looked down the barrel of the future and saw a dark, empty hole.¶ “For the soldier death is the future, the future his profession assigns him,” wrote Simone Weil in her remarkable meditation on war, “The Iliad or the Poem of Force.” “Yet the idea of man’s having death for a future is abhorrent to nature. Once the experience of war makes visible the possibility of death that lies locked up in each moment, our thoughts cannot travel from one day to the next without meeting death’s face.” That was the face I saw in the mirror, and its gaze nearly paralyzed me.¶ I found my way forward through an 18th-century Samurai manual, Yamamoto Tsunetomo’s “Hagakure,” which commanded: “**Meditation on inevitable death should be performed daily.” Instead of fearing my end, I owned it**. Every morning, after doing maintenance on my Humvee, I’d imagine getting blown up by an I.E.D., shot by a sniper, burned to death, run over by a tank, torn apart by dogs, captured and beheaded, and succumbing to dysentery. Then, before we rolled out through the gate, **I’d tell myself that I didn’t need to worry, because I was already dead**. The only thing that mattered was that I did my best to make sure everyone else came back alive. “If by setting one’s heart right every morning and evening, one is able to live as though his body were already dead,” wrote Tsunetomo, “he gains freedom in the Way.”¶ I got through my tour in Iraq one day at a time, meditating each morning on my inevitable end. When I left Iraq and came back stateside, I thought I’d left that future behind. Then I saw it come home in the chaos that was unleashed after Katrina hit New Orleans. And then I saw it again when Sandy battered New York and New Jersey: Government agencies [failed to move quickly enough](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/nyregion/new-york-city-housing-agency-was-overwhelmed-after-storm.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0), and [volunteer groups like Team Rubicon had to step in](http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/politics/2012/12/6900518/gap-citys-hurricane-response-and-volunteer-armys-attempt-fill-it) to manage disaster relief.¶ **Now, when I look into our future — into the Anthropocene — I see water rising up to wash out lower Manhattan. I see food riots, hurricanes, and climate refugees. I see 82nd Airborne soldiers shooting looters. I see grid failure, wrecked harbors, Fukushima waste, and plagues. I see Baghdad.** I see the Rockaways. I see a strange, precarious world.¶ Our new home.¶ **The human psyche naturally rebels against the idea of its end.** Likewise, civilizations have throughout history marched blindly toward disaster, because humans are wired to believe that tomorrow will be much like today — it is unnatural for us to think that this way of life, this present moment, this order of things is not stable and permanent. Across the world today, our actions testify to our belief that we can go on like this forever, burning oil, poisoning the seas, killing off other species, pumping carbon into the air, ignoring the ominous silence of our coal mine canaries in favor of the unending robotic tweets of our new digital imaginarium. Yet the reality of global climate change is going to keep intruding on our fantasies of perpetual growth, permanent innovation and endless energy, just as the reality of mortality shocks our casual faith in permanence.¶ The biggest problem climate change poses isn’t how the Department of Defense should plan for resource wars, or how we should put up sea walls to protect Alphabet City, or when we should evacuate Hoboken. **It won’t be addressed by buying a Prius, signing a treaty, or turning off the air-conditioning. The biggest problem we face is a philosophical one: understanding that this civilization is already dead.** **The sooner we confront this problem, and the sooner we realize there’s nothing we can do to save ourselves, the sooner we can get down to the hard work of adapting, with mortal humility, to our new reality**.¶ The choice is a clear one. **We can continue acting as if tomorrow will be just like yesterday, growing less and less prepared for each new disaster as it comes, and more and more desperately invested in a life we can’t sustain. Or we can learn to see each day as the death of what came before, freeing ourselves to deal with whatever problems the present offers without attachment or fear. If we want to learn to live in the Anthropocene, we must first learn how to die.**

**The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who provides the best method to reframe humanities relationship to nature. The imminence of the anthropocene makes this our foremost educational responsibility. Ecological Thoughtprint 11**

Ecological Thoughtprint (website for educators that promote sustainability education and teach ecological epistemology) “Dualism doesn’t make sense” December 4, 2011. https://ecologicalthoughtprint.org/2011/12/04/dualism-doesnt-make-sense/

Have you ever asked someone, “Where **is Nature?** Where is the environment?”  How do you think they would respond?  How would you respond? One icy afternoon, **from the heated confines of a classroom, I asked this same question.  Student after student repeated a similar motion.  “There,” they said, immediately pointing across the room to the half-frosted window.  “Out there.”** Through the third-storey window we could see frozen oak leaves fallen from near-barren branches, sailing through the air until they softly landed in rolling hills of rust, amber and gold.  Further out, the inlet waters lapped at decaying logs washed up on the rocks.  Glimmers of winter sunlight peeked out from the edge of heavy grey clouds. I turned back to the students.  “Okay, what about in here?” I asked, waving my hands around the room.  “Is this Nature too?” They exchanged puzzled looks.  A few shook their heads in firm disagreement, glancing at the tightly sealed glass window. I continued.  “Think about your body.  Your breathing.  Air is flowing in and out.  Where is the air coming from?  Where is it going?  If we open the window, what then?  Is ‘Nature’ coming in?  What if we were to go outside to a tree and pick an apple and eat it?  You would say the apple is part of Nature, right?  What about as it enters your mouth, as you bite, as you chew, swallow, digest, and absorb?  The apple is in you — did the Nature-part of the apple disappear?  Or is it still there?  Is Nature in you?  Is Nature now a part of you?” Taking a step back, I looked at the entire class.  “Conversely, are you a part of Nature?” **Blurring the boundary. What I hoped is that students would begin to question a deep-seeded modern way of thinking known as dualism**.  **From a dualistic worldview, there is a clear division between the human world and natural world.** A concrete building is regarded as soundly in the human domain while a mountain is relegated to the realm of Nature — no matter that they are both composed from common aggregates of rock and minerals.  A pencil is of humans while a tree is of Nature — no matter that they share an “ancestry” of materials.  In this way of thinking, humans are seen as largely autonomous from the rest of the natural world; the environment is simply that— environs — one’s surroundings, that which lays around at a distance but not within. **Whether through logic or intuition, upon examination the apparent separation between humans and Nature holds little truth.  As living beings, we are each conceived through the physical union of two “outsiders”, upon which the genesis for our individual lives grows in complete dependence on its mother-environment.**  During development in the womb, there is never a precise dividing line between fetus and mother.  The two are fused.  Even upon birth, in which we might think of an infant being separated from its creator and thrust out into the larger environment, the child’s complete reliance upon the parent’s protection, direct nutrients and physical comfort sustains this unyielding connection.  **Even as a child grows and develops, understanding her place in the world, she naturally maintains this sense of interconnectedness — that even as an individual she is an integral part of a grand system of life. It is only in certain cultures where this intuitive sense of connection is driven away.**  These are the cultures rooted in the **modern ecological thoughtprint.  In this industrial worldview, where we seek convenient and self-serving ways of thinking to legitimize our destructive behaviours toward the more-than-human world, a belief in the dualism of humanity and Nature is forced upon our youth.**  Expanding urban life in cement cities reinforces the false understanding that Nature is “out there” and that human life is independent of all ecological support.  As David Suzuki recounts, we can live in air-conditioned boxes in the sky, be whisked down elevators to our air-conditioned cars in sealed parking garages, drive to underground garages at our workplaces and then up and away to air-conditioned offices connected directly to shopping malls — gaining the ability to go weeks with leaving the “inside” world. Where do we get food?  The grocery store.  Where does our energy come from?  The outlet in the wall.  Where does our water come from?  Pipes.  What about our waste and garbage?  It gets taken to this magical place called “Away”.  Placing the sources of our sustenance out of clear sight relieves us of the daily need to recognize our intractable dependence on Nature.  We are, in effect, **exporting reality**. **Schools continue to hammer out holism — the belief that all is connected — through a sole emphasis on reason and categorical thinking.  In secondary education and beyond, we clearly define different subject areas — science, history, art, language — and then further subdivide these, asserting that knowledge is readily compartmentalized with little interaction between.  “Environment” is often relegated to science, where Nature tends to be dissected, devalued, and converted to a cold, lifeless, logical arrangement of compounds and governing laws.** While ecology lessons may teach simplistic food webs and food chains, it is the rare student (usually one who does not thrive in the academic world, for which they are punished) who resolutely preserves his intuitive sense of the endlessly complex interdependence of all of Creation, with himself included in the mix.Finally, it is our modern consumer products themselves which serve to propagate the illusion of dualism.  Plastic, for example, has a powerful property in that we cannot readily see — or even imagine — what elements of Nature have gone into its construction.  Our buildings are similar; uniform processed particle board and monotonous metallic infusions are mysterious materials seemingly born not out of the natural world but out of some autonomous synthetic factory in a distant industrial land.

### 1NC (Util) – We’re Fucked Already

#### Coming to the TOC, I’m confused as to why we’re debating handguns when there is a much larger issue at hand. Welcome to the Anthropocene, where extinction lurks behind every corner. Ecological extinction is inevitable and irreversible and the aff’s obsession with the redemption of the human narrative ensures that we will never even notice us plummeting towards our own demise and paves over the destruction of the biosphere that we have created. The aff’s focus on stopping extinction fails to see the forest through the quickly disappearing trees.

#### Cohen 12

Tom Cohen (Professor of Literary, Cultural, and Media Studies at University of Albany), “Murmurations—“Climate Change” and the Defacement of Theory”, Telemorphosis: Theory in the Era of Climate Change, Vol. 1.

**Warnings regarding the planet earth’s imminent depletion of reserves or “life as we know it” arrive today more as routine tweets than events** that might give us pause, particularly as the current wars over global “sovereign debt” and economic “crises” swamp attention. The intensifying specter of megadebt—**at a time of “peak everything”** (peak water, peak oil, peak humans)—dumped into a future despoiled of reserves and earning capacity has a specific relation to this white-out—**the “economical” and “ecological” tandem shifts all attention to the first term** (or first “eco”). In a post-global present consolidating what is routinely remarked as a neo-feudal order, the titanic shift of hyperwealth to the corporatist few (the so-called 1%) sets the stage for a shift to control societies anticipat- ing social disruption and the implications of “Occupy” style eruptions— concerning which the U.S. congress hastily passed new unconstitutional rules to apprehend citizens or take down websites. **The** Ponzi scheme **logics of twenty-first century earthscapes** portray an array of time-bubbles, catastrophic deferrals, telecratic capture, and a voracious present that seems to **practice a sort of** tempophagy on itself corresponding with its structural premise of hyper-consumption and perpetual “growth. The supposed urgencies of threatened economic and monetary “collapse” occlude and defer any attention to the imperatives of the biosphere, but this apparent pause or deferral of attention covers over an irreversible mutation. **A new phase of unsustainability appears in which a faux status quo** ante **appears to will to sustain itself as long as possible and at whatever cost;** the event of the twenty-first century is that there will be no event, that no crisis will disturb the expansion of consumption beyond all supposed limits or peaks.In such an environment other materialities emerge, reference systems default, and the legacies of anthropo-narcissm go into overdrive in mechanical ways. Supposedly advanced or post-theory theory is no exception**—**claiming on the one hand ever more verdant comings together of redemptive communities, anddiscretely restoringmanyphenomenological tropes that 20th century thought had displaced. This has been characterized as an unfolding eco-eco disaster—a complex at once eco- nomic and ecological.1 The logics of the double oikos appear, today, caught in a self-feeding default. The present volume, in diverse ways, reclaims a certain violence that has seemed occluded or anaesthetized (it is a “present,” after all, palpably beyond “tipping points” yet shy of their fully arrived implications— hence the pop proliferation of “zombie” metaphors: zombie banks, zom- bie politics, zombie “theory”). It departs from a problem inherent in the “eco” as a metaphoric complex, that of the home (oikos), and the suicidal fashion in which this supposed proper ground recuperates itself from a nonexistent position. The figure of an ecology that is ours and that must be saved precludes us from confronting the displacement and dispossession which conditions all production, including the production of home- lands. Memory **regimes have insistently**, silently and anonymously **prolonged and defended the construct of “homeland security” (both in its political sense, and in the epistemological sense of being secure in our modes of cognition),** **but** these systems of security have in fact accelerated the vortices of ecocatastrophic imaginaries. If a double logic of eco-eco disaster overlaps with the epoch in deep time geologists now refer to as the “anthropocene,” what critical reorientations, today, contest what has been characterized as a collective blind or psychotic foreclosure? Nor can one place the blame at the feet alone of an accidental and evil ‘1%’ of corporate culture alone, since an old style revolutionary model does not emerge from this exitless network of sys- tems. More interesting is the way that ‘theory’, with its nostalgic agendas for a properly political world of genuine praxis or feeling has been com- plicit in its fashion. How might one read the implicit, unseen collabora- tion that critical agendas coming out of twentieth century master-texts unwittingly maintained with the accelerated trajectories in question? The mesmerizing **fixation with** **cultural histories, the ethics of “others,”** the enhancement of subjectivities, **“human rights” and institutions of power** not only partook of this occlusion but ‘we theorists’ have **deferred addressing biospheric collapse,** mass extinction events, or the implications of resource wars and “population” culling. It is our sense of justified propriety—our defense of cultures, affects, bodies and others—that allows us to remain secure in our homeland, unaware of all the ruses that maintain that spurious home. The rapacious present places the hidden metaphoric levers of the eco or oikos in an unsustainable exponential curve, compounding megadebt upon itself, and consuming futures in what has been portrayed as a sort of psychotic trance—what Hillis Miller calls, in this volume, a suicidal “auto-co-immunity” track.2 Yet the “Sovereign debt crisis” corresponds to a credibility crisis as well. The latter applies not only to the political classes of the post-democratic klepto-telecracies of the West but seems to taint the critical concepts, agendas, and terms received from twentieth-century itineraries that accompanied the last decades and that persist as currency. Far from opening beyond the propriety of the oikos theories of affect, living labor and critical legacies have doubled down on their investments, created guilds as reluctant as Wall St. to give up cognitive capital. All the while there is attention paid to ‘saving’ the humanities or a critical industry that might be extended for a while longer (as if with “sovereignty” itself). Bruno Latour [2010] presumes to call this recent and ongoing episode the “Modernist parenthesis” of thought. In his conjec- ture, the very pre-occupation with human on human histories, cultural- ism, archivism, and the institutions of power were complicit with a larger blind that, in his view, the ecological crisis belatedly discloses.3 At the moment of writing it is common to point to the 2011 “occupy” movement, viral and cloud-like, as the Bartlebyesque counter to a total- ization of the systems of this control. Bartleby has become the figure for a rejection of end-fixated production. Were one able to speak of an occupy movement applied to critical concepts and twentieth century derived idioms one might imagine a call to occupy critical theory and conceptual networks—but with what interruption of received programs (“Sovereign debt”), what alternative materialities, what purported “ethics” involving commodified futures (and the structure of debt), what mnemotechnics, and with resistance to what power, if it is the oikos itself, the metaphoric chimera and its capture of late anthropocene imaginaries that is at is- sue? This is one of the implications of what this volume terms telemor- phosis, the intricacy by which referential regimes, memory, and reading, participate in these twenty-first century disclosures. The occupy motif, at the moment, sets itself against a totalization or experience of foreclo- sure—political, mediacratic, financial, cognitive. Various strategies ap- pearing in this volume involve what could equally be called a disoccupy logic or meme. Such a logic of disoccupation assumes that the domain in question is already saturated, occupied in the militarist sense by a program that, un- wittingly, persists in the acceleration of destruction and takeover. Critical thought of recent decades would have walked hand in hand with the cur- rent foreclosures. The explication of ecocatastrophic logics, accordingly, are not found in Foucault nor, surprisingly, Derrida. Timothy Morton’s Ecology without Nature is one such effort at disoccupation—seeking to void the two terms of the title, and in the process disrupt the “revised organicisms” of contemporary critical schools which, he argues, have managed to lapse into sophisticated pre-critical modes not unrelated to a more general inertia. **The meme of disoccupation resonates**, for instance, **with** what Robert Markley in this volume proposes as **a practice of “disidentification**,” and is implied by Timothy Clark’s tracking of a “derangement of scale**” in the perpetual cognitive disjunctures that come up against the ecocatastrophic present. One would disoccupy the figure of subjectivity,** refusing not only the comfort**ing commodifications of “the other”** in cultural theory, but also the later moral appeals to other redemptive beings, such as the animal (as Joanna Zylinska argues with regard to post-humanism and its “animal studies”). What might be disoccupied would be the meta- phorics of the home, even where the latter would sustain itself today in cherished terms like trauma, affect, alterity, embodiment, or even culture. Yet a refusal of supposed redemptive ‘outsides’ to capitalism does not lead to a place of critical purity beyond the implied moralism of ‘occupy’ but the return of, and orientation to, a violence before which no model of sovereignty can be sustained. To imagine that one might disoccupy by refusing all the supposed redemptive ‘outsides’ to capitalism is not to find a place of critical purity beyond the moralism of ‘occupy.’ Occupation is never simply takeover and appropriation, but always involves destruction of what it claims. The viral migration of the “occupy” motif involves a premise of disoccupation covertly. In the present volume this takes different forms. If one is now beyond tipping points in a zone of irreversibility, what corresponds to this as a critical injunction? Catherine Malabou sets aside the entire way the figure of trauma and the “always already” have organized time. Claire Colebrook affirms, rather than accepting as tragic, extinction as a point of departure for thought, which can be used to work against the organicist ideologies of the present (such as sexual difference). Martin McQuillan shifts the referential spectrum of discourse to “other materialities” in the hypothesis of a post-carbon thought, while Robert Markley tracks the in-flux of geological times that displace human narrative matrices. Bernard Stiegler voids the biopolitical model, which he sees as exceeded by “the third limit of Capitalism” (when it impinges on the biosphere). From that point of excess he strategizes a counter-stroke to the capture of attention by telecratic circuits, initiating a noopolitics. Joana Zylinska disoccupies, to continue this motif, the covert model of soft “otherness” by which animal studies has invented itself as an anthropo-colonianism. Like post- humanism generally, Zylinska argues, animal studies sustains its sub- jectal hegemonies. Hillis Miller locates a source for the ecocatastrophic imaginary in the blind insistence of “organicist” models of reading that sustain the comforts of the oikos. Against this hermeneutics of security Miller posits an “ecotechnics” that is at once machinal and linguistically based (where language is not communicative, but literal and inscriptive in a manner exemplified by Kafka’s Odradek). Justin Read displaces any biopolitical model, again, by relinquishing trauma, the oikos, survival and interiorities of any manner, instead describing the circulation of data (or the “unicity”) from which the only remaining political gesture would be oriented to the ecocatrastrophic. Jason Groves shifts the refer- ential screen from, again, a human-centered index to the viral textualism of (alien) species invasion, the global rewriting of bio-geographies. Mike Hill transitions to the alteration of atmospherics under the imaginary of climate war technologies in a new horizon of invisible wars (and wars on visibility), which today include not only nanotechnologies but also the “autogenic” turning of wars without discrete (national) enemies into suicidal rages against the “homeland”—a sort of, again, auto-occupation that is accelerating.

**The apocalypse is not something to be prevented but recognized as ongoing – we need to cut our losses and ensure we don’t harm the biosphere more than we have already. The new context of the anthropocene means we have new political responsibilities towards the non-human world.**

**Swyngedouw 13**

Erik Swyngedouw (Professor of Geography at the School of Environment and Development at University of Manchester Lewis), “Apocalypse Now! Fear and Doomsday Pleasures,” *Symposium on Apocalypse*. Published 02/06/2013.

Against this cynical stand, the third, and for me proper, leftist response to the apocalyptic imaginary is twofold and cuts through the deadlock embodied by the first two responses. To begin with, **the revelatory promise of the apocalyptic narrative has to be fully rejected. In the face of the cataclysmic imaginaries mobilized to assure that the apocalypse will NOT happen (if the right techno-managerial actions are taken**), **the only reasonable response is** ‘‘Don’t worry (Al Gore, Prince Charles, many environmental activists....), you are really right, the environmental apocalypse WILL not only happen, it has already happened, **IT IS ALREADY HERE.**’’ **Many are already living in the post-apocalyptic interstices of life**, whereby the fusion of environmental transformation and social conditions, render life‘‘bare.’’ The fact that the socio-environmental imbroglio has already passed the point of no return has to be fully asserted. **The socio-environmental Armageddon is already here for many; it is not some distant dystopian promise mobilized to trigger response today. Water conflicts, struggles for food, environmental refugees**, etc. **testify to the socio-ecological predicament that choreographs everyday life for the majority of the world’s population.** **Things are already too late**; **they have always already been too late.** There is no Arcadian place, time, or environment to return to, no benign socio-ecological past that needs to be maintained or stabilized. Many already live in the interstices of the apocalypse, albeit a combined and uneven one. It is only within the realization of the apocalyptic reality of the now that a new politics might emerge. The second gesture of a proper leftist response is to reverse the order between the universal and the particular that today dominates the catastrophic political imaginary. This order maintains that salvaging the particular historical-geographical configuration we are in depends on re-thinking and re-framing the human environment articulation in a universal sense. We have to change our relationship with nature so that capitalism can continue somehow. **Not only does this argument to preserve capitalism guarantee the prolongation of the combined and uneven apocalypse of the present, it forecloses considering fundamental change to the actually existing unequal forms of organizing the society-environment relations.** Indeed, **the apocalyptic imaginary is one that generally still holds on to a dualistic view of nature and culture.** **The argument is built on the view that humans have perturbed the ecological dynamic balance in ways inimical to human** (and possibly non-human**) long-term survival, and the solution consists broadly in bringing humans** (in a universal sense**) back in line with the possibilities and constraints imposed by ecological limits and dynamics**. A universal transformation is required in order to maintain the present. And this can and should be done through managing the present particular configuration. This is the message of Al Gore or Prince Charles and many other environmental pundits. A left socio-environmental perspective has to insist that we need to transform this universal message into a particular one. The historically and geographically specific dynamics of capitalism have banned an external nature radically to a sphere beyond earth. On earth, **there is no external nature left**. It is from this particular historical-geographical configuration that a radical politics of transformation has to be thought and practiced. Only through the transformation of the particular socio-ecological relations of capitalism can a generic egalitarian, free, and common re-ordering of the human/non-human imbroglios be forged. Those who already recognized the irreversible dynamics of the socio-environ mental imbroglio that has been forged over the past few centuries coined a new term to classify the epoch we are in. ‘‘**Welcome to the Anthropocene’’ became a popular catch-phrase to inform us that we are now in a new geological era, one in which humans are co-producers of the deep geological time** that hitherto had slowly grinded away irrespective of humans’ dabbling with the surface layers of earth, oceans, and atmosphere. Noble prize-winning chemist Paul Crutzen introduced ‘‘the Anthropocene,’’ coined about a decade ago as the successor name of the Holocene, the relatively benign geo-climatic period that allegedly permitted agriculture to flourish, cities to be formed, and humans to thrive (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000). Since the beginning of industrialization, so the Anthropocenic argument goes, humans’ increasing interactions with their physical conditions of existence have resulted in a qualitative shift in geo-climatic acting of the earth system. **The Anthropocene is nothing else than the geological name for capitalism WITH nature**. **Acidification of oceans, biodiversity transformations, gene displacements** and recombinations, **climate change**, big infrastructures effecting the earth’s geodetic dynamics, among others, resulted in knotting together **‘‘natural’’ and ‘‘social’’ processes such that humans have become active agents in co-shaping earth’s deep geological time**. Now that the era has been named as the Anthropocene, we can argue at length over its meaning, content, existence, and possible modes of engagement. Nonetheless, it affirms that **humans and nature are co-produced and that the particular historical epoch that goes under the name of capitalism forged this mutual determination**. **The Anthropocene is just another name for insisting on Nature’s death.** This cannot be unmade, however hard we try. The past is forever closed and the future including nature’s future\*is radically open, up for grabs. Indeed**, the affirmation of the historical-geographical co-production of society WITH nature radically politicizes nature, makes nature enter into the domain of contested socio-physical relations and assemblages**. We cannot escape‘ ‘producing nature’’; rather, it forces us to make choices about what socio-natural worlds we wish to inhabit. It is from this particular position, therefore, that the **environmental conundrum ought to be approached so that a qualitative transformation of BOTH society AND nature has to be envisaged. This perspective moves the gaze from thinking through a ‘‘politics of the environment’’ to ‘‘politicizing the environment’’** (Swyngedouw 2011; 2012). **The human world is now an active agent in shaping the non-human world**. **This extends the terrain of the political to domains hitherto left to the mechanics of nature. The non-human world becomes ‘‘enrolled’’ in a process of politicization**. And that is precisely what needs to be fully endorsed. **The Anthropocene opens up a terrain whereby different natures can be contemplated and actually co-produced.** And the struggle over these trajectories and, from a leftist perspective, the process of the egalitarian socio-ecological production of the commons of life is precisely what our politics are all about. Yes, the apocalypse is already here, but do not despair, let us fully endorse the emancipatory possibilities of apocalyptic life. Perhaps we should modify the now over-worked statement of the Italian Marxist Amadeo Bordiga that ‘‘if the ship goes down, the first-class passengers drown too.’’ Amadeo was plainly wrong. Remember the movie Titanic (as well as the real catastrophe). A large number of the first-class passengers found a lifeboat; the others were trapped in the belly of the beast. Indeed the social and ecological catastrophe we are already in is not shared equally. While the elites fear both economic and ecological collapse, the consequences and implications are highly uneven. The elite’s fears are indeed only matched by the actually existing socio-ecological and economic catastrophes many already live in. The apocalypse is combined and uneven. And it is within this reality that political choices have to be made and sides taken.

**The alternative is to learn how to die gracefully. The end is near with no tinfoil hats in sight, we either die in fear or live authentically and try our best to leave Earth intact. That starts with rejecting the shortsighted politics of the aff.**

**Scranton 13**

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**There’s a word for this new era we live in: the Anthropocene**. This term, taken up by [geologists](http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/369/1938/835.abstract), [pondered by intellectuals](http://www.livingbooksaboutlife.org/books/Extinction) and discussed in the pages of publications such as [The Economist](http://www.economist.com/node/18741749) and the [The New York Times](http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/05/19/the-age-of-anthropocene-should-we-worry), represents the idea that we have entered a new epoch in Earth’s geological history, one characterized by the arrival of the human species as a geological force. The Nobel-Prize-winning chemist Paul Crutzen coined the term in 2002, and it has steadily gained acceptance as evidence has increasingly mounted that the changes wrought by global warming will affect not just the world’s climate and biological diversity, but its very geology — and not just for a few centuries, but for millenniums. The geophysicist David Archer’s 2009 book, “[The Long Thaw: How Humans are Changing the Next 100,000 Years of Earth’s Climate](http://www.amazon.com/Long-Thaw-Changing-Climate-Essentials/dp/0691136548),” lays out a clear and concise argument for how huge concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and melting ice will radically transform the planet, beyond freak storms and warmer summers, beyond any foreseeable future.¶ The Stratigraphy Commission of the Geological Society of London — the scientists responsible for pinning the “golden spikes” that demarcate geological epochs such as the Pliocene, Pleistocene, and Holocene — have adopted the Anthropocene as a term deserving further consideration, [“significant on the scale of Earth history.”](http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/369/1938/1036.full)Working groups are discussing what level of geological time-scale it might be (an “epoch” like the Holocene, or merely an “age” like the Calabrian), and at what date we might say it began. The beginning of the Great Acceleration, in the middle of the 20th century? The beginning of the Industrial Revolution, around 1800? The advent of agriculture?¶ The challenge **the Anthropocene poses** is **a challenge not just** to national security, to food and energy markets, or **to our “way of life”** — though these challenges are all real, profound, and inescapable. **The greatest challenge the Anthropocene poses may be to our sense of what it means to be human**. Within 100 years — within three to five generations — we will face average temperatures 7 degrees Fahrenheit higher than today, rising seas at least three to 10 feet higher, and worldwide shifts in crop belts, growing seasons and population centers. Within a thousand years, unless we stop emitting greenhouse gases wholesale right now, humans will be living in a climate the Earth hasn’t seen since the Pliocene, three million years ago, when oceans were 75 feethigher than they are today. **We face the imminent collapse of the agricultural, shipping and energy networks upon which the global economy depends, a large-scale die-off in the biosphere that’s already well on its way, and our own possible extinction. I**f homo sapiens (or some genetically modified variant) survives the next millenniums, it will be survival in a world unrecognizably different from the one we have inhabited.¶ Geological time scales, civilizational collapse and **species extinction give rise to profound problems that** humanities **scholars** and academic philosophers, with their taste for fine-grained analysis, esoteric debates and archival marginalia, might **seem remarkably ill suited to address.** After all, **how will** thinking about **Kant help us trap carbon dioxide?** Can arguments between object-oriented ontology and historical materialism protect honeybees from colony collapse disorder? Are ancient Greek philosophers, medieval theologians, and contemporary metaphysicians going to keep Bangladesh from being inundated by rising oceans?¶ Of course not. **But the biggest problems the Anthropocene poses are precisely those that have always been at the root of humanistic and philosophical questioning: “What does it mean to be human?” and “What does it mean to live?”** In the epoch of the Anthropocene, the question of individual mortality — “What does my life mean in the face of death?” — is universalized and framed in scales that boggle the imagination. What does human existence mean against 100,000 years of climate change? What does one life mean in the face of species death or the collapse of global civilization? How do we make meaningful choices in the shadow of our inevitable end?¶ These questions have no logical or empirical answers. **They are philosophical problems** par excellence. Many thinkers, including Cicero, Montaigne, Karl Jaspers, and The Stone’s own Simon Critchley, have argued that studying philosophy is learning how to die. If that’s true, then we have entered humanity’s most philosophical age — for this is precisely the problem of the Anthropocene. **The rub is that now we have to learn how to die not as individuals, but as a civilization**.¶ III.¶ **Learning how to die isn’t easy. In Iraq, at the beginning, I was terrified by the idea.** Baghdad seemed incredibly dangerous, even though statistically I was pretty safe. We got shot at and mortared, and I.E.D.’s laced every highway, but I had good armor, we had a great medic, and we were part of the most powerful military the world had ever seen. The odds were good I would come home. Maybe wounded, but probably alive. Every day I went out on mission, though, I looked down the barrel of the future and saw a dark, empty hole.¶ “For the soldier death is the future, the future his profession assigns him,” wrote Simone Weil in her remarkable meditation on war, “The Iliad or the Poem of Force.” “Yet the idea of man’s having death for a future is abhorrent to nature. Once the experience of war makes visible the possibility of death that lies locked up in each moment, our thoughts cannot travel from one day to the next without meeting death’s face.” That was the face I saw in the mirror, and its gaze nearly paralyzed me.¶ I found my way forward through an 18th-century Samurai manual, Yamamoto Tsunetomo’s “Hagakure,” which commanded: “**Meditation on inevitable death should be performed daily.” Instead of fearing my end, I owned it**. Every morning, after doing maintenance on my Humvee, I’d imagine getting blown up by an I.E.D., shot by a sniper, burned to death, run over by a tank, torn apart by dogs, captured and beheaded, and succumbing to dysentery. Then, before we rolled out through the gate, **I’d tell myself that I didn’t need to worry, because I was already dead**. The only thing that mattered was that I did my best to make sure everyone else came back alive. “If by setting one’s heart right every morning and evening, one is able to live as though his body were already dead,” wrote Tsunetomo, “he gains freedom in the Way.”¶ I got through my tour in Iraq one day at a time, meditating each morning on my inevitable end. When I left Iraq and came back stateside, I thought I’d left that future behind. Then I saw it come home in the chaos that was unleashed after Katrina hit New Orleans. And then I saw it again when Sandy battered New York and New Jersey: Government agencies [failed to move quickly enough](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/nyregion/new-york-city-housing-agency-was-overwhelmed-after-storm.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0), and [volunteer groups like Team Rubicon had to step in](http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/politics/2012/12/6900518/gap-citys-hurricane-response-and-volunteer-armys-attempt-fill-it) to manage disaster relief.¶ **Now, when I look into our future — into the Anthropocene — I see water rising up to wash out lower Manhattan. I see food riots, hurricanes, and climate refugees. I see 82nd Airborne soldiers shooting looters. I see grid failure, wrecked harbors, Fukushima waste, and plagues. I see Baghdad.** I see the Rockaways. I see a strange, precarious world.¶ Our new home.¶ **The human psyche naturally rebels against the idea of its end.** Likewise, civilizations have throughout history marched blindly toward disaster, because humans are wired to believe that tomorrow will be much like today — it is unnatural for us to think that this way of life, this present moment, this order of things is not stable and permanent. Across the world today, our actions testify to our belief that we can go on like this forever, burning oil, poisoning the seas, killing off other species, pumping carbon into the air, ignoring the ominous silence of our coal mine canaries in favor of the unending robotic tweets of our new digital imaginarium. Yet the reality of global climate change is going to keep intruding on our fantasies of perpetual growth, permanent innovation and endless energy, just as the reality of mortality shocks our casual faith in permanence.¶ The biggest problem climate change poses isn’t how the Department of Defense should plan for resource wars, or how we should put up sea walls to protect Alphabet City, or when we should evacuate Hoboken. **It won’t be addressed by buying a Prius, signing a treaty, or turning off the air-conditioning. The biggest problem we face is a philosophical one: understanding that this civilization is already dead.** **The sooner we confront this problem, and the sooner we realize there’s nothing we can do to save ourselves, the sooner we can get down to the hard work of adapting, with mortal humility, to our new reality**.¶ The choice is a clear one. **We can continue acting as if tomorrow will be just like yesterday, growing less and less prepared for each new disaster as it comes, and more and more desperately invested in a life we can’t sustain. Or we can learn to see each day as the death of what came before, freeing ourselves to deal with whatever problems the present offers without attachment or fear. If we want to learn to live in the Anthropocene, we must first learn how to die.**

**The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who provides the best method to reframe humanities relationship to nature. The imminence of the anthropocene makes this our foremost educational responsibility. Ecological Thoughtprint 11**

Ecological Thoughtprint (website for educators that promote sustainability education and teach ecological epistemology) “Dualism doesn’t make sense” December 4, 2011. https://ecologicalthoughtprint.org/2011/12/04/dualism-doesnt-make-sense/

Have you ever asked someone, “Where **is Nature?** Where is the environment?”  How do you think they would respond?  How would you respond? One icy afternoon, **from the heated confines of a classroom, I asked this same question.  Student after student repeated a similar motion.  “There,” they said, immediately pointing across the room to the half-frosted window.  “Out there.”** Through the third-storey window we could see frozen oak leaves fallen from near-barren branches, sailing through the air until they softly landed in rolling hills of rust, amber and gold.  Further out, the inlet waters lapped at decaying logs washed up on the rocks.  Glimmers of winter sunlight peeked out from the edge of heavy grey clouds. I turned back to the students.  “Okay, what about in here?” I asked, waving my hands around the room.  “Is this Nature too?” They exchanged puzzled looks.  A few shook their heads in firm disagreement, glancing at the tightly sealed glass window. I continued.  “Think about your body.  Your breathing.  Air is flowing in and out.  Where is the air coming from?  Where is it going?  If we open the window, what then?  Is ‘Nature’ coming in?  What if we were to go outside to a tree and pick an apple and eat it?  You would say the apple is part of Nature, right?  What about as it enters your mouth, as you bite, as you chew, swallow, digest, and absorb?  The apple is in you — did the Nature-part of the apple disappear?  Or is it still there?  Is Nature in you?  Is Nature now a part of you?” Taking a step back, I looked at the entire class.  “Conversely, are you a part of Nature?” **Blurring the boundary. What I hoped is that students would begin to question a deep-seeded modern way of thinking known as dualism**.  **From a dualistic worldview, there is a clear division between the human world and natural world.** A concrete building is regarded as soundly in the human domain while a mountain is relegated to the realm of Nature — no matter that they are both composed from common aggregates of rock and minerals.  A pencil is of humans while a tree is of Nature — no matter that they share an “ancestry” of materials.  In this way of thinking, humans are seen as largely autonomous from the rest of the natural world; the environment is simply that— environs — one’s surroundings, that which lays around at a distance but not within. **Whether through logic or intuition, upon examination the apparent separation between humans and Nature holds little truth.  As living beings, we are each conceived through the physical union of two “outsiders”, upon which the genesis for our individual lives grows in complete dependence on its mother-environment.**  During development in the womb, there is never a precise dividing line between fetus and mother.  The two are fused.  Even upon birth, in which we might think of an infant being separated from its creator and thrust out into the larger environment, the child’s complete reliance upon the parent’s protection, direct nutrients and physical comfort sustains this unyielding connection.  **Even as a child grows and develops, understanding her place in the world, she naturally maintains this sense of interconnectedness — that even as an individual she is an integral part of a grand system of life. It is only in certain cultures where this intuitive sense of connection is driven away.**  These are the cultures rooted in the **modern ecological thoughtprint.  In this industrial worldview, where we seek convenient and self-serving ways of thinking to legitimize our destructive behaviours toward the more-than-human world, a belief in the dualism of humanity and Nature is forced upon our youth.**  Expanding urban life in cement cities reinforces the false understanding that Nature is “out there” and that human life is independent of all ecological support.  As David Suzuki recounts, we can live in air-conditioned boxes in the sky, be whisked down elevators to our air-conditioned cars in sealed parking garages, drive to underground garages at our workplaces and then up and away to air-conditioned offices connected directly to shopping malls — gaining the ability to go weeks with leaving the “inside” world. Where do we get food?  The grocery store.  Where does our energy come from?  The outlet in the wall.  Where does our water come from?  Pipes.  What about our waste and garbage?  It gets taken to this magical place called “Away”.  Placing the sources of our sustenance out of clear sight relieves us of the daily need to recognize our intractable dependence on Nature.  We are, in effect, **exporting reality**. **Schools continue to hammer out holism — the belief that all is connected — through a sole emphasis on reason and categorical thinking.  In secondary education and beyond, we clearly define different subject areas — science, history, art, language — and then further subdivide these, asserting that knowledge is readily compartmentalized with little interaction between.  “Environment” is often relegated to science, where Nature tends to be dissected, devalued, and converted to a cold, lifeless, logical arrangement of compounds and governing laws.** While ecology lessons may teach simplistic food webs and food chains, it is the rare student (usually one who does not thrive in the academic world, for which they are punished) who resolutely preserves his intuitive sense of the endlessly complex interdependence of all of Creation, with himself included in the mix.Finally, it is our modern consumer products themselves which serve to propagate the illusion of dualism.  Plastic, for example, has a powerful property in that we cannot readily see — or even imagine — what elements of Nature have gone into its construction.  Our buildings are similar; uniform processed particle board and monotonous metallic infusions are mysterious materials seemingly born not out of the natural world but out of some autonomous synthetic factory in a distant industrial land.

### 1NC (Util - Long) – We’re Fucked

#### Coming to the TOC, I’m confused as to why we’re debating handguns when there is a much larger issue at hand. Welcome to the Anthropocene, where extinction lurks behind every corner. Ecological extinction is inevitable and irreversible and the aff’s obsession with the redemption of the human narrative ensures that we will never even notice us plummeting towards our own demise and paves over the destruction of the biosphere that we have created. The aff’s focus on stopping extinction fails to see the forest through the quickly disappearing trees.

#### Cohen 12

Tom Cohen (Professor of Literary, Cultural, and Media Studies at University of Albany), “Murmurations—“Climate Change” and the Defacement of Theory”, Telemorphosis: Theory in the Era of Climate Change, Vol. 1.

**Warnings regarding the planet earth’s imminent depletion of reserves or “life as we know it” arrive today more as routine tweets than events** that might give us pause, particularly as the current wars over global “sovereign debt” and economic “crises” swamp attention. The intensifying specter of megadebt—**at a time of “peak everything”** (peak water, peak oil, peak humans)—dumped into a future despoiled of reserves and earning capacity has a specific relation to this white-out—**the “economical” and “ecological” tandem shifts all attention to the first term** (or first “eco”). In a post-global present consolidating what is routinely remarked as a neo-feudal order, the titanic shift of hyperwealth to the corporatist few (the so-called 1%) sets the stage for a shift to control societies anticipat- ing social disruption and the implications of “Occupy” style eruptions— concerning which the U.S. congress hastily passed new unconstitutional rules to apprehend citizens or take down websites. **The** Ponzi scheme **logics of twenty-first century earthscapes** portray an array of time-bubbles, catastrophic deferrals, telecratic capture, and a voracious present that seems to **practice a sort of** tempophagy on itself corresponding with its structural premise of hyper-consumption and perpetual “growth. The supposed urgencies of threatened economic and monetary “collapse” occlude and defer any attention to the imperatives of the biosphere, but this apparent pause or deferral of attention covers over an irreversible mutation. **A new phase of unsustainability appears in which a faux status quo** ante **appears to will to sustain itself as long as possible and at whatever cost;** the event of the twenty-first century is that there will be no event, that no crisis will disturb the expansion of consumption beyond all supposed limits or peaks.In such an environment other materialities emerge, reference systems default, and the legacies of anthropo-narcissm go into overdrive in mechanical ways. Supposedly advanced or post-theory theory is no exception**—**claiming on the one hand ever more verdant comings together of redemptive communities, anddiscretely restoringmanyphenomenological tropes that 20th century thought had displaced. This has been characterized as an unfolding eco-eco disaster—a complex at once eco- nomic and ecological.1 The logics of the double oikos appear, today, caught in a self-feeding default. The present volume, in diverse ways, reclaims a certain violence that has seemed occluded or anaesthetized (it is a “present,” after all, palpably beyond “tipping points” yet shy of their fully arrived implications— hence the pop proliferation of “zombie” metaphors: zombie banks, zom- bie politics, zombie “theory”). It departs from a problem inherent in the “eco” as a metaphoric complex, that of the home (oikos), and the suicidal fashion in which this supposed proper ground recuperates itself from a nonexistent position. The figure of an ecology that is ours and that must be saved precludes us from confronting the displacement and dispossession which conditions all production, including the production of home- lands. Memory **regimes have insistently**, silently and anonymously **prolonged and defended the construct of “homeland security” (both in its political sense, and in the epistemological sense of being secure in our modes of cognition),** **but** these systems of security have in fact accelerated the vortices of ecocatastrophic imaginaries. If a double logic of eco-eco disaster overlaps with the epoch in deep time geologists now refer to as the “anthropocene,” what critical reorientations, today, contest what has been characterized as a collective blind or psychotic foreclosure? Nor can one place the blame at the feet alone of an accidental and evil ‘1%’ of corporate culture alone, since an old style revolutionary model does not emerge from this exitless network of sys- tems. More interesting is the way that ‘theory’, with its nostalgic agendas for a properly political world of genuine praxis or feeling has been com- plicit in its fashion. How might one read the implicit, unseen collabora- tion that critical agendas coming out of twentieth century master-texts unwittingly maintained with the accelerated trajectories in question? The mesmerizing **fixation with** **cultural histories, the ethics of “others,”** the enhancement of subjectivities, **“human rights” and institutions of power** not only partook of this occlusion but ‘we theorists’ have **deferred addressing biospheric collapse,** mass extinction events, or the implications of resource wars and “population” culling. It is our sense of justified propriety—our defense of cultures, affects, bodies and others—that allows us to remain secure in our homeland, unaware of all the ruses that maintain that spurious home. The rapacious present places the hidden metaphoric levers of the eco or oikos in an unsustainable exponential curve, compounding megadebt upon itself, and consuming futures in what has been portrayed as a sort of psychotic trance—what Hillis Miller calls, in this volume, a suicidal “auto-co-immunity” track.2 Yet the “Sovereign debt crisis” corresponds to a credibility crisis as well. The latter applies not only to the political classes of the post-democratic klepto-telecracies of the West but seems to taint the critical concepts, agendas, and terms received from twentieth-century itineraries that accompanied the last decades and that persist as currency. Far from opening beyond the propriety of the oikos theories of affect, living labor and critical legacies have doubled down on their investments, created guilds as reluctant as Wall St. to give up cognitive capital. All the while there is attention paid to ‘saving’ the humanities or a critical industry that might be extended for a while longer (as if with “sovereignty” itself). Bruno Latour [2010] presumes to call this recent and ongoing episode the “Modernist parenthesis” of thought. In his conjec- ture, the very pre-occupation with human on human histories, cultural- ism, archivism, and the institutions of power were complicit with a larger blind that, in his view, the ecological crisis belatedly discloses.3 At the moment of writing it is common to point to the 2011 “occupy” movement, viral and cloud-like, as the Bartlebyesque counter to a total- ization of the systems of this control. Bartleby has become the figure for a rejection of end-fixated production. Were one able to speak of an occupy movement applied to critical concepts and twentieth century derived idioms one might imagine a call to occupy critical theory and conceptual networks—but with what interruption of received programs (“Sovereign debt”), what alternative materialities, what purported “ethics” involving commodified futures (and the structure of debt), what mnemotechnics, and with resistance to what power, if it is the oikos itself, the metaphoric chimera and its capture of late anthropocene imaginaries that is at is- sue? This is one of the implications of what this volume terms telemor- phosis, the intricacy by which referential regimes, memory, and reading, participate in these twenty-first century disclosures. The occupy motif, at the moment, sets itself against a totalization or experience of foreclo- sure—political, mediacratic, financial, cognitive. Various strategies ap- pearing in this volume involve what could equally be called a disoccupy logic or meme. Such a logic of disoccupation assumes that the domain in question is already saturated, occupied in the militarist sense by a program that, un- wittingly, persists in the acceleration of destruction and takeover. Critical thought of recent decades would have walked hand in hand with the cur- rent foreclosures. The explication of ecocatastrophic logics, accordingly, are not found in Foucault nor, surprisingly, Derrida. Timothy Morton’s Ecology without Nature is one such effort at disoccupation—seeking to void the two terms of the title, and in the process disrupt the “revised organicisms” of contemporary critical schools which, he argues, have managed to lapse into sophisticated pre-critical modes not unrelated to a more general inertia. **The meme of disoccupation resonates**, for instance, **with** what Robert Markley in this volume proposes as **a practice of “disidentification**,” and is implied by Timothy Clark’s tracking of a “derangement of scale**” in the perpetual cognitive disjunctures that come up against the ecocatastrophic present. One would disoccupy the figure of subjectivity,** refusing not only the comfort**ing commodifications of “the other”** in cultural theory, but also the later moral appeals to other redemptive beings, such as the animal (as Joanna Zylinska argues with regard to post-humanism and its “animal studies”). What might be disoccupied would be the meta- phorics of the home, even where the latter would sustain itself today in cherished terms like trauma, affect, alterity, embodiment, or even culture. Yet a refusal of supposed redemptive ‘outsides’ to capitalism does not lead to a place of critical purity beyond the implied moralism of ‘occupy’ but the return of, and orientation to, a violence before which no model of sovereignty can be sustained. To imagine that one might disoccupy by refusing all the supposed redemptive ‘outsides’ to capitalism is not to find a place of critical purity beyond the moralism of ‘occupy.’ Occupation is never simply takeover and appropriation, but always involves destruction of what it claims. The viral migration of the “occupy” motif involves a premise of disoccupation covertly. In the present volume this takes different forms. If one is now beyond tipping points in a zone of irreversibility, what corresponds to this as a critical injunction? Catherine Malabou sets aside the entire way the figure of trauma and the “always already” have organized time. Claire Colebrook affirms, rather than accepting as tragic, extinction as a point of departure for thought, which can be used to work against the organicist ideologies of the present (such as sexual difference). Martin McQuillan shifts the referential spectrum of discourse to “other materialities” in the hypothesis of a post-carbon thought, while Robert Markley tracks the in-flux of geological times that displace human narrative matrices. Bernard Stiegler voids the biopolitical model, which he sees as exceeded by “the third limit of Capitalism” (when it impinges on the biosphere). From that point of excess he strategizes a counter-stroke to the capture of attention by telecratic circuits, initiating a noopolitics. Joana Zylinska disoccupies, to continue this motif, the covert model of soft “otherness” by which animal studies has invented itself as an anthropo-colonianism. Like post- humanism generally, Zylinska argues, animal studies sustains its sub- jectal hegemonies. Hillis Miller locates a source for the ecocatastrophic imaginary in the blind insistence of “organicist” models of reading that sustain the comforts of the oikos. Against this hermeneutics of security Miller posits an “ecotechnics” that is at once machinal and linguistically based (where language is not communicative, but literal and inscriptive in a manner exemplified by Kafka’s Odradek). Justin Read displaces any biopolitical model, again, by relinquishing trauma, the oikos, survival and interiorities of any manner, instead describing the circulation of data (or the “unicity”) from which the only remaining political gesture would be oriented to the ecocatrastrophic. Jason Groves shifts the refer- ential screen from, again, a human-centered index to the viral textualism of (alien) species invasion, the global rewriting of bio-geographies. Mike Hill transitions to the alteration of atmospherics under the imaginary of climate war technologies in a new horizon of invisible wars (and wars on visibility), which today include not only nanotechnologies but also the “autogenic” turning of wars without discrete (national) enemies into suicidal rages against the “homeland”—a sort of, again, auto-occupation that is accelerating.

#### Even if all anthropogenic emissions were stopped immediately the impacts of climate change and the warming of the surface would still be irreversible – this is the most recent scientific consensus.

#### IPCC 2014

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (he leading international body for the assessment of climate change. It was established by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in 1988 to provide the world with a clear scientific view on the current state of knowledge in climate change and its potential environmental and socio-economic impacts. Currently 195 countries are in the IPCC. It’s where all of your statistics come from), 2014 Synthesis Report, <http://ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full.pdf>

Many aspects of **climate change and its** associated **impacts will continue** for centuries, even if anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are stopped. **The risks of abrupt or irreversible changes increase as the magnitude of the warming increases**. Warming will continue beyond 2100 under all RCP scenarios except RCP2.6. **Surface temperatures will remain** approximately constant at **elevated** levels **for many centuries after** a complete cessation of net anthropogenic CO2 emissions (see Section 2.2.5 for the relationship between CO2 emissions and global temperature change.). A large fraction of **anthropogenic climate change resulting from CO2 emissions is** irreversible on a multi-century to millennial timescale, except in the case of a large net removal of CO2 from the atmosphere over a sustained period (Figure 2.8a, b). {WGI SPM E.1, SPM E.8, 12.5.2} Stabilization of global average surface temperature does not imply stabilization for all aspects of the climate system. **Shifting biomes,** re-equilibrating **soil carbon, ice sheets, ocean temperatures and** associated **sea level rise all have their own intrinsic** **long timescales that will** result in ongoing **change**s **for** hundreds to **thousands of years after global surface temperature has been stabilized**. {WGI SPM E.8, 12.5.2–12.5.4, WGII 4.2} confidence), **Ocean acidification will continue** for centuries if CO2 emissions continue, it will strongly affect marine ecosystems (high and the impact will be exacerbated by rising temperature extremes (Figure 2.5b). {WGI 3.8.2, 6.4.4, WGII SPM B-2, 6.3.2, 6.3.5, 30.5, Box CC-OA} **Global mean sea level rise will continue for many centuries beyond 2100** (virtually certain). The few available analyses that go beyond 2100 indicate sea level rise to be less than 1 m above the pre-industrial level by 2300 for GHG concentrations that peak and decline and remain below 500 ppm CO2-eq, as in scenario RCP2.6. For a radiative forcing that corresponds to a CO2-eq concentration in 2100 that is above 700 ppm but below 1500 ppm, as in scenario RCP8.5, the projected rise is 1 m to more than 3 m by 2300 (medium confidence) (Figure 2.8c). There is low confidence in the available models’ ability to project solid ice discharge from the Antarctic ice sheet. Hence, these models likely underestimate the Antarctica ice sheet contribution, **resulting in an underestimation of projected sea level rise beyond 2100**. {WGI SPM E.8, 13.4.4, 13.5.4} There is little evidence in global climate models of a tipping point or critical threshold in the transition from a perennially ice-covered to a seasonally ice-free Arctic Ocean, beyond which further sea-ice loss is unstoppable and irreversible. {WGI 12.5.5} There is low confidence in assessing the evolution of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation beyond the 21st century because of the limited number of analyses and equivocal results. However, a collapse beyond the 21st century for large sustained warming cannot be excluded. {WGI SPM E.4, 12.4.7, 12.5.5} Sustained mass loss by ice sheets **would cause larger sea level rise, and** part of the mass loss **might be irreversible**. There is high confidence that sustained global mean warming greater than a threshold would lead to the near-complete loss of the Greenland ice sheet over a millennium or more, causing a sea level rise of up to 7 m. Current estimates indicate that the threshold is greater than about 1°C (low confidence) but less than about 4°C (medium confidence) of global warming with respect to pre-industrial temperatures. Abrupt and irreversible ice loss from a potential instability of marine-based sectors of the Antarctic ice sheet in response to climate forcing is possible, but current evidence and understanding is insufficient to make a quantitative assessment. {WGI SPM E.8, 5.6.2, 5.8.1, 13.4.3, 13.5.4} Within the 21st century, **magnitudes and rates of climate change** associated with medium to high emission scenarios (RCP4.5, RCP6.0 and RCP8.5) **pose a high risk of** abrupt and irreversible regional-scale change in the composition, structure and function of marine, terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems, including wetlands (medium confidence), as well as warm water coral reefs (high confidence). Examples that could substantially amplify climate change are the boreal-tundra Arctic system (medium confidence) and the Amazon forest (low confidence). {WGII 4.3.3.1, Box 4.3, Box 4.4, 5.4.2.4, 6.3.1–6.3.4, 6.4.2, 30.5.3–30.5.6, Box CC-CR, Box CC-MB} A reduction in permafrost extent is virtually certain with continued rise in global temperatures. Current permafrost areas are projected to become a net emitter of carbon (CO2 and CH4) with a loss of 180 to 920 GtCO2 (50 to 250 GtC) under RCP8.5 over the 21st century (low confidence). {WGI TFE.5, 6.4.3.4, 12.5.5, WGII 4.3.3.4}

**The apocalypse is not something to be prevented but recognized as ongoing – we need to cut our losses and ensure we don’t harm the biosphere more than we have already. The new context of the anthropocene means we have new political responsibilities towards the non-human world.**

**Swyngedouw 13**

Erik Swyngedouw (Professor of Geography at the School of Environment and Development at University of Manchester Lewis), “Apocalypse Now! Fear and Doomsday Pleasures,” *Symposium on Apocalypse*. Published 02/06/2013.

Against this cynical stand, the third, and for me proper, leftist response to the apocalyptic imaginary is twofold and cuts through the deadlock embodied by the first two responses. To begin with, **the revelatory promise of the apocalyptic narrative has to be fully rejected. In the face of the cataclysmic imaginaries mobilized to assure that the apocalypse will NOT happen (if the right techno-managerial actions are taken**), **the only reasonable response is** ‘‘Don’t worry (Al Gore, Prince Charles, many environmental activists....), you are really right, the environmental apocalypse WILL not only happen, it has already happened, **IT IS ALREADY HERE.**’’ **Many are already living in the post-apocalyptic interstices of life**, whereby the fusion of environmental transformation and social conditions, render life‘‘bare.’’ The fact that the socio-environmental imbroglio has already passed the point of no return has to be fully asserted. **The socio-environmental Armageddon is already here for many; it is not some distant dystopian promise mobilized to trigger response today. Water conflicts, struggles for food, environmental refugees**, etc. **testify to the socio-ecological predicament that choreographs everyday life for the majority of the world’s population.** **Things are already too late**; **they have always already been too late.** There is no Arcadian place, time, or environment to return to, no benign socio-ecological past that needs to be maintained or stabilized. Many already live in the interstices of the apocalypse, albeit a combined and uneven one. It is only within the realization of the apocalyptic reality of the now that a new politics might emerge. The second gesture of a proper leftist response is to reverse the order between the universal and the particular that today dominates the catastrophic political imaginary. This order maintains that salvaging the particular historical-geographical configuration we are in depends on re-thinking and re-framing the human environment articulation in a universal sense. We have to change our relationship with nature so that capitalism can continue somehow. **Not only does this argument to preserve capitalism guarantee the prolongation of the combined and uneven apocalypse of the present, it forecloses considering fundamental change to the actually existing unequal forms of organizing the society-environment relations.** Indeed, **the apocalyptic imaginary is one that generally still holds on to a dualistic view of nature and culture.** **The argument is built on the view that humans have perturbed the ecological dynamic balance in ways inimical to human** (and possibly non-human**) long-term survival, and the solution consists broadly in bringing humans** (in a universal sense**) back in line with the possibilities and constraints imposed by ecological limits and dynamics**. A universal transformation is required in order to maintain the present. And this can and should be done through managing the present particular configuration. This is the message of Al Gore or Prince Charles and many other environmental pundits. A left socio-environmental perspective has to insist that we need to transform this universal message into a particular one. The historically and geographically specific dynamics of capitalism have banned an external nature radically to a sphere beyond earth. On earth, **there is no external nature left**. It is from this particular historical-geographical configuration that a radical politics of transformation has to be thought and practiced. Only through the transformation of the particular socio-ecological relations of capitalism can a generic egalitarian, free, and common re-ordering of the human/non-human imbroglios be forged. Those who already recognized the irreversible dynamics of the socio-environ mental imbroglio that has been forged over the past few centuries coined a new term to classify the epoch we are in. ‘‘**Welcome to the Anthropocene’’ became a popular catch-phrase to inform us that we are now in a new geological era, one in which humans are co-producers of the deep geological time** that hitherto had slowly grinded away irrespective of humans’ dabbling with the surface layers of earth, oceans, and atmosphere. Noble prize-winning chemist Paul Crutzen introduced ‘‘the Anthropocene,’’ coined about a decade ago as the successor name of the Holocene, the relatively benign geo-climatic period that allegedly permitted agriculture to flourish, cities to be formed, and humans to thrive (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000). Since the beginning of industrialization, so the Anthropocenic argument goes, humans’ increasing interactions with their physical conditions of existence have resulted in a qualitative shift in geo-climatic acting of the earth system. **The Anthropocene is nothing else than the geological name for capitalism WITH nature**. **Acidification of oceans, biodiversity transformations, gene displacements** and recombinations, **climate change**, big infrastructures effecting the earth’s geodetic dynamics, among others, resulted in knotting together **‘‘natural’’ and ‘‘social’’ processes such that humans have become active agents in co-shaping earth’s deep geological time**. Now that the era has been named as the Anthropocene, we can argue at length over its meaning, content, existence, and possible modes of engagement. Nonetheless, it affirms that **humans and nature are co-produced and that the particular historical epoch that goes under the name of capitalism forged this mutual determination**. **The Anthropocene is just another name for insisting on Nature’s death.** This cannot be unmade, however hard we try. The past is forever closed and the future including nature’s future\*is radically open, up for grabs. Indeed**, the affirmation of the historical-geographical co-production of society WITH nature radically politicizes nature, makes nature enter into the domain of contested socio-physical relations and assemblages**. We cannot escape‘ ‘producing nature’’; rather, it forces us to make choices about what socio-natural worlds we wish to inhabit. It is from this particular position, therefore, that the **environmental conundrum ought to be approached so that a qualitative transformation of BOTH society AND nature has to be envisaged. This perspective moves the gaze from thinking through a ‘‘politics of the environment’’ to ‘‘politicizing the environment’’** (Swyngedouw 2011; 2012). **The human world is now an active agent in shaping the non-human world**. **This extends the terrain of the political to domains hitherto left to the mechanics of nature. The non-human world becomes ‘‘enrolled’’ in a process of politicization**. And that is precisely what needs to be fully endorsed. **The Anthropocene opens up a terrain whereby different natures can be contemplated and actually co-produced.** And the struggle over these trajectories and, from a leftist perspective, the process of the egalitarian socio-ecological production of the commons of life is precisely what our politics are all about. Yes, the apocalypse is already here, but do not despair, let us fully endorse the emancipatory possibilities of apocalyptic life. Perhaps we should modify the now over-worked statement of the Italian Marxist Amadeo Bordiga that ‘‘if the ship goes down, the first-class passengers drown too.’’ Amadeo was plainly wrong. Remember the movie Titanic (as well as the real catastrophe). A large number of the first-class passengers found a lifeboat; the others were trapped in the belly of the beast. Indeed the social and ecological catastrophe we are already in is not shared equally. While the elites fear both economic and ecological collapse, the consequences and implications are highly uneven. The elite’s fears are indeed only matched by the actually existing socio-ecological and economic catastrophes many already live in. The apocalypse is combined and uneven. And it is within this reality that political choices have to be made and sides taken.

**The alternative is to learn how to die gracefully. The end is near with no tinfoil hats in sight, we either die in fear or live authentically and try our best to leave Earth intact. That starts with rejecting the shortsighted politics of the aff.**

**Scranton 13**

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**There’s a word for this new era we live in: the Anthropocene**. This term, taken up by [geologists](http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/369/1938/835.abstract), [pondered by intellectuals](http://www.livingbooksaboutlife.org/books/Extinction) and discussed in the pages of publications such as [The Economist](http://www.economist.com/node/18741749) and the [The New York Times](http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/05/19/the-age-of-anthropocene-should-we-worry), represents the idea that we have entered a new epoch in Earth’s geological history, one characterized by the arrival of the human species as a geological force. The Nobel-Prize-winning chemist Paul Crutzen coined the term in 2002, and it has steadily gained acceptance as evidence has increasingly mounted that the changes wrought by global warming will affect not just the world’s climate and biological diversity, but its very geology — and not just for a few centuries, but for millenniums. The geophysicist David Archer’s 2009 book, “[The Long Thaw: How Humans are Changing the Next 100,000 Years of Earth’s Climate](http://www.amazon.com/Long-Thaw-Changing-Climate-Essentials/dp/0691136548),” lays out a clear and concise argument for how huge concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and melting ice will radically transform the planet, beyond freak storms and warmer summers, beyond any foreseeable future.¶ The Stratigraphy Commission of the Geological Society of London — the scientists responsible for pinning the “golden spikes” that demarcate geological epochs such as the Pliocene, Pleistocene, and Holocene — have adopted the Anthropocene as a term deserving further consideration, [“significant on the scale of Earth history.”](http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/369/1938/1036.full)Working groups are discussing what level of geological time-scale it might be (an “epoch” like the Holocene, or merely an “age” like the Calabrian), and at what date we might say it began. The beginning of the Great Acceleration, in the middle of the 20th century? The beginning of the Industrial Revolution, around 1800? The advent of agriculture?¶ The challenge **the Anthropocene poses** is **a challenge not just** to national security, to food and energy markets, or **to our “way of life”** — though these challenges are all real, profound, and inescapable. **The greatest challenge the Anthropocene poses may be to our sense of what it means to be human**. Within 100 years — within three to five generations — we will face average temperatures 7 degrees Fahrenheit higher than today, rising seas at least three to 10 feet higher, and worldwide shifts in crop belts, growing seasons and population centers. Within a thousand years, unless we stop emitting greenhouse gases wholesale right now, humans will be living in a climate the Earth hasn’t seen since the Pliocene, three million years ago, when oceans were 75 feethigher than they are today. **We face the imminent collapse of the agricultural, shipping and energy networks upon which the global economy depends, a large-scale die-off in the biosphere that’s already well on its way, and our own possible extinction. I**f homo sapiens (or some genetically modified variant) survives the next millenniums, it will be survival in a world unrecognizably different from the one we have inhabited.¶ Geological time scales, civilizational collapse and **species extinction give rise to profound problems that** humanities **scholars** and academic philosophers, with their taste for fine-grained analysis, esoteric debates and archival marginalia, might **seem remarkably ill suited to address.** After all, **how will** thinking about **Kant help us trap carbon dioxide?** Can arguments between object-oriented ontology and historical materialism protect honeybees from colony collapse disorder? Are ancient Greek philosophers, medieval theologians, and contemporary metaphysicians going to keep Bangladesh from being inundated by rising oceans?¶ Of course not. **But the biggest problems the Anthropocene poses are precisely those that have always been at the root of humanistic and philosophical questioning: “What does it mean to be human?” and “What does it mean to live?”** In the epoch of the Anthropocene, the question of individual mortality — “What does my life mean in the face of death?” — is universalized and framed in scales that boggle the imagination. What does human existence mean against 100,000 years of climate change? What does one life mean in the face of species death or the collapse of global civilization? How do we make meaningful choices in the shadow of our inevitable end?¶ These questions have no logical or empirical answers. **They are philosophical problems** par excellence. Many thinkers, including Cicero, Montaigne, Karl Jaspers, and The Stone’s own Simon Critchley, have argued that studying philosophy is learning how to die. If that’s true, then we have entered humanity’s most philosophical age — for this is precisely the problem of the Anthropocene. **The rub is that now we have to learn how to die not as individuals, but as a civilization**.¶ III.¶ **Learning how to die isn’t easy. In Iraq, at the beginning, I was terrified by the idea.** Baghdad seemed incredibly dangerous, even though statistically I was pretty safe. We got shot at and mortared, and I.E.D.’s laced every highway, but I had good armor, we had a great medic, and we were part of the most powerful military the world had ever seen. The odds were good I would come home. Maybe wounded, but probably alive. Every day I went out on mission, though, I looked down the barrel of the future and saw a dark, empty hole.¶ “For the soldier death is the future, the future his profession assigns him,” wrote Simone Weil in her remarkable meditation on war, “The Iliad or the Poem of Force.” “Yet the idea of man’s having death for a future is abhorrent to nature. Once the experience of war makes visible the possibility of death that lies locked up in each moment, our thoughts cannot travel from one day to the next without meeting death’s face.” That was the face I saw in the mirror, and its gaze nearly paralyzed me.¶ I found my way forward through an 18th-century Samurai manual, Yamamoto Tsunetomo’s “Hagakure,” which commanded: “**Meditation on inevitable death should be performed daily.” Instead of fearing my end, I owned it**. Every morning, after doing maintenance on my Humvee, I’d imagine getting blown up by an I.E.D., shot by a sniper, burned to death, run over by a tank, torn apart by dogs, captured and beheaded, and succumbing to dysentery. Then, before we rolled out through the gate, **I’d tell myself that I didn’t need to worry, because I was already dead**. The only thing that mattered was that I did my best to make sure everyone else came back alive. “If by setting one’s heart right every morning and evening, one is able to live as though his body were already dead,” wrote Tsunetomo, “he gains freedom in the Way.”¶ I got through my tour in Iraq one day at a time, meditating each morning on my inevitable end. When I left Iraq and came back stateside, I thought I’d left that future behind. Then I saw it come home in the chaos that was unleashed after Katrina hit New Orleans. And then I saw it again when Sandy battered New York and New Jersey: Government agencies [failed to move quickly enough](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/nyregion/new-york-city-housing-agency-was-overwhelmed-after-storm.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0), and [volunteer groups like Team Rubicon had to step in](http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/politics/2012/12/6900518/gap-citys-hurricane-response-and-volunteer-armys-attempt-fill-it) to manage disaster relief.¶ **Now, when I look into our future — into the Anthropocene — I see water rising up to wash out lower Manhattan. I see food riots, hurricanes, and climate refugees. I see 82nd Airborne soldiers shooting looters. I see grid failure, wrecked harbors, Fukushima waste, and plagues. I see Baghdad.** I see the Rockaways. I see a strange, precarious world.¶ Our new home.¶ **The human psyche naturally rebels against the idea of its end.** Likewise, civilizations have throughout history marched blindly toward disaster, because humans are wired to believe that tomorrow will be much like today — it is unnatural for us to think that this way of life, this present moment, this order of things is not stable and permanent. Across the world today, our actions testify to our belief that we can go on like this forever, burning oil, poisoning the seas, killing off other species, pumping carbon into the air, ignoring the ominous silence of our coal mine canaries in favor of the unending robotic tweets of our new digital imaginarium. Yet the reality of global climate change is going to keep intruding on our fantasies of perpetual growth, permanent innovation and endless energy, just as the reality of mortality shocks our casual faith in permanence.¶ The biggest problem climate change poses isn’t how the Department of Defense should plan for resource wars, or how we should put up sea walls to protect Alphabet City, or when we should evacuate Hoboken. **It won’t be addressed by buying a Prius, signing a treaty, or turning off the air-conditioning. The biggest problem we face is a philosophical one: understanding that this civilization is already dead.** **The sooner we confront this problem, and the sooner we realize there’s nothing we can do to save ourselves, the sooner we can get down to the hard work of adapting, with mortal humility, to our new reality**.¶ The choice is a clear one. **We can continue acting as if tomorrow will be just like yesterday, growing less and less prepared for each new disaster as it comes, and more and more desperately invested in a life we can’t sustain. Or we can learn to see each day as the death of what came before, freeing ourselves to deal with whatever problems the present offers without attachment or fear. If we want to learn to live in the Anthropocene, we must first learn how to die.**

## Overviews

**Vs. Alec**

**You have to evaluate all arguments in this round in the context of the anthropocene, the world’s top scientists agree that ecological disaster is irreversible and we’re in the middle of mass extinction. Their romantic politics may solve the aff, but they are not the proper way to live in the anthropocene which is the top layer issue in this round. Looking to the future is only further ignoring the disaster all around us, learning how to die is the only way to compromise their romanticism by living authentically and the real empirical realities of a dying world.**

**Vs. Util:**

**There’s no need to fish for an extinction story through academically bankrupt link chains when the Anthropocene constitutes our certain, quickly approaching extinction. We have to recontextualize everything in terms of the Anthropocene. Their focus on human preservation is an inauthentic model for politics and individual life when their impacts are nonunique on a slightly longer timescale. Their preservation focus is also the root cause of the anthropocene because our efforts to further the human narrative have been fueled through unsustainable industrialism. Instead of living in fear we have two questions to answer: What legacy should we leave behind before the end? And how should we approach the end?**

**Vs. Phil**

**Scranton says it best when he says, “How will Kant help us trap carbon dioxide?” The philosophical approach of the aff does not account for the modern age of the anthropocene, our ethical questions must pass this litmus test. Cohen points out that our focus on moral questions has distracted us from being able to answer the most important questions at the core of anthropocene. The sense of inherent human worth at the center of ethics has lead us to blindly maximize humanity without answering the essential questions that Scranton poses, “What does it mean to be human? What does it mean to live?” Without answering these questions first in the context of the modern age, there ethics have no intrinsic value and the human lives they fight for our temporary and meaningless in the grand scheme of the biosphere.**

**Vs. Structural Violence**

**The rights and moral inclusion of all is important and like the aff has been a major focus in scholarship in recent years, however the focus on human excellence it at a crossroads. In the world of the anthropocene, we need to shed our humanism and cut our losses with the natural world. If suffering amongst humans seems bad, we have set the biosphere into a downward spiral that dooms us to inevitable extinction and threatens the rest of life on Earth. They need to answer the question of what makes us more than a parasite in the grand scheme of the universe – that’s Cohen. In the case that we are – our focus must be dynamically shifted away from humanism and towards cutting our losses and saving what we can of the natural world. This is our foremost ontological obligation.**

## 2NR Blocks

### 2NR – Framework

#### They get to weigh the aff, solves all their offence, doesn’t help them much because I say the way they view their impacts is bad, that was above.

#### C/I: They must defend the framing of extinction in the 1ac

#### Prefer my Counter Interpretation

#### Most predictable, they structured their aff the way it is for certain reasons, they should be forced to defend their assumptions.

#### The neg is a perquisite to any political engagement; Scranton indicates that we become blinded because the human consciousness rebels against its own destruction. This clouds our policymaking and renders it ineffective. Also, Swyngedouw says that the climate change debate becomes a banner for the politicians who co-opt the debate in terms of bureaucratic nonsense.

#### We turn their education claims with the role of the ballot. Dualistic knowledge is the most important site of education in the Anthropocene because we can only stop the modern way of life which drains the Earth of life and has created our own demise is if we recognize that we are ontologically included within nature.

### AT: Theory

Theory in the anthropocene is irrelevant, the arguments I read are not only true within debate and their truth or falsity is not a function of fairness – face the facts, the world is ending right now and we’re going with it. Their effort to nitpick the rules of the game focuses in on the minutest of human details. What does theory do for the dying rainforests? The role of the ballot is for the judge to act as a critical educator who votes for who best examines the human/nature binary that exists, the end is coming now and we simply don’t have time to vote on theory. This discussion is key.

### AT: Perm

#### Group their perms

#### 1. No perms in a methods debate. All of the perms sever out of the representations of the future posed by the 1AC. That’s a reason to reject them, because bad perms destroy all clash allowing them to dodge any offence destroying education.

#### 2. Ill do the link debate here, every link we win is a Disadvantage to the perm.

**The perm will not “overcome” the link. The 1AC treats nature as a knowble good we can maximize. You cannot go north and south at the same time. Taylor 98**

(Prue, Senior Lecturer of law and a founding member of the New Zealand Centre for Environmental Law at the University of Auckland, [An Ecological Approach to International Law: Responding to the Challenges of Climate Change (Hardcover) p. 39-42, 45-48])

The question 'are ecocentric ethics really necessary?' is frequently asked. Could we not, for example, achieve our environmental goals by more rigorous environmental legislation? Obviously much could be improved as a consequence of tighter controls, but two important limitations would remain. First, the question of 'how clean is clean' would continue to be answered solely by reference to human needs and standards. Thus water quality would he determined by interests such as human welfare, recreation needs and aesthetic values. The interests of nature and the needs of fully functioning ecosystems, which full below a human‑centred threshold, would be left unprtxected. By taking into account a much larger and more complex set of ecocentrically determined interests, tougher environmental standards would he achieved.217 Second, as Bosselmann points out, decision‑makers would not be able to make the important paradigm jump to protecting nature for its own sake. Worse, in cases where decision‑makers felt morally committed to such a jump, they would be forced to find constrained logic to justify their decisions. The variety of ethical approaches to environmental decision‑making has raised the question of moral pluralism. Stone, for example, has suggested that situations can be resolved according to either anthropocentric or ecocentric views depending on the nature of the problem. Thus decision makers are able to switch from one value system to another. Such a process is rejected by commentators such as 3. Baird Callicott who believes that ecocentric ethics are 'not only a question of better rational arguments but the expres­sion of a fundamentally changed attitude to nature. Callicott reminds Stone that anthropocentric attitudes and ecocencric ethics represent quite different paradigms. That in reality **people do not follow anthropocentric attitudes in the morning, only to switch to ecocentric ethics after lunch**. In the context of New Zealand's primary environmental legislation, this debate is currently being worked through in practice. The Resource Management Act 1991 (1RMA') is guided by 'sustainable management', a concept which is defined in both anthropocentric and ecocentric terms, leaving room for tension between the supporters of alternative approaches." 221 To date the RMA has been largely dominated by anthropocenisic interests due to a failure by key authorities, such as the Environment Court and local govern‑ ment, to make the significant changes in attitude required by the Act's ecocentric principles. It has been suggested that this tension, evident in implementation of the RMA, can only be resolved by an interpretation of sustainable management' which is ecological.

#### 3. No solvency. **The way we represent humanities relationship with nature shapes our actions – their dualistic approach crowds out solvency**

Doremus 2k (Holly Doremus is Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, and co-faculty director of the California Center for Environmental Law and Policy "The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection:Toward a New Discourse" 1-1-2000scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1311&context=wlulr)

The stories we tell to explain and justify our view of the relationship of humanity with nature are important determinants of the policies we adopt and the attitudes we develop. To date we have relied on three primary discourses to explain why and how the law should protect nature. These discourses are all valid. Nature is an important material resource for human use, a unique esthetic resource for human enjoyment, and most people agree that we have some kind of ethical obligation to protect nature.¶ While the discourses themselves are both valid and inevitable, the forms in which they have been brought to the political debate limit our ability to respond to, and even our ability to fully perceive, the problem of nature protection. The ecological horror story encourages us to view nature solely as a bundle of resources for human consumption or convenience, to rely on cost-benefit accounting in making decisions about what parts of nature we should protect, and to ignore the loss of nature short of catastrophic ecological collapse. The wilderness story teaches us that nature is defined by our absence, and encourages us to establish a limited number of highly protected reserves. The story of Noah's ark allows us to believe we are racing a short-term crisis, resolvable through straightforward temporary measures.¶ None of these stories addresses the crux of the modern nature problem, which is where people fit into nature. In order to address the boundary conflicts, distributional issues, and conflicts between discourses that currently plague our efforts to protect nature, we must find ways to address those issues in our political conversation. We already have a substantial number of building blocks that could contribute to a new discourse about people and nature. Constructing such a discourse should be a high priority in the new millennium for those who hope nature will survive into the next one.

#### 4. Rationality DA: The fear of our own death clouds out of rational thought process which turns any political action because the human psyche allows itself into believing anything as long as the promise of salvation is presented, only the alternative alone solves this because it allows us to transcend our own death, that’s Scranton.

#### 5. Fear DA: They still hold onto the notion that the apocalypse and therefore our own demise can be prevented. This life-centered mentality is a noble lie, a binary logic of natural mastery that justifies all forms of domination

Heisman 2010 (Mitchell Heisman, University at Albany bachelor's degree in psychology, Suicide Note, 2010)

There is a very popular opinion that choosing life is inherently superior to choosing death. This belief that life is inherently preferable to death is one of the most widespread superstitions. This bias constitutes one of the most obstinate mythologies of the human species. This prejudice against death, however, is a kind of xenophobia. Discrimination against death is simply assumed good and right. Absolutist faith in life is commonly a result of the unthinking conviction that existence or survival, along with an irrational fear of death, is “good”. This unreasoned conviction in the rightness of life over death is like a god or a mass delusion. Life is the “noble lie”; the common secular religion of the West. For the conventional Westerner, the obvious leap of faith to make here is that one’s “self” and its preservation constitute the first measure of rationality. Yet if one begins reasoning with the unquestioned premise that life is good, or that one’s own life or any life is justified, this is very different from bringing that premise itself to be questioned rationally. Anyone who has ever contemplated his or her own mortality might question the ultimate sanity of the premise of self-preservation. Even if it is possible to live forever, moreover, this makes not an iota of difference as to the question of the value of existence. Most people are so prejudiced on this issue that they simply refuse to even consider the possibilities of death. Humans tend to be so irrationally prejudiced towards the premise of life that rational treatment of death seldom sees the light of day. Most people will likely fall back on their most thoughtless convictions, intuitions, and instincts, instead of attempting to actually think through their biases (much less overcome them). Yet is choosing death “irrational”? For what reason? For most people, “irrationality” apparently refers to a subjectivity experience in which their fear of death masters them — as opposed the discipline of mastering one’s fear of death. By “irrational”, they mean that they feel compelled to bow down before this master. An individual is “free”, apparently, when he or she is too scared to question obedience to the authority of the fear of death. This unquestioned slavery to the most common and unreasonable instincts is what, in practice, liberal-individualists call rationalism. Most common moral positions justify and cloak this fear of death. And like any traditional authority, time has gathered a whole system of rituals, conventions, and customs to maintain its authority and power as unquestionable, inevitable, and fated; fear of death as the true, the good, and the beautiful. For most people, fear of death is the unquestionable master that establishes all other hierarchies — both social hierarchies, and the hierarchies within one’s own mind. Most are humbly grateful for the very privilege of obedience and do not want to be free. I propose opening your mind towards the liberation of death; towards exposing this blind faith in life as a myth, a bias, and an error. To overcome this delusion, the “magic spell” of pious reverence for life over death must be broken. To do so is to examine the faith in life that has been left unexamined; the naïve secular and non-secular faith in life over death. Opening one’s mind to death emerges from the attempt to unshackle one’s mind from the limitations of all borders. It leads to overcoming all biological boundaries, including borders between the “self” and the larger world. It reaches towards the elimination of biologically based prejudices altogether, including prejudice towards biological self-preservation. The attempt to go beyond ethnocentrism and anthropomorphism leads towards overcoming the prejudices of what I call viviocentrism, or, life-centeredness. Just as overcoming ethnocentrism requires recognition of the provincialism of ethnic values, overcoming viviocentrism emerges from the recognition of the provincialism of life values. Viviocentric provincialism is exposed through an enlarged view from our planet, our solar system, our galaxy, and the limits of our knowledge of the larger cosmos we live in. Overcoming the prejudice against death, then, is only an extension and continuation of the Western project of eliminating bias, especially biologically based biases (i.e. race or sex based biases). The liberation of death is only the next step in the political logic that has hitherto sought to overcome prejudices based on old assumptions of a fixed biological human nature. Its opposite is an Aristotelian, teleological conception of nature; a nature of natural slaves, natural aristocracy, natural patriarchy, natural inferiority of women, natural racial kinds, natural heterosexuality and, finally, natural self-preservation. This older, teleological view suggests that individual self-preservation is an expression of a fixed biologically based nature that culture and/or reason is incapable of changing, altering, or overcoming. Just as it was considered unnatural or even insane that men be loosed from “natural” subordination to their king, or that women be unchained from “natural” subordination to their fathers and husbands, today it is considered unnatural that death be liberated from its “natural” subordination to the tyranny of life. From this point of view, one can recognize that the pro-choice stance on abortion and the right to die stance on euthanasia have already opened paths over conventional pro-life superstitions. These developments towards the liberation of biological death may lead to what may be the highest fulfillment of egalitarian progress: the equality of life and death. Further liberations of death should challenge one’s convictions in the same way that egalitarianisms of the past have challenged common assumptions and convictions: the equality of all men, the equality of the races, the equality of the sexes, the equality of sexual orientations, the equality of the biological and physical, and the equality of life and death. Overcoming the “will to live”, then, represents one of the final steps in overcoming the provincial and “primitive” life instincts probably inherited from our evolutionary past, i.e. inclinations towards patriarchy, authoritarianism, sexism, kinism, and racism. It is not only a contribution to civilization but a culmination of the progress of civilization, that is, the application of reason to human existence. Only when the will to live itself is civilized, can one be free to acknowledge that reason itself does not dictate a bias towards life.

### AT: Monopoly of Force

**The aff’s appeal to a “monopoly on force” gives you the impression of a peaceful public sphere, ignoring that this monopoly is how the state re-orders its own violence against dissidents—this violence necessarily serves to strengthen the hierarchies of modern capitalism**

**Kossler 3**

Reinhart Kossler (Visiting Professor, College of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan, Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Münster, Germany). “The Modern Nation State and Regimes of Violence: Reflections on the Current Situation.” The International Studies Association of Ritsumeikan University: Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies, 2003. <http://www.ritsumei.ac.jp/acd/cg/ir/college/bulletin/e-vol.2/kossler.pdf>

Contradictions of the monopoly on violence and the need for societal control Even from this brief sketch, we can gauge an idea of what seems to lie at the basis of the great conceptual difficulties that exist in coming to terms with the modern nation state. This can be understood as a set of dialectical tensions which shape the system of the organisation of violence. These tensions evolve between poles that are identical with two central traits of the modern state: concentration of the exertion of violence and control of violence, both in the public field at home and in external relations. Yet, as has been indicated, the monopoly on violence, limited as it is to the public sphere, is not equivalent to an absence of violence, as particularly some readings of the process of ‘civilisation’ in the Eliasian version may suggest. This monopoly disregards systematically important realms of life which are defined as ‘private’ in modern capitalist societies, above all, the enterprise and the family, although state sponsored regulations have of course been introduced here, as it were ex post (cf. Kössler 1993). What is more, the modern state’s monopoly on violence is anything but the elimination of violence even in the public realm where it applies. What we are rather confronted with is a thoroughgoing re-organisation, a **re-ordering of (public) violence**. Thus, the modern nation state in its internal dimension does hedge violence precisely by enforcing its monopoly, by overpowering, not only just law-breakers but all too frequently, **dissidents and opponents as well**. The monopoly on violence therefore implies, in direct and apparent as well as in more latent and structural ways, a systematic application of violence, precisely **to safeguard the main conditions of the functioning of public and economic life under prevailing production and property relations.** This monopoly also extends outside the state’s realm in the sense that the sovereigns, by their mutual recognition under the Westphalian system, mutually guarantee to each other comprehensive control of their territories, also to foreclose unwarranted violent action reaching out from one state territory to the other; up to the formal banning of war (safe for self-defense) under the UN Charter, this limited outward violent action also to state controlled, formalised, if catastrophically destructive war. As we shall see below, this situation has since changed fundamentally. Past and current examples for such employment of violence by states include the day-to-day use, mainly of police power to maintain public order; specific efforts to install and maintain an effective border regime which in former times, mainly guarded internal markets against the competition by imported goods that might put to risk domestic industries, while today it is maintained by many states largely to give effective force to the exclusionary logic of citizenship; the **repression of dissent**; the **homogenising impact of state institutions** on societies which may be **backed up by violent means**; wars for various purposes. In particular the internal applications of violence deserve some comment, before we turn to the problem of wars or the regime of violence in international relations. The monopoly on violence forms a basic instrument to ensure the everyday safety of a state’s citizens (or subjects) from random acts of force, as a necessary corollary to stripping them of possession of their own means of violence. A public realm that is in this sense pacified, i.e. devoid of random violence, may also be considered as a necessary pre-condition for a public discourse and debate that involves more than the chosen few. In this sense, the monopoly of violence in its dimension of ensuring public peace and order has been associated with the emergence of a civil society and a public sphere (see e.g. Dunn 2001: 51), i.e., a sphere of basically free deliberation and debate, indispensable for any meaningful involvement of citizens into the affairs of state. All this presupposes a generally accepted or in any case, a prevalent idea of public order. As can be seen from many instances, consensus on such questions is not as self-evident as may be supposed at first sight. At the same time, such consensus is obviously subject to debate in the public realm, which may lead potentially to shifts and redefinitions. Free-flowing public discourse is in this way inherently self-reflexive and self-critical. But all this is fraught with conceptual difficulties as well as with problems in the real world. Suffice it to say that the disarming of citizens has to date not been accomplished yet in a country such as the US, and in this sense a very crucial aspect of the concept of a strictly civilian, basically non-violent public order is subject to major controversy. Again, it has for a long time been characteristic for the upholding of public order in Britain that **police would not be equipped with fire arms**. Furthermore, the public realm or civil society, i.e. the space of ideally uninhibited articulation and organisation of interests and concerns, is **anything but a level playing field**. From a broadly Gramscian perspective in particular, **civil society and public space appear rather as shaped deeply by relations of domination and inequality that are characteristic of modern capitalist society** (cf. Kössler/Melber 1993: 60-82). Therefore, the idea of public order and the concrete ways and means how it is enforced is subject to definition and to public debate, most likely to be defined and redefined by hegemonic processes. Public discourse, then, is decisively impacted, but not exclusively determined by societal power relations, and this applies also to the prevalent idea of public order. These are not arcane concepts and debates. Rather, such processes find their concrete and palpable expression in the treatment of dissidents by police, in the quality of courts of justice, or in the leeway accorded to the media in any society bounded by a nation state. These hints point further to the importance of public scrutiny of state actions, once more incumbent on civil society structures; and further yet, to the issue of ‘civilising’, in an Eliasian sense, the performance of state organs and agents in the execution of the monopoly of violence (see e.g. Hinz 2002: 325-6).

### AT: Owens

#### This isn’t responsive, Owen just criticizes abstract postmodernists and focusing on the different “ologies” – we don’t do that, our critique has material dimensions, that’s Scranton

#### Owen votes neg – the capacity to reflect must come first – this is from a later portion of their article

**Owen 2 –** Reader of Political Theory at the University of Southhampton

(David, “Re-orienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning”, Millennium – Journal of International Studies July 2002 vol. 31 no. 3 653-673, dml)

From a processual rather than teleological standpoint, it is precisely this free activity, this capacity to critically reflect on and transform our ethical orientation to—and practical relations with—government that matters and it is this process, this operation of intelligence, that IR conceived as practical philosophy serves. Second, one might worry that taking growth as the end itself fails to distinguish between different forms of growth, for example those that we consider ethical and those that we do not. The problem with this objection is that it does not think through what taking growth as the end itself entails. There are two points to note here. First, that growth is conceptualised by Dewey in terms of our capacity for critical intelligence, that is, our capacity for discriminating judgement and action. Thus, for example, an increase in our capacities for ignoring inconvenient evidence, for wilful blindness and for wishful thinking is not growth in terms of Dewey’s use of this concept. Second, taking growth as the end itself means discriminating between forms of growth in terms of the degree to which they support or undermine the further growth of our powers of critical intelligence.

### AT: Reps not First/Don’t Shape

#### 1. The 1AC staked out a particular model of extinction that makes certain judgments about the world – the 1NC was an indict of those judgments – they should be forced to defend them

#### 2. It’s key to stable link ground, their interpretation allows the affirmative to spike of any links, destroying clash which is the best internal link to education which is the only portable skill of debate.

#### 3. Its reciprocal, the neg must defend the representations of the alt

#### 4. Key to policy making - The critique presents a radically different model of the political in the age of the anthropocene. The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who presents the best representation of the political. It’s impossible to evaluate the desirability of a policy without judging the representations used to justify it.

**Doremus, 2000**-The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse NAME: Holly Doremus \* BIO: Professor of Law, University of California at Davis. J.D., 57 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 11, \* Washington & Lee Law Review Winter, 2000

Rhetoric matters. That is almost too basic to be worth saying, but it bears repeating because sometimes the rhetoric we use to describe problems becomes so ingrained as to be almost invisible. Even if we are unaware of it, though, **rhetoric has the very real effect of severely constraining our perception of a problem and its potential solutions**. Terminology is one aspect of rhetoric. The words we use to describe the world around us condition our response to that world. Whether we use the word "swamps" or "wetlands," for example, may determine whether we drain or protect those areas. n1 Not surprisingly, the battle to control terminology is an important one in the environmental context. n2 But there is far more to the rhetoric of law. The way words are put together to form stories and discourses shapes the law and society. Stories, which put a human face on [\*13] concerns that might otherwise go unnoticed, exert a powerful emotional tug. n3 "Discourses," loose collections of concepts and ideas, provide a shared language for envisioning problems and solutions. n4 This Article focuses on the use of rhetoric in political battles over the extent to which law should protect nature against human encroachment. At some level, all rhetoric in a democratic society can be tied to the political process; any statement that any member of the political community encounters may influence his or her views, votes, financial contributions, or other political activities. But some communications are more likely than others to affect political outcomes or to play a privileged role in the implementation and interpretation of law. The discussion that follows concentrates on such "political rhetoric," including communications directed to legislatures, agencies, or voters with the intention of influencing the outcome of political decisions; **statements made by legislators or agency personnel to explain or justify their decisions;** and legislative, administrative, and judicial actions. Part II details the three principal discourses called into service in the domestic political arena by advocates of nature protection. n6 The first, trotted out most frequently in the political debates, treats nature as a material resource for human consumption. n7 The second, encountered less often, treats nature as an esthetic resource. n8 This discourse is still instrumental in the sense that it views nature as an object of human use and enjoyment. But it envisions a different sort of use. The aesthetic discourse recognizes nature not just as a source of material goods, but as a source of enjoyment and mental or spiritual sustenance. The third discourse, nearly omitted from the political arena until [\*14] recently, argues that humanity has an ethical obligation to protect nature independent of any instrumental value nature may have. n9 Many variations on each of these discourses have been elaborated. But only a handful appear in the political rhetoric. In this context, the material discourse has often been reduced to the ecological horror story, warning that careless treatment of nature may result in ecological catastrophe. n10 A more recent variant calls for sustainable development, suggesting that protection of nature can coexist with economic development. n11 The most distinctive modern version of the esthetic discourse has been the vision of a pure wilderness, free of all human taint. n12 Although the ethical discourse once lacked distinctive form, the biblical story of Noah saving the animals from the flood has recently become pervasive. n13 Part III addresses the power and peril of these political stories. Deliberately crafted by nature advocates for maximum political effect, these stories have strongly influenced the law of nature protection. In fact, they have been remarkably effective in spurring legislation addressing the problems they describe. Yet nature advocates remain unsatisfied. One explanation, offered by Gregg Easterbrook, is that environmentalists simply do not recognize the extent to which they have prevailed. n14 I propose an alternative explanation. Nature advocates have obtained much of what they have asked for, but they have not asked for what they really want. In the interest of achieving political success, nature advocates have deliberately limited the vocabulary they use to describe the problem of nature protection. Not surprisingly, the political success they have achieved does not go beyond the problem they have articulated. The political rhetoric of nature has been directed squarely at what Daniel Esty and Marian Chertow refer to as a "first order problem," n15 that of implementing basic protections to avert the immediate crisis. But it does not address, and therefore cannot solve, the second-order, long-term problem of creating a viable and appropriate human relationship with nature. Part IV details the gap between the political rhetoric and the reality of the nature problem today. The political stories push us toward a strategy of dividing the world between nature and humanity. The second-order problem, however, is [\*15] how to integrate nature and humanity, creating both a place for humans in nature and a place for nature in human lives. In order to solve that problem, we must address what nature means in a world dominated by human impacts, what aspects of nature we should seek to protect, how, and what costs we are willing to accept. It might be argued that the solution to this second-order problem must come through changes in attitudes rather than through law and, therefore, that it is not important that political rhetoric address this problem. Undoubtedly changing attitudes, convincing people to care more about the fate of nature, is crucial to effective long-term nature protection. All kinds of tools other than law can and should be turned to the task of seeking those changes. But nature advocates cannot afford to ignore the law's potential to change, or to reinforce, cultural attitudes toward nature. n16 Moreover, as discussed in Part IV below, nature is either the cause or the subject of many current conflicts. Inevitably, law plays a role in the resolution of these conflicts. If it is to do so in a way that advances progress toward a solution to the modern nature problem, it must be informed by a fuller understanding of that problem. Even so, it might be argued that although the law itself is important, the precise nature of the rhetoric that produces that law is not. After all, some might say, politicians do not always (or perhaps even generally) believe all the things they say. They employ rhetoric cynically, to manipulate voter opinions. Nature advocates should exploit this tendency by offering rhetoric that provides political cover for votes made with the legislators' own personal ends in view. Perhaps in some circumstances such manipulation can be effective, and political rhetoric can be used to hide the true basis of a political decision that achieves quite different ends. But in the context of nature protection, that strategy is demonstrably ineffective. **The laws that have been enacted to protect nature respond directly to the political stories used to argue for their passage**. In other words, they are aimed at the problems those stories describe. As a result they are not likely, as I explain in Part IV, to solve the fundamental problem of nature protection in the modern world. **Nor does the political rhetoric become irrelevant once a law or regulation is in place; that rhetoric necessarily forms the background against which the law or regulation is interpreted**.

#### 5. Discursive understandings shape our relationships towards the world

The Dark Mountain Project 09

The Dark Mountain Project (“a network of writers, artists and thinkers who have stopped believing the stories our civilisation tells itself. We produce and seek out writing, art and culture rooted in place, time and nature”), “UNCIVILISATION THE DARK MOUNTAIN MANIFESTO”, This little self-published pamphlet, funded by online crowd-sourcing and launched at a small riverside gathering in Oxford in summer 2009; <http://dark-mountain.net/about/manifesto/>

Yet as the myth of civilisation deepened its grip on our thinking, borrowing the guise of science and reason, we began to deny the role of stories, to dismiss their power as something primitive, childish, outgrown. The old tales by which generations had made sense of life’s subtleties and strangenesses were bowdlerised and packed off to the nursery. Religion, that bag of myths and mysteries, birthplace of the theatre, was straightened out into a framework of universal laws and moral account-keeping. The dream visions of the Middle Ages became the nonsense stories of Victorian childhood. In the age of the novel, stories were no longer the way to approach the deep truths of the world, so much as a way to pass time on a train journey. It is hard, today, to imagine that the word of a poet was once feared by a king. Yet for all this, our world is still shaped by stories. Through television, film, novels and video games, we may be more thoroughly bombarded with narrative material than any people that ever lived. What is peculiar, however, is the carelessness with which these stories are channelled at us — as entertainment, a distraction from daily life, something to hold our attention to the other side of the ad break. There is little sense that these things make up the equipment by which we navigate reality. On the other hand, there are the serious stories told by economists, politicians, geneticists and corporate leaders. These are not presented as stories at all, but as direct accounts of how the world is. Choose between competing versions, then fight with those who chose differently. The ensuing conflicts play out on early morning radio, in afternoon debates and late night television pundit wars. And yet, for all the noise, what is striking is how much the opposing sides agree on: all their stories are only variants of the larger story of human centrality, of our ever-expanding control over ‘nature’, our right to perpetual economic growth, our ability to transcend all limits. So we find ourselves, our ways of telling unbalanced, trapped inside a runaway narrative, headed for the worst kind of encounter with reality. In such a moment, writers, artists, poets and storytellers of all kinds have a critical role to play. Creativity remains the most uncontrollable of human forces: without it, the project of civilisation is inconceivable, yet no part of life remains so untamed and undomesticated. Words and images can change minds, hearts, even the course of history. Their makers shape the stories people carry through their lives, unearth old ones and breathe them back to life, add new twists, point to unexpected endings. It is time to pick up the threads and make the stories new, as they must always be made new, starting from where we are. Mainstream art in the West has long been about shock; about busting taboos, about Getting Noticed. This has gone on for so long that it has become common to assert that in these ironic, exhausted, post-everything times, there are no taboos left to bust. But there is one. The last taboo is the myth of civilisation. It is built upon the stories we have constructed about our genius, our indestructibility, our manifest destiny as a chosen species. It is where our vision and our self-belief intertwine with our reckless refusal to face the reality of our position on this Earth. It has led the human race to achieve what it has achieved; and has led the planet into the age of ecocide. The two are intimately linked. We believe they must decoupled if anything is to remain. We believe that artists — which is to us the most welcoming of words, taking under its wing writers of all kinds, painters, musicians, sculptors, poets, designers, creators, makers of things, dreamers of dreams — have a responsibility to begin the process of decoupling. We believe that, in the age of ecocide, the last taboo must be broken — and that only artists can do it. Ecocide demands a response. That response is too important to be left to politicians, economists, conceptual thinkers, number crunchers; too all-pervasive to be left to activists or campaigners. Artists are needed. So far, though, the artistic response has been muted. In between traditional nature poetry and agitprop, what is there? Where are the poems that have adjusted their scope to the scale of this challenge? Where are the novels that probe beyond the country house or the city centre? What new form of writing has emerged to challenge civilisation itself? What gallery mounts an exhibition equal to this challenge? Which musician has discovered the secret chord?

#### Symbolic constructions of the world control direct material effects – until we change our symbolic domination of the planet, material reform efforts cannot succeed

Sandman ’96

Warren Sandman, Assistant Professor of Communication, *Earthtalk*, Eds. Star Muir & Thomas Veenendall, p. 131-132

Gore presents us with a compelling illustration of the symbolic construction of reality, of humans as agents and as constructs, and of the material effects of symbolism. Many may differ with Gore’s specific political proposals, and many may also find flaws in his use of evidence. That is not what is at issue here. The essence of Gore’s arguments is that, as McGee and Burke have already noted, we live in a symbolically created world. The only meaningful relationship we can have with the material world is through symbol use. What Gore argues in his book is that we are playing out a no-win game by our failure to understand our symbolic relationship with the earth. The rules of the game have changes, as far as the planet is concerned. The problem is that we are still playing according to the old symbols and the old relationship in which we are placed by these symbols. Until we acknowledge the interdependence of the symbolic and the material, until we acknowledge that our symbols control our relationship with the material, and until we acknowledge that we can play an active role in the creation of new symbols and the reinterpretation of old, we will continue the degradation of the planet. No environmental program, no recycling campaign, no search for alternative energy source—nothing will have an impact on the environment until our symbolic relationship with the planet is changed. What can we learn from our analysis of this text, from our better understanding of the relationship between the symbolic and the material world? We learn that we cannot continue to separate the two, to believe that there is no relationship between symbols that we use (and that use us) and the material world in which we live. There is no such thing as “mere” rhetoric. The language that we use is the only tool that we have for creating the material structures and practices by which we can change and improves the material world. If we are unable to correct the current dysfunctional relationship between the symbolic and the material or to create a better, more functional relationship, then there can be no material changes to the material world. What both Gore and scholars such as Burke, McGee, Hall, and Althusser tell us is that we must practice symbolic change at the same time we work toward material change. Despite all the difficulties in creating (or renewing) a more positive symbol system for the relationship between humanity and the planet, that work must occur. To continue to operate within the current symbolic relationship will not allow real material change. The battle over the environment is first and foremost a battle for the power to name. The winner in this battle sets the rules for the battle, the place for the battle, and the means by which a “winner” can be declared. If those who wish to create a more functional relationship between the earth and humanity fail to acknowledge the importance of the symbols that are used or fail to gain control of those symbols, then the earth and humanity will be left in the hands of those who have helped to create the dysfunction in the first place. This chapter cannot provide an explicit manual for how this change can be accomplished. But change is possible. We do not live in a world that operates without the consent of those who constructed it. Both the current symbolic relationship and the societal structures that have been created by this relationship and that help to maintain this relationship are the product of human action, and human action can alter this relationship. If there is one lesson to be learned from this analysis, it is this: The control of symbols is the control of social reality and the ability to make material consequences. Ignore rhetoric at your own (and the planet’s) risk.

#### They are ethically obligated to defend their representations in political discussion

**Williams, 3** (Michael, IR Prof @ University of Ottawa, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 4, Dec., 2003, pp. 511-53, Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The International Studies Association, JSTOR)

Simply put, if security is nothing more than a specific form of social practice-a speech-act tied to existential threat and a politics of emergency-then does this mean that anything can be treated as a "security" issue and that, as a consequence, any form of violent, exclusionary, or irrationalist politics must be viewed simply as another form of "speech-act" and treated "objectively"? Questions such as these have led many to ask whether despite its avowedly "constructivist" view of security practices, securitization theory is implicitly committed to a methodological objectivism that is politically irresponsible and lacking in any basis from which to critically evaluate claims of threat, enmity, and emergency.29 A first response to this issue is to note that the Copenhagen School has not shied away from confronting it. In numerous places the question of the ethics of securitization are discussed as raising difficult issues. As Wever has argued in relation to theorizing the highly sensitive issue of identity, for example, Such an approach implies that we have to take seriously concerns about identity, but have also to study the specific and often problematic effects of their being framed as security issues. We have also to look at the possibilities of handling some of these problems in nonsecurity terms, that is to take on the problems but leave them unsecuritized. This latter approach recognizes that social processes are already under way whereby societies have begun to thematize themselves as security agents that are under threat. This process of social construction can be studied, and the security quality of the phenomenon understood, without thereby actually legitimizing it. (1995: 66; see also Waever, 1999). As sustained as these considerations have been, it must be admitted that the answers are somewhat less searching than the questioning, and that this remains one of the most underarticulated aspects of securitization theory (Wyn Jones, 1999: 111-12). I would like to suggest, however, that there are two important issues at stake in these questions, each of which can be clarified through a greater recognition of the Schmittian elements of securitization theory. The first, and simplest point is that in some ways the Copenhagen School treats securitization not as a normative question, 27 I owe this insight especially to Didier Bigo. 28 Again, there are clear links here between securitization theory and classical Realism's stress on the "ethic of responsibility." 29 Voiced, for example, in Erickson (1999). These issues are, of course, also central to debates concerning social constructivismm ore generally.S ee in particulart he exchange between John Mearsheimer( 1994/95, 1995) and Alexander Wendt (1995). A broad overview can be found in Price and Reus-Smit (1998). 521 Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics but as an objective process and possibility. Very much like Schmitt, they view securitization as a social possibility intrinsic to political life. In regard to his concept of the political, for example, Schmitt once argued, It is irrelevant here whether one rejects, accepts, or perhaps finds it an atavistic remnant of barbaric times that nations continue to group themselves according to friend and enemy, or whether it is perhaps strong pedagogic reasoning to imagine that enemies no longer exist at all. The concern here is neither with abstractions nor normative ideals, but with inherent reality and the real possibility of making such a distinction. One may or may not share these hopes and pedagogic ideals. But, rationally speaking, it cannot be denied that nations continue to group themselves according to the friend-enemy antithesis, that the distinction still remains actual today, and that this is an ever present possibility for every people existing in the political sphere (1996 [1932]: 28).30 In certain settings, the Copenhagen School seems very close to this position. Securitization must be understood as both an existing reality and a continual possibility. Yet equally clearly there is a basic ambivalence in this position, for it raises the dilemma that securitization theory must remain at best agnostic in the face of any securitization, even, for example, a fascist speech-act (such as that Schmitt has often been associated with) that securitizes a specific ethnic or racial minority. To say that we must study the conditions under which such processes. I would like to suggest that it is in response to these issues, and in regard to the realm of ethical practice, that the idea of security as a speech-actta kes on an importance well beyond its role as a tool of social explanation. Casting securitization as a speechact places that act within a framework of communicative action and legitimation that links it to a discursive ethics that seeks to avoid the excesses of a decisionist account of securitization. While the Copenhagen School has been insufficiently clear in developing these aspects of securitization theory, they link clearly to some of the most interesting current analyses of the practical ethics of social-constructivism. As Thomas Risse (2000) has recently argued, communicative action is not simply a realm of instrumental rationality and rhetorical manipulation. Communicative action involves a process of argument, the provision of reasons, presentation of evidence, and commitment to convincing others of the validity of one's position. Communicative action (speech-acts) are thus not just given social practices, they are implicated in a process of justification. Moreover, as processes of dialogue, communicative action has a potentially transformative capacity. As Risse puts it: Argumentative rationality appears to be crucially linked to the constitutive rather than the regulative role of norms and identities by providing actors with a mode of interaction that enables them to mutually challenge and explore the validity claims of those norms and identities. When actors engage in a truth-seeking discourse, they must be prepared to change their own views of the world, their interests, and sometimes even their identities. (2000: 2)31 30 More broadly,i t can be argued that for Schmitti t was not only a possibilityb, ut a choice, a decision, that he paradoxically saw as necessary if a vital human life was to be lived. For an analysis of Schmitt in relation to a vitalistic romanticisma nd a virulenth ostilityt o liberalisms ee againW olin( 1992). Schmitt'sv italismm arkso ne of the clearest differences with the Copenhagen School, as discussed below. 31 Risse's analysis here draws greatly on that of Habermas. For Habermas's own treatment of speech-act theory see Habermas (1984). For Habermas's own views on Schmitt see Habermas (1990); a recent brief survey of the relationship between Habermas and Schmitt in the context of International Relations is Wheeler (2000), and a more extended and varied collection is Wyn Jones (2001). As speech-acts, securitizations are in principle forced to enter the realm of discursive legitimation. Speech-act theory entails the possibility of argument, of dialogue, and thereby holds out the potential for the transformation of security perceptions both within and between states. The securitizing speech-act must be accepted by the audience, and while the Copenhagen School is careful to note that "[a]ccept does not necessarily mean in civilized, dominance-free discussion; it only means that an order always rests on coercion as well as on consent," it is nonetheless the case that "[s]ince securitization can never only be imposed, there is some need to argue one's case"(Buzan et al., 1998: 23), and that "[s]uccessful securitization is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience of the security speech-act: does the audience accept that something is an existential threat to a shared value? Thus security (as with all politics) ultimately rests neither with the objects nor with the subjects but among the subjects"( 1998:31). It is via this commitment to communicative action and discursive ethics, I would like to suggest, that the Copenhagen School seeks to avoid the radical realpolitik that might otherwise seem necessarily to follow from the Schmittian elements of the theory of securitization. Schmitt appeals to the necessity and inescapability of decision, enmity, and "the political." He appeals to the mobilizing power of myth in the production of friends and enemies, and asserts the need for a single point of decision to the point of justifying dictatorship. He mythologizes war and enmity as the paramount moments of political life.32 By contrast, the Copenhagen School treats securitization as a social process, and casts it as a phenomenon largely to be avoided. Securitization is the Schmittian realm of the political, and for precisely this reason it is dangerous and-by and large-to be avoided.33 This element of the Copenhagen School is clearly illustrated in the concepts of "desecuritization" and "asecurity" which form integral aspects of securitization theory. As a consequence of their Schmittian understanding of security-and in contrast to many (indeed most) other forms of security studies-the Copenhagen School does not regard security as an unambiguously positive value. In most cases, securitization is something to be avoided. While casting an issue as one of "security" may help elevate its position on the political agenda, it also risks placing that issue within the logic of threat and decision, and potentially within the contrast of friend and enemy.34 "Security,"accordingly, is something to be invoked with great care and, in general, minimized rather than expanded-a movement that should be sought in the name of stability, tolerance, and political negotiation, not in opposition to it. "Desecuritization" involves precisely this process; a moving of issues off the "security" agenda and back into the realm of public political discourse and "normal" political dispute and accommodation. The transformation of many elements of European security as part of the end of the Cold War stands as a key example (Waever, Buzan, Kelstrup, and Lemaitre, 1993). Similarly, the concept of "asecurity" designates a (probably optimal) situation in which relations are so firmly "politicized" that there is little chance of them becoming re-securitized, a case that Waever argues is illustrated by the Nordic countries whose relations with each other constitute an "asecurity community" rather than a "security community" in the more conventional sense (Waver, 1998b). 32 See, for example, the direct discussion of-and partial contrast to-Schmitt's use of enmity in the construction of sovereignty in Waver (1995: fn. 63); Schmitt also figures in the analysis of religion as a "referent object" pursued in Bagge Lausten and Waver (2000:726, 733). 33 Here, too, the links to classical Realism are strong, for as William Scheuerman (1999) has brilliantly illustrated, this was precisely the tack adopted by Hans Morgenthau in his extended critical engagement with Schmitt. 34 Recognizing this particular Schmittian legacy hopefully also helps clarify the dispute between the Copenhagen School and those who think its scepticism toward the word and concept of "security" is politically debilitating. 523 Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics As a contribution to political practice, the sociological analysis of the Copenhagen School attempts to provide tools whereby these transformative processes can be fostered. By exposing the limits imposed by the securitization of specific issues, it provides resources for challenging these limitations. In presenting security as a speech-act, the Copenhagen School is doing more than developing a sociological thesis: it is presenting a political ethic. This does not mean that securitizations will always be forced to enter the realm of discursive legitimation. Indeed, part of the power of securitization theory lies in its stress on how "security" issues are often or usually insulated from this process of public debate: they operate in the realm of secrecy, of "national security," of decision. Equally, relations may be "sedimented" to such a degree that discursive ethics and tactics of social negotiation are unlikely to succeed and need to be subordinated (at least in the short term) to more traditional mechanisms of (relatively fixed) interest manipulation and material power balancing.35 These are key elements of any analysis of security policy. But the limitations should also not be overstated. As resistant as they may be, these security policies and relationships are susceptible to being pulled back into the public realm and capable of transformation, particularly when the social consensus underlying the capacity for decision is challenged, either by questioning the policies, or by disputing the threat, or both.36

#### Evaluate discourse and ideologies first—it is necessary to understand why we believe what we believe

Bryant 11

(Levi R. Bryant, prof of phil @ Collin College, The Democracy of Objects, Open Humanities Press, 2011, http://openhumanitiespress.org/Bryant\_2011\_The%20Democracy%20of%20Objects.pdf)

By way of a second point, while both onticology and Žižek argue that ¶ objects are split, the two do so for radically different reasons. For Žižek, ¶ objects are split between their appearance and the void of their place of Chapter 3: Virtual Proper Being 131¶ inscription in the symbolic. As a consequence of this divide between placeholder and place, objects can never be identical to themselves. Insofar as ¶ objects are split between their appearance and the void of their place of ¶ inscription, objects are effects of the symbolic or the signifier. Here Žižek ¶ directly follows Lacan, for as Lacan remarks in Encore, “[t]he universe is ¶ a flower of rhetoric”.143 The claim that the universe is a flower of rhetoric ¶ is the claim that the universe is an effect or product of rhetoric. The ¶ universe, for Lacan, is that which blooms out of language and speech. And ¶ indeed, earlier we find Lacan remarking that, “[t]here isn't the slightest ¶ prediscursive reality, for the very fine reason that what constitutes a ¶ collectivity—what I called men, women, and children—means nothing ¶ qua prediscursive reality. Men, women, and children are but signifiers”.144¶ Presumably Lacan would claim the same thing of flowers, zebras, ¶ subatomic particles, burritos, stars and all other entities. The thesis that objects are an effect of the signifier, the symbolic, or ¶ language is a variant of what I call the “hegemonic fallacy”. Put crudely, ¶ in political theory a hegemonic relation is a social, ideological, cultural, or ¶ economic dominance exerted over all other members of the social field. ¶ For example, Christianity and, in particular, evangelical Christianity, has ¶ a hegemonic influence on United States politics in comparison to other ¶ religious beliefs or the absence of religious belief altogether. Onticology ¶ shifts the concept of hegemony from the domain of political theory to the ¶ domain of ontology and might be fruitfully compared to the concept of ¶ ontotheology. Within the framework of onticology, the hegemonic fallacy ¶ occurs whenever one type of entity is treated as the ground or explanans of ¶ all other entities.¶ In treating language or the signifier as the ground of being or the ¶ universe as an effect of the signifier, this is precisely what takes place ¶ in Žižek and Lacan. Beings are hegemonized under the signifier or ¶ language, just as they are hegemonized under mind in Kant. Lurking in ¶ the background of Žižek's argument is, I suspect, a variant of the epistemic ¶ fallacy and actualism as discussed in the first chapter. Just as Locke rejected ¶ the coherence of the concept of substance on the grounds that we are not ¶ given any access to substance in consciousness, the grounds for rejecting ¶ anything like prediscursive reality would lie in the fact that we can only¶ speak about prediscursive reality through signifiers or language and that, ¶ no matter how hard we strive to escape language, we only produce more ¶ signifiers. Here language is the actuality that is given and we are invited to ¶ think of all being in terms of the epistemological or how beings are given to ¶ us through language.¶ However, as we saw in the first chapter, this argument only follows if it ¶ is possible to transform properly ontological questions into epistemological ¶ questions. The reasoning through which we arrive at the existence of objects ¶ is found not in our access to objects through language or consciousness, ¶ but rather through a reflection on what the world must be like for our ¶ practices to be intelligible. And indeed, it is difficult to see how language ¶ could ever have the power to divide or parcel in the way suggested by the ¶ linguistic idealists were it not for the fact that the world is itself structured ¶ and differentiated. Absent a world that is structured and differentiated, the ¶ surface of the world, as a sort of formless flux, would be too slippery, too ¶ smooth, for the signifier to structure at all.

### AT: Empirics (MUST READ)

#### We turn and indict this argument.

#### There are NO empirics for dealing with the Anthropocene, this is a new geological and social epoch that humanity has never experienced before.

#### Scranton says that problems in the Anthropocene must first be addressed with philosophy, specifically learning how to die, means only the alternative can solve, and is a reason the permutation fails.

### AT: Extinction First Yo

#### **The Aff must explain why your response to** death should be worry – the alt doesn’t embrace extinction but refuses to subordinate life to fear

Bataille 45:

Georges Bataille (that dude who wrote Story of the Eye, pretty decent philosopher though), “On Nietzsche”, pg. 173-176)[rkezios]

"'Life." I said. "is bound to be lost in death, as a river loses itself in the sea, the known in the unknown" (Inner Experiena). And death is the end life easily reaches (as water does sea level). So why would I wish to turn my desire to be persuasive into a worry? I dissolve into myself like the sea-and I know the roaring waters of the torrent head straight at me! Whatever a judicious understanding sometimes seems to rude, an inunense folly connected with it (understanding is only an infinitesimal part of that folly), doesn't hesitate to give back. The certainty of incoherence in reading, the inevitable crumbling of the soundest constructions, is the deep truth of books. Since appearance constitutes a limit, what truly exists is a dissolution into common opacity rather than a development of lucid thinking. The apparent unchangingness of books is deceptive: each book is also the sum of the misunderstandings it occasions. So why exhaust myself with efforts toward consciousness? I can only make lun of myself as I write. (Why write even a phrase if laughter doesn't immediately join me?) It goes without saying that, lor the task. Ibring to bear whatever rigor I have within me. But the crumbling nature of thinking's awareness of itself and especially the certainty of thinking reaching its end only in failing, hinder any repose and prevent the relaxed state that facilitates a rigorous disposition of things. Committed to the casual stance-l think and express myself in the free play of hazard. Obviously, everyone in some way admits the importance of hazard. But this recognition is as minimal and unconscious as possible. Going my way unconstralned. unhampered. I develop my thoughts, make choices with regard to expression-but I don't have the control over myseH that I wanl. And the actual dynamic of my intelligence is equally uncontrollable. So that l owe to other dynamics-to lucky chance and to fleeting moments of relaxation-the minimal order and relative learning that I do have. And the rest of the time . . . Thus, as I see it my thought proceeds in harmony with its object, an object that it attains more and perfectly the greater the state of its own ruin. Though it isn't necessarily conscious of this. At one and the same time my thinking must reach plenary illumination and dissolution . . . In the same individual, thought must construct and destroy itself. And even that isn't quite right. Even the most rigorous thinkers yield to chance. In addition, the demands inherent in the exerdse of thought often take me far from where I started. One of the great difficulties encountered by understanding is to put order into thought's interrelations in time. In a given moment, my thought reaches considerable rigor. But how to link it with yesterday's thinking? Yesterday, in a sense, I was another person, responding to other worries. Adapting one to the other remains possible, but . . . This insufficiency bothers me no more than the insuffidency relating to the many woes of the human condition generally. Humanness is related in us to nonsatisfaction. a nonsatisfaction to which we yield without accepting it, though; we distance ourselves from humann ess when we regard ourselves as satisfied or when we give up searching for satisfaction. Sarue is right in relation to me to recll the myth Of Sisyphus, though "in relation to me""' here equates to "in relation to humanity," I suppose. What can be expected of us is to go as far as possible and not to stop. What by contrast. humanly speaking. can be aitidzed are endeavors whose only meaning is some relation to moments of completion. Is it possible for me to go further? I won't wait to coordinate my efforts in that case-I'll go further. I'll take the risk. And the reader. free not to venture after me, will often take advantage of that same freedom! The critics are right to scentdanger here! But let me in turn paint out a greater danger, one that comes from methods that, adequate only to an outcome of knowledge, confer on individuals whom they limit a sheerly fragmentary existence-an existence that is mutilated with respect to the whole that remains inaccessible. Having recognized this, I'll defend my position. I've spoken of inner experience: my intention was to make known an object. But by propo!iing this vague title, T didn't want to confine myself sheerly to inner facts of that experience. It's an arbitrary procedure to reduce knowledge to what we get from our intuitions as subjects. This is something only a newborn can do. And we ourselves (who write) can only know something about this newborn by observing it from outside (the child is only our object). A separation experience, related to a vital continuum (our conception and our birth) and to a return to that continuum (in our first sexual feelings and our first laughter), leaves us without any clear recollections, and only in objective operations do we reach the core of the being we are. A phenomenology of the developed mind assumes a coinddence of subjective and objective aspects and at the same time a fusion of subject and object.\* This means an isolated operation is admissible only because of fatigue (so, the explanation I gave of laughter, because I was unable to develop a whole movement in tandem with a conjugation of the modalities of laughter would be left suspended-since every theory of laughter is integrally a philosophy and. similarly, every integral philosophy is a theory of laughter . . . ). But that is the point­ though I set forth these principles, at the same time I must renounce following them. Thought is produced in me as uncoordinated flashes, withdrawing endlessly from a term to which its movement pushes it. I can't tell if I'm expressing human helplessness this way, or my own . . . I don't know. though I'm not hopeful of even some outwardly satisfying outcome. Isn't there an advantage in creating philosophy as I do? A flash in the night-a language belonging to a brief moment . . . Perhaps in this respect this latest moment contains a simple truth. In order to will knowledge, by an indirect expedient I tend to become the whole universe. But in this movement I can't be a whole hwnan beinSt since I submit to a particular goal. becoming the whole. Granted. if I could become it, I would thus be a whole hwnan being. But in my effon,don't I distance myself from exactly that? And how can I become the whole without becoming a whole human being? I can't be this whole hwnan being except when I let go. I can't be this through willpower: my will necessarily has to will outcomes! But if misfortune (or chance) wills me to let go, then I know I am an integral whole humanness. subordinate to nothing. In other words. the moment of revolt inherent in willing a knowledge beyond practical ends can't be indefinitely continued. And in order to be the whole universe, humankind has to let go and abandon its principle, accepting as the sole criterion of what it is the tendency to go beyond what it is. This existence that I am is a revolt against existence and is indefinite desire. For this existence God was simply a stage-and now here he is, looming large, grown from unfathomable experience, comically perched on the stake used for impalement.

### AT: Action Needed NOW

#### Don’t be blackmailed by their threat of immediate consequences---actomania in the face of environmental apocalypse not only requires a fantasy of natural manipulation but it actively blinds us to a reconfiguration of our consumptive practices

**Swyngedouw 6** Erik, Dept of Geography, School of Environment and Development, Manchester University “Impossible “Sustainability” and the Post-Political Condition,” Forthcoming in: David Gibbs and Rob Krueger (Eds.) Sustainable Development, <http://www.liv.ac.uk/geography/seminars/Sustainabilitypaper.doc>

This chapter seeks to destabilise some of the most persistent myths about nature, sustainability and environmental politics. First, I shall argue that there is **no such thing as a singular Nature** around which a policy of ‘sustainability’ can be constructed. Rather, there are a multitude of natures and a multitude of existing or possible socio-natural relations. Second, the **obsession with a singular nature** that requires ‘sustaining’ is sustained by an **apocalyptic imaginary** that **forecloses asking serious political questions about possible socio-environmental trajectories**, particularly in the context of a neo-liberal hegemony. Third, and most importantly, I shall argue that environmental issues and their political ‘framing’ contribute to the making and consolidation of a post-political and post-democratic condition, one that actually **forecloses the possibility of a real politics of the environment**. I conclude with a call of a politicization of the environment, one that is predicated upon the recognition of radically different possible socio-environmental futures and the proliferation of new socio-environmental imaginaries. ¶ 1. The Question of Natures¶ “Nature does not exist” … or …When vegetarians will eat meat! ¶ The Guardian International reported recently (13th August 2005) how a University of Maryland scientist had succeeded in producing “cultured meat”. Soon, he said, “it will be possible to substitute reared beef or chicken with artificially grown meat tissue. It will not be any longer necessary to kill an animal in order to get access to its meat. We can just rear it in industrialised labs”. A magical solution, so it seems, that might tempt vegetarians to return to the flock of animal protein devotees, while promising yet again (after the failed earlier promises made by the pundits of pesticides, the green revolution and now genetic engineering and GM products) the final solution for world hunger and a more sustainable life for the millions of people who go hungry now. Meanwhile, NASA is spending circa US$ 40 million a year on how to recycle wastewater and return it to potable conditions, something that would of course be necessary to permit space missions of long duration, but which would be of significant importance on earth as well. At the same time, sophisticated new technologies are developed for sustainable water harvesting, for a more rational use of water, or a better recycling of residual waters, efforts defended on the basis of the need to reach the Millennium Development Goals that promise, among others, a reduction by half of the 2.5 billion people that do not have adequate access to safe water and sanitation. ¶ In the mean time, other ‘natures’ keep wrecking havoc around the world. The Tsunami disaster comes readily to mind, as do the endless forest fires that blazed through Spain in the summer of 2005 during the country’s driest summer since records started, killing dozens of people and scorching the land; HIV continues its genocidal march through Sub-Saharan Africa, summer heat waves killed thousands of people prematurely in 2004 in France. In 2006, Europeans watched anxiously the nomadic wanderings of the avian flue virus and waits, almost stoically, for the moment it will pass more easily from birds to humans. While all this is going on, South Korea’s leading bio-tech scientist, Hwang Woo Suk proudly presented, in August 2005, the Seoul National University Puppy (SNUPPY) to the global press as the first cloned dog (a Labrador) while a few months later, in December 2005, this science hero was forced to withdraw a paper on human stem cells from Science after accusations of intellectual fraud (later confirmed, prompting his resignation and wounding South-Korea’s great biotech dream). In the UK, male life expectancy between the ‘best’ and ‘worst’ areas is now more than 11 years and the gap is widening with life expectancy actually falling (for the first time since the second world war) in some areas . Tuberculosis is endemic again in East London, obesity is rapidly becoming the most seriously lethal socio-ecological condition in our fat cities (Marvin and Medd, 2006), and, as the ultimate cynical gesture, nuclear energy is again celebrated and iconized by many elites, among whom Tony Blair, as the world’s saviour, the ultimate response to the climatic calamities promised by continuing carbon accumulation in our atmosphere **while satisfying our insatiable taste for energy**.¶ This great variety of examples all testify to the blurring of boundaries between the human and the artificial, the technological and the natural, the non-human and the cyborg-human; they certainly also suggest that there are all manner of ‘natures’ out there. While some of the above examples promise ‘sustainable’ forms of development, others seem to stray further away from what might be labelled as sustainable. At first glance, Frankenstein meat, cyborg waters and stem cell research are exemplary cases of possibly ‘sustainable’ ways of dealing with apparently important socio-environmental problems while solving significant social problems (animal ethics and food supply on the one hand, dwindling freshwater resources or unsustainable body metabolisms on the other). Sustainable processes are sought for around the world and solutions for our precarious environmental condition are feverishly developed. Sustainability, so it seems, is in the making, even for vegetarians. ¶ Meanwhile, as some of the other examples attest, socio-environmental processes keep on wrecking havoc in many places around the world. ‘Responsible’ scientists, environmentalists of a variety of ideological stripes and colours, together with a growing number of world leaders and politicians, keep on spreading apocalyptic and dystopian messages about the clear and present danger of pending environmental catastrophes that will be unleashed if we refrain from **immediate and determined action**. Particularly the threat of global warming is framed in apocalyptic terms if the atmospheric accumulation of CO2 (which is of course the classic ‘side effect’ of the accumulation of capital in the troposphere) continues unheeded. Table 1 collects a sample of some of the most graphic recent doomsday media headlines on the theme. The world as we know it will come to a premature end (or be seriously mangled) unless we urgently reverse, stop, or at least slow down global warming and return the climate to its status quo ante. Political and regulatory technologies (such as the Kyoto Protocol) and CO2 reducing techno-machinery (like hybrid cars) are developed that would, so the hope goes, stop the threatening evolution and return the earth’s temperature to its benevolent earlier condition. From this perspective, sustainability is predicated upon a return, if we can, to a perceived global climatologic equilibrium situation that would permit a sustainable **continuation of the present world’s way of life**. ¶ So, while one sort of sustainability seems to be predicated upon feverishly developing new natures (like artificial meat, cloned stem cells, or manufactured clean water), forcing nature to act in a way we deem sustainable or socially necessary, the other type is predicated upon limiting or redressing our intervention in nature, returning it to a presumably more benign condition, so that human and non-human sustainability in the medium and long term can be assured. Despite the apparent contradictions of these two ways of ‘becoming sustainable’ (one predicated upon preserving nature’s status quo, the other predicated upon producing new natures), they share the same basic vision that techno-natural and socio-metabolic interventions are urgently needed if we wish to secure the survival of the planet and much of what it contains. But these examples also show that ‘nature’ is not always what it seems to be. Frankenstein meat, dirty water, bird - flue virus symbiosis, stem cells, fat bodies, heat waves, tsunamis, hurricanes, genetic diversity, CO2, to name just a few, are radically different things, expressing radically different natures, pushing in radically different directions, with radically different consequences and outcomes, and with radically different human/non-human connectivities. If anything, before we can even begin to unpack ‘sustainability’, the above examples certainly suggest that we urgently need to interpolate our understandings of ‘nature’, revisit what we mean by nature, and, what we assume ‘nature’ to be. ¶ Surrendering Nature – Indeterminate natures¶ Slavoj Žižek suggests in Looking Awry that the current ecological crisis is indeed a radical condition that not only constitutes a real and present danger, but, equally importantly, “questions our most unquestionable presuppositions, the very horizon of our meaning, our everyday understanding of ‘nature’ as a regular, rhythmic process” (Zizek, (1992) 2002: 34). It raises serious questions about what were long considered self-evident certainties. He argues that this fundamental threat to our deepest convictions of what we always thought we knew for certain about nature is co-constitutive of our general unwillingness to take the ecological crisis completely serious. It is this destabilising effect that explains “the fact that the typical, predominant reaction to it still consists in a variation of the famous disavowal, “I know very well (that things are deadly serious, that what is at stake is our very survival), but just the same I don’t really believe, … and that is why I continue to act as if ecology is of no lasting consequence for my everyday life” (page 35). The same unwillingness to question our very assumptions about what nature is (and even more so what natures might ‘become’) also leads to the typical **obsessive reactions** of those who DO take the ecological crisis seriously. Žižek considers both the case of the environmental activist, who in his or her relentless and obsessive activism to achieve a transformation of society in more ecologically sustainable ways expresses a fear that to stop acting would lead to catastrophic consequences. In his words, obsessive acting becomes a tactic to stave off the ultimate catastrophe, i.e. “if I stop doing what I am doing, the world will come to an end in an ecological Armageddon”. Others, of course, see all manner of transcendental signs in the ‘revenge of nature’, read it as a message that signals our destructive intervention in nature and urge us to change our relationship with nature. In other words, we have to listen to nature’s call, as expressed by the pending environmental catastrophe, and respond to its message that pleas for a more benign, associational relation with nature, a post-human affective connectivity, as a cosmopolitical “partner in dialogue”. While the first attitude radically ignores the reality of possible ecological disaster, the other two, which are usually associated with actors defending ‘sustainable’ solutions for our current predicament, are **equally problematic** in that they both ignore, or are blind to the inseparable gap between our symbolic representation (our understanding) of Nature and the actual acting of a wide range of radically different and, often contingent, natures. In other words, there is – of necessity – an unbridgeable gap, a void, between our dominant view of Nature (as a predictable and determined set of processes that tends towards a (dynamic) equilibrium – but one that is disturbed by our human actions and can be ‘rectified’ with proper sustainable practices) and the acting of natures as an (often) unpredictable, differentiated, incoherent, open-ended, complex, chaotic (although by no means unordered or un-patterned) set of processes. The latter implies the existence not only of many natures, but, more importantly, it also assumes the possibility of all sorts of possible future natures, all manner of imaginable different human-non human assemblages and articulations, and all kinds of different possible socio-environmental becomings. ¶ The inability to take ‘natures’ seriously is dramatically illustrated by the controversy over the degree to which disturbing environmental change is actually taking place and the risks or dangers associated with it. Lomborg’s The Sceptical Environmentalist captures one side of this controversy in all its phantasmagorical perversity (Lomborg, 1998), while climate change doomsday pundits represent the other. Both sides of the debate argue from an imaginary position of the presumed existence of a dynamic balance and equilibrium, the point of ‘good’ nature, but one side claims that the world is veering off the correct path, while the other side (Lomborg and other sceptics) argues that we are still pretty much on nature’s course. With our gaze firmly fixed on capturing an imaginary ‘idealised’ Nature, the controversy further solidifies our conviction of the possibility of a harmonious, balanced, and fundamentally benign ONE Nature if we would just get our interaction with it right, an argument **blindly (and stubbornly) fixed on the question of where Nature’s rightful point of benign existence resides**. This futile debate, circling around an assumedly centred, known, and singular Nature, certainly permits -- **in fact invites** -- **imagining ecological catastrophe at some distant point** (global burning (or freezing) through climate change, resource depletion, death by overpopulation). Indeed, **imagining catastrophe** and fantasising about the final ecological **Armageddon** seems considerably easier for most environmentalists than envisaging **relatively small changes in the socio-political and cultural-economic organisation of local and global life here and now.** Or put differently, the world’s premature ending in a climatic Armageddon seems easier to imagine (and sell to the public) than a transformation of (or end to) the neo-liberal capitalist order that keeps on practicing **expanding energy use** and widening and deepening its ecological footprint.¶

### **AT: Cede the Political**

**Ecological ethics does NOT cede the political—Arguing for nature’s intrinsic value is the prime mover pushing new environmental politics.**

Calicott 2002

J. Baird Callicott, Professor of Philosophy at UNT, 2002

[*Environmental Ethics* p. 554-555]

The agenda for a future environmental philoso­phy thus was set. First, we identify and criticize our inherited beliefs about the nature of nature, human nature, and the relationship between the two. White himself initiated this stage with a critique of those most evident biblical ideas of nature, "man," and the man‑nature relationship. Other environmental philosophers, I among them, went on to identify and criticize the more insidious intellectual legacy of Western natural and moral philosophy going back to the Greeks. Second, we try to articulate a new nat­ural philosophy and moral philosophy distilled from contemporary science. We try, in other words, to ar­ticulate an evolutionary‑ecological worldview and an associated environmental ethic. This two‑phase program of environmental phi­losophy has been gaining momentum for the past two decades. In that amount of time‑which is really not very much time to bring off a cultural revolution comparable to the shift from the medieval to the modern world‑how effective has environmental philosophy been? In so short a time, the rethinking of our old religion that White called for is virtually a fait accompli. The stewardship interpretation of the God‑"man"‑nature relationship set out in Genesis is now semiofficial religious doctrine among "people of the Book"‑Jews, Catholics, Protestants, even Muslims.23 Such an interpretation and its dissemi­nation would not have come about, or at least it would not have come about so soon, had White's despotic interpretation not provoked it. The currently institutionalized Judeo‑Christian‑Islamic steward­ship environmental ethic was a dialectical reaction to White's critique. It has now trickled down into the synagogues and churches, and may be on its way into the mosques. Children learning about God's cre­ation and our responsibility to care for it and pass it on intact to future generations may never hear White's name, or the names of John Black, James Barr, Robert Gordis, Jonathan Helfand, Francis Schaeffer, Albert Fritsch, Thomas Berry, Wendell Berry, Matthew Fox, Iqtidar Zaldi, and the other Jewish, Christian, and Islamic theologians whom White provoked, but what they are being taught­and as a result of that teaching how in the future they may try to be good stewards of God's creation­owes a lot to Lynn White and those whom he chal­lenged to reconceive Judeo‑Christian‑Islamic atti­tudes and values toward nature. But if you think I'm impossibly biased‑a philosopher affirming the power of ideas and de­fending the practical efficacy of philosophy‑then perhaps you can trust Dave Foreman, environmen­tal activist extraordinaire, to provide a candid as­sessment of the role that environmental philosophy has played in shaping the contemporary environ­mental movement. Remember that it was Foreman who wrote, "Let our actions set the finer points of our philosophy."24 And in a 1983 debate with Eu­gene C. Hargrove about the wisdom of monkey­wrenching, it was Foreman who dismissed environ­mental philosophers in the following terms: "Too often, philosophers are rendered impotent by their inability to act without analyzing everything to ab­surd detail. To act, to trust your instincts, to go with the flow of natural forces, is an underlying philoso­phy. Talk is cheap. Action is dear."25 Eight years later, Foreman changed his tune. In "The New Conservation Movement," Foreman iden­tified four forces that are shaping the conservation movement of the 1990s. They are, and I quote, first "academic philosophy," second, "conservation biol­ogy," third, "independent local groups," and fourth, "Earth First!" That's right, "academic philosophy" heads the list. This is some of what Foreman has to say about it: During the 1970s, philosophy professors in Europe, North America, and Australia started looking at en­vironmental ethics as a worthy focus for discussion and exploration .... By 1980, enough interest had coalesced for an academic journal called *Environ­mental Ethics* to appear .... An international net­work of specialists in environmental ethics devel­oped, leading to one of the more vigorous debates in modem philosophy. At first, little of this big blow in the ivory towers drew the notice of working con­servationists, but by the end of the 'SOs, few con­servation group staff members or volunteer activists were unaware of the Deep Ecology‑Shallow Envi­ ronmentalism distinction or of the general discus­sion about ethics and ecology. At the heart of the discussion was the question of whether other species possessed intrinsic value or had value solely be­cause of their use to humans. Ginger Rogers to this Fred Astaire was the question what, if any, ethical obligations humans had to nature or other species.26 And part of the way that Earth First!‑last but not least on Foreman's list‑helped to shape the new conservation movement was by bringing "the dis­cussion of biocentric philosophy‑Deep Ecology­out of dusty academic journals."27 Clearly Foreman understands the power of ideas. Of course, we philosophers do not simply create new environmental ideas and ideals ex nihilo. Rather, we try to articulate and refine those that the intellectual dialectic of the culture has ripened. To employ a So­cratic metaphor, we philosophers are the midwives assisting the birth of new cultural notions and asso­ciated norms. In so doing we help to change our cul­ture's worldview and ethos. Therefore, since all hu­man actions are carried out and find their meaning and significance in a cultural ambience of ideas, we speculative environmental philosophers are inescapably environmental activists. All environmentalists should be activists, but ac­tivism can take a variety of forms. The way that en­vironmental philosophers can be the most effective environmental activists is by doing environmental philosophy. Of course, not everyone can be or wants or needs to be an environmental philosopher. Those who are not can undertake direct environmental ac­tion in other ways. My point is that environmental philosophers should not feel compelled to stop thinking, talking, and writing about environmental ethics, and go do something about it instead‑be­cause talk is cheap and action is dear. In thinking, talking, and writing about environmental ethics, en­vironmental philosophers already have their shoul­ders to the wheel, helping to reconfigure the prevailing cultural worldview and thus helping to push general practice in the direction of environmental responsibility.

#### TURN. Their model of fiat cedes the political and papers over personal responsibility

Kappeler 95 (Susanne, *The Will to Violence: The politics of personal behavior,* Pg. 10-11)

Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally, and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers, For we tend to think that we cannot 'do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'what would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defense?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like 'I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution. 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in co-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our non-comprehension': our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't'- our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others.' We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according: to the structures and the values of war and violence.

### 2NR – AT CC Reversible

**Now this is our link, Swyngedouw 13**

#### Even if all anthropogenic emissions were stopped immediately the impacts of climate change and the warming of the surface would still be irreversible – this is the most recent scientific consensus.

#### IPCC 2014

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (he leading international body for the assessment of climate change. It was established by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in 1988 to provide the world with a clear scientific view on the current state of knowledge in climate change and its potential environmental and socio-economic impacts. Currently 195 countries are in the IPCC. It’s where all of your statistics come from), 2014 Synthesis Report, <http://ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full.pdf>

Many aspects of **climate change and its** associated **impacts will continue** for centuries, even if anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are stopped. **The risks of abrupt or irreversible changes increase as the magnitude of the warming increases**. Warming will continue beyond 2100 under all RCP scenarios except RCP2.6. **Surface temperatures will remain** approximately constant at **elevated** levels **for many centuries after** a complete cessation of net anthropogenic CO2 emissions (see Section 2.2.5 for the relationship between CO2 emissions and global temperature change.). A large fraction of **anthropogenic climate change resulting from CO2 emissions is** irreversible on a multi-century to millennial timescale, except in the case of a large net removal of CO2 from the atmosphere over a sustained period (Figure 2.8a, b). {WGI SPM E.1, SPM E.8, 12.5.2} Stabilization of global average surface temperature does not imply stabilization for all aspects of the climate system. **Shifting biomes,** re-equilibrating **soil carbon, ice sheets, ocean temperatures and** associated **sea level rise all have their own intrinsic** **long timescales that will** result in ongoing **change**s **for** hundreds to **thousands of years after global surface temperature has been stabilize[s]**. {WGI SPM E.8, 12.5.2–12.5.4, WGII 4.2} confidence), **Ocean acidification will continue** for centuries if CO2 emissions continue, it will strongly affect marine ecosystems (high and the impact will be exacerbated by rising temperature extremes (Figure 2.5b). {WGI 3.8.2, 6.4.4, WGII SPM B-2, 6.3.2, 6.3.5, 30.5, Box CC-OA} **Global mean sea level rise will continue for many centuries beyond 2100** (virtually certain). The few available analyses that go beyond 2100 indicate sea level rise to be less than 1 m above the pre-industrial level by 2300 for GHG concentrations that peak and decline and remain below 500 ppm CO2-eq, as in scenario RCP2.6. For a radiative forcing that corresponds to a CO2-eq concentration in 2100 that is above 700 ppm but below 1500 ppm, as in scenario RCP8.5, the projected rise is 1 m to more than 3 m by 2300 (medium confidence) (Figure 2.8c). There is low confidence in the available models’ ability to project solid ice discharge from the Antarctic ice sheet. Hence, these models likely underestimate the Antarctica ice sheet contribution, **resulting in an underestimation of projected sea level rise beyond 2100**. {WGI SPM E.8, 13.4.4, 13.5.4} There is little evidence in global climate models of a tipping point or critical threshold in the transition from a perennially ice-covered to a seasonally ice-free Arctic Ocean, beyond which further sea-ice loss is unstoppable and irreversible. {WGI 12.5.5} There is low confidence in assessing the evolution of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation beyond the 21st century because of the limited number of analyses and equivocal results. However, a collapse beyond the 21st century for large sustained warming cannot be excluded. {WGI SPM E.4, 12.4.7, 12.5.5} Sustained mass loss by ice sheets **would cause larger sea level rise, and** part of the mass loss **might be irreversible**. There is high confidence that sustained global mean warming greater than a threshold would lead to the near-complete loss of the Greenland ice sheet over a millennium or more, causing a sea level rise of up to 7 m. Current estimates indicate that the threshold is greater than about 1°C (low confidence) but less than about 4°C (medium confidence) of global warming with respect to pre-industrial temperatures. Abrupt and irreversible ice loss from a potential instability of marine-based sectors of the Antarctic ice sheet in response to climate forcing is possible, but current evidence and understanding is insufficient to make a quantitative assessment. {WGI SPM E.8, 5.6.2, 5.8.1, 13.4.3, 13.5.4} Within the 21st century, **magnitudes and rates of climate change** associated with medium to high emission scenarios (RCP4.5, RCP6.0 and RCP8.5) **pose a high risk of** abrupt and irreversible regional-scale change in the composition, structure and function of marine**, terrestrial and freshwater** ecosystems, including wetlands (medium confidence), as well as warm water coral reefs (high confidence). Examples that could substantially amplify climate change are the boreal-tundra Arctic system (medium confidence) and the Amazon forest (low confidence). {WGII 4.3.3.1, Box 4.3, Box 4.4, 5.4.2.4, 6.3.1–6.3.4, 6.4.2, 30.5.3–30.5.6, Box CC-CR, Box CC-MB} A reduction in permafrost extent is virtually certain with continued rise in global temperatures. Current permafrost areas are projected to become a net emitter of carbon (CO2 and CH4) with a loss of 180 to 920 GtCO2 (50 to 250 GtC) under RCP8.5 over the 21st century (low confidence). {WGI TFE.5, 6.4.3.4, 12.5.5, WGII 4.3.3.4}

**Impossible to stop warming, even complete stopping CO2 today is too late**

**Thornhill** 11/26/**13** (Ted Thornhill joined the Department of Sociology and Anthropology in fall 2011 after teaching at American International College in Springfield, MA and the University of Massachusetts–Amherst. A native of Ft. Lauderdale, FL, Ted earned his B.A. in sociology and ethnic studies with honors from Florida Atlantic University in Boca Raton, FL. He holds an M.S. in applied social research from Florida State University and completed his Ph.D. in sociology at the University of Massachusetts–Amherst. His dissertation focused on the role of family and education on black college students’ racial ideologies, “It may be too late': Reducing greenhouse gas emissions might not stop global warming, claims climate scientist,” http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2513936/It-late-Reducing-greenhouse-gas-emissions-stop-global-warming-claims-climate-scientist.html))))SEC))))

Many scientists believe that global warming will come to an end if, some day, humans succeed in stopping greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere.¶ It would, they say, be hotter on Earth than before industrialisation, but nonetheless temperatures would not rise.¶ However, this strongly held notion has been challenged by climate physicist Thomas Frölicher.¶ He argues that it is very possible that **the Earth’s atmosphere could continue to warm for hundreds of years even after emissions of greenhouse** gas carbon dioxide **have been halted**.¶ What’s more, temperature levels may stabilise at an even higher level at a later stage.¶ He said: ‘In the long term, **the temperature increase could be 25 per cent greater than assumed today**.’¶ Also, Frölicher’s study, conducted at Princeton University, suggests that it might take a lot less carbon than previously thought to reach the global temperature scientists deem unsafe.¶ The researchers simulated an Earth on which, **after 1,800 billion tons of carbon entered the atmosphere**, all carbon dioxide **emissions suddenly stopped**.¶ Scientists commonly use the scenario of emissions screeching to a stop to gauge the heat-trapping staying power of carbon dioxide.¶ Within a millennium of this simulated shutoff, the carbon itself faded steadily with 40 per cent absorbed by Earth's oceans and landmasses within 20 years and 80 per cent soaked up at the end of the 1,000 years.¶ y itself, such a decrease of atmospheric carbon dioxide should lead to cooling. But **the heat trapped by the carbon dioxide took a divergent track**.¶ After a century of cooling, **the planet warmed** by 0.37 degrees Celsius (0.66 Fahrenheit) during the next 400 years as the oceans absorbed less and less heat.¶ While the resulting temperature spike seems slight, a little heat goes a long way here. Earth has warmed by only 0.85 degrees Celsius (1.5 degrees Fahrenheit) since pre-industrial times.¶ The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates that global temperatures a mere two degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit) higher than pre-industrial levels would dangerously interfere with the climate system.¶ To avoid that point would mean humans have to keep cumulative carbon dioxide emissions below 1,000 billion tons of carbon, about half of which has already been put into the atmosphere since the dawn of industry.¶ The Princeton University research suggests that **even if carbon dioxide emissions came to a sudden halt, the carbon dioxide already in Earth's atmosphere could continue to warm our planet for hundreds of years**.¶ The researchers found while carbon dioxide steadily dissipates, the **absorption of heat by the oceans** decreases, especially in the polar oceans such as Antarctica. This **effect has not been accounted for in existing research**.¶ And the lingering warming effect the researchers found suggests that the two-degree point may be reached with much less carbon.¶ ‘If our results are correct, the total carbon emissions required to stay below two degrees of warming would have to be three-quarters of previous estimates, only 750 billion tons instead of 1,000 billion tons of carbon,’ said Frölicher, now a researcher at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich.¶ ‘Thus, limiting the warming to two degrees would require keeping future cumulative carbon emissions below 250 billion tons, only half of the already emitted amount of 500 billion tons.’¶ The researchers' **work contradicts a scientific consensus that the global temperature would remain constant or decline if emissions were suddenly cut** to zero.¶ But previous research did not account for a gradual reduction in the oceans' ability to absorb heat from the atmosphere, particularly the polar oceans, Frölicher said.¶ Although carbon dioxide steadily dissipates, Frölicher and his co-authors were able to see that **the oceans that remove heat** from the atmosphere **gradually take up less**. Eventually, the residual heat offsets the cooling that occurred due to dwindling amounts of carbon dioxide.¶ The researchers showed that the change in ocean heat uptake in the polar regions has a larger effect on global mean temperature than a change in low-latitude oceans, a mechanism known as ‘ocean-heat uptake efficacy.’¶ ‘The regional uptake of heat plays a central role. **Previous models have not really represented that** very well,’ Frölicher said.¶ ‘Scientists have thought that the temperature stays constant or declines once emissions stop, but now we show that the possibility of a temperature increase can not be excluded,’ Frölicher said. ‘This is illustrative of how difficult it may be to reverse climate change - **we stop the emissions, but still get an increase in the global mean temperature**.'¶ The study was published in Nature Climate Change.

**Emissions reductions don’t solve, only adaptations checks extinction**

**Nye 13** (James Nye is a head writer on climate change for the Daily Mail in the UK, “Apocalypse Now: Unstoppable man-made climate change will become reality by the end of the decade and could make New York, London and Paris uninhabitable within 45 years, claims new study,” http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2451604/Apocalypse-Now-Unstoppable-man-climate-change-reality-end-decade-make-New-York-London-Paris-uninhabitable-45-years-says-new-study.html)))SEC))))

**The Earth is racing towards an apocalyptic future** in which major cities such as New York and London could become uninhabitable because of irreversible man-made climate change within 45-years according to a sobering new study published this week.¶ Humanitarian crisis' could unfold, as hundreds of millions of global warming refugees pour illegally across borders fleeing the consequences of the temperature rises which might leave entire regions of the planet extinct of life.¶ And while the doomsday clock is ticking, with the first signs of change expected at the end of this decade, **researchers** of the study **claim that it is too late to reverse and mankind needs to prepare** for a world where the coldest years will be warmer than what we remember as the hottest.¶ Indeed, the study from the University of Hawaii published online Wednesday in the journal Nature predicts that **even if we utilized all resources to stop and halt our current carbon emissions, the changes are irrevocable and can only be postponed**.¶ All things remaining the same, New York City will begin to experience dramatic, life altering temperatures by 2047, Los Angeles by 2048 and London by 2056.¶ However, if harmful greenhouse emissions are stabilized, New York would be able to stave off the inevitable changes until 2072 and London until 2088.¶ The first U.S. cities to feel the changes would be Honolulu and Phoenix, followed by San Diego and Orlando, in 2046. New York and Washington will get new climates around 2047, with Los Angeles, Detroit, Houston, Chicago, Seattle, Austin and Dallas a bit later.¶ The current projections from the team led by biologist Mora predict that the epicenter of global warming will be at the tropics which will bear the brunt of the initial changes, with temperature rises beginning in or around Manokwari, Indonesia by 2020.¶ However, if the current emissions were stopped today, Manokwari, which is directly on the Equator, would still experience temperature changes in 2025.¶ We are used to the climate that we live in. With this climate change, what is going to happen is we're going to be moving outside this comfort zone,' said Camilo Mora, the study's lead author, to¶ NBC News.¶ **'It is going to be uncomfortable** for us as humans and it will be very uncomfortable for species as well.'¶ The study claims that by 2050 between 1 and 5 billion people will live in areas with an unprecedented climate, said study co-author Ryan Longman, a graduate student at the University of Hawaii.¶ **'Countries first impacted** by unprecedented climate change **are the ones with the least** **economic** **capacity to respond**. Ironically, **these** **are the countries that are least responsible** for climate change in the first place,' he said.¶ **'By expanding our understanding** of climate change, our **paper reveals** new **consequences for biodiversity** and highlights the urgency to take action now.'¶ The study from Mora and the University of Hawaii, Manoa, shifts the way in which climate scientists have been examining the implications of greenhouse emissions.¶ While most have focused on the rapidly warming climate in the Arctic and the effects on wildlife such as polar bears and also sea levels, Mora's team are concerned with the effects on people - specifically the tropics - where the majority of the world's population lives and whose citizens have contributed the least to global warming.¶ It is in the already warm tropics that an increase of only a couple of degrees can alter the balance of life, crippling crops, spreading disease and leading to mass migration away to cooler climes.¶ 'The **warming in the tropics** is not as much but we are rather more quickly going to go outside that recent experience of temperature and that **is going to be devastating** to species and it is probably going to be devastating to people,' said Stuart Pimm, a conservation biologist at Duke University, to¶ NBC News.¶ Mora and his colleagues collated global climate models and built an index of estimates on when a given spot on the globe will change beyond temperatures experienced on Earth over the past 150 years between 1860 and 2005.¶ To arrive at their projections, the researchers used weather observations, computer models and other data to calculate the point at which every year from then on will be warmer than the hottest year ever recorded over the last 150 years.¶ For example, the world as a whole had its hottest year on record in 2005. The new study, published Wednesday in the journal Nature, says that by the year 2047, every year that follows will probably be hotter than that record-setting scorcher.¶ Eventually, the coldest year in a particular city or region will be hotter than the hottest year in its past.¶ 'On average, the **tropics will experience unprecedented climate change** 16 years **earlier** than the rest of the world, starting as early as 2020' in Manokwari, Indonesia, Mora said in a briefing with reporters on Tuesday.¶ He added that if mankind continued to burn fossil fuels, the threshold for the planet as an average globally is 2047 - with temperatures rising by as much as seven degrees centigrade.¶ If greenhouse gas emissions are stabilized, this date is delayed only by 20 years, as an average.¶ But, those extra 20 years bought through emissions cuts would could prove crucial for many species’ survival, Mora said.¶ 'Imagine you are on a highway, and you spot an obstacle in the road up ahead,' Mora said.¶ 'Should you step on the gas, or hit the brake?'¶ 'Hitting an obstacle at a slower speed will minimize the damage to the car and its occupants, in much the same way as hitting a climate threshold at a slower speed would reduce the ramifications for biological systems.¶ 'The speed at which you face that obstacle is going to make a huge difference.'¶ Mora admits that his study is subject to geographic variables, saying that the changes he is predicting will not occur at the same time across the world.¶ However, he has narrowed down his projections to a 5-year margin of error either side, which he calls 'remarkable', given that the study used 39 different models from 21 teams in 12 countries.¶ Skeptics such as Eric Post, a biologist at Penn State University, said that while he disagree with the precision of Mora's study, as with all climate change work, the public and politicians must take note.¶ 'If the assessment by Mora et al. proves accurate, conservation practitioners take heed — **the climate change race is not only on, it is fixed, with the extinction finish line looming** closest for the tropics,' he wrote in Nature magazine.¶ Mora's research has led him to the conclusion that all the species in any of the regions affected by adverse temperature rises have three stark choices.¶ Either they move to a cooler climate, adapt to the warmer climate or become extinct.¶ However, **this is where conflict could arise amongst nations** as desperate and starving people try to migrate en-mass north or south to escape the arid land they have come to live in.¶ 'We have these political boundaries that we cannot cross as easily. Like people in Mexico — if the climate was to go crazy there, it is not like they can move to the United States,' said Mora to NBC News.¶ The Mora **team found** that by **one measurement** — **ocean acidity** — **Earth** **has already crossed** **the threshold** into an entirely new regime. **That happened in** about **2008**, with every year since then more acidic than the old record, according to study co-author Abby Frazier.¶ Of the species studied, **coral reefs will be the first stuck in a new climate** — around 2030 — and are most vulnerable to climate change, Mora said.¶ Judith Curry, a Georgia Institute of Technology climate scientist who often clashes with mainstream scientists, said she found Mora’s approach to make more sense than the massive report that came out of the U.N.-sponsored Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change last month.¶ Pennsylvania State University climate scientist Michael Mann said the research 'may actually be presenting an overly rosy scenario when it comes to how close we are to passing the threshold for dangerous climate impacts.'¶ 'By some measures, **we are already there**,' he said.

**Can’t solve ice sheets**

**Chestney 12** (Nina helps coordinate Reuters' coverage of European power, gas, coal and renewables markets with a focus on policies, investment and trading. She also covers environment, climate change and new clean energy technologies, “Global warming close to becoming irreversible-scientists,” http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/26/us-climate-thresholds-idUSBRE82P0UJ20120326))))SEC))))

(Reuters) - The world is close to reaching tipping points that will make it irreversibly hotter, making this decade critical in efforts to contain global warming, scientists warned on Monday.¶ Scientific estimates differ but the world's temperature looks set to rise by six degrees Celsius by 2100 if greenhouse gas emissions are allowed to rise uncontrollably.¶ As emissions grow, scientists say the world is close to reaching thresholds beyond which the effects on the global climate will be irreversible, such as the melting of polar ice sheets and loss of rainforests.¶ "This is the critical decade. If we don't get the curves turned around this decade we will cross those lines," said Will Steffen, executive director of the Australian National University's climate change institute, speaking at a conference in London.¶ Despite this sense of urgency, a new global climate treaty forcing the world's biggest polluters, such as the United States and China, to curb emissions will only be agreed on by 2015 - to enter into force in 2020.¶ "We are on the cusp of some big changes," said Steffen. "We can ... cap temperature rise at two degrees, or cross the threshold beyond which the system shifts to a much hotter state."¶ TIPPING POINTS¶ **For ice sheets** - **huge refrigerators that slow down the warming of the planet** - **the tipping point has** probably **already been passed**, Steffen said. The West **Antarctic ice sheet has shrunk** over the last decade **and the Greenland ice sheet has lost around 200 cubic km** (48 cubic miles) **a year** since the 1990s.¶ Most **climate estimates agree the Amazon rainforest will get drier** as the planet warms. Mass **tree deaths** caused by drought have **raised fears it is on the verge of a tipping point, when it will stop absorbing emissions and add to them** instead.¶ Around 1.6 billion tonnes of carbon were lost in 2005 from the rainforest and 2.2 billion tonnes in 2010, **which has undone** about 10 years of **carbon sink activity**, Steffen said.¶ One of the most worrying and unknown thresholds is the Siberian permafrost, which stores frozen carbon in the soil away from the atmosphere.¶ "There is about 1,600 billion tonnes of carbon there - about twice the amount in the atmosphere today - and the northern high latitudes are experiencing the most severe temperature change of any part of the planet," he said.¶ In a worst case scenario, 30 to 63 billion tonnes of carbon a year could be released by 2040, rising to 232 to 380 billion tonnes by 2100. This compares to around 10 billion tonnes of CO2 released by fossil fuel use each year.¶ Increased **CO2** in the atmosphere has **also turned oceans more acidic** as they absorb it. In the past 200 years, ocean acidification has happened at a speed not seen for around 60 million years, said Carol Turley at Plymouth Marine Laboratory.¶ **This threatens coral reef development** and could lead to the extinction of some species within decades, as well as to an increase in the number of predators.¶ As leading scientists, policy-makers and environment groups gathered at the "Planet Under Pressure" conference in London, opinions differed on what action to take this decade.¶ London School of Economics professor Anthony Giddens favours focusing on the fossil fuel industry, seeing as renewables only make up 1 percent of the global energy mix.¶ "We have enormous inertia within the world economy and should make much more effort to close down coal-fired power stations," he said.¶ Oil giant Royal Dutch Shell favours working on technologies leading to negative emissions in the long run, like carbon capture on biomass and in land use, said Jeremy Bentham, the firm's vice president of global business environment.¶ The conference runs through Thursday.

**Can’t solve warming, NOAA agrees**

**Romm** 1/26/**09** (Joe Romm is a Fellow at American Progress and is the Founding Editor of Climate Progress, “NOAA stunner: Climate change “largely irreversible for 1000 years,” with permanent Dust Bowls in Southwest and around the globe,” http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2009/01/26/203610/noaa-climate-change-irreversible-1000-years-drought-dust-bowls/)))))SEC))))

Important new **research led by NOAA scientists**, “Irreversible climate change because of carbon dioxide emissions,” **finds**:¶ …**the climate change** that is taking place because of increases in carbon dioxide concentration **is largely irreversible for 1,000 years after emissions stop**…. Among illustrative irreversible impacts that should be expected if atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations increase from current levels near 385 parts per million by volume (ppmv) to a peak of 450-600 ppmv over the coming century are irreversible dry-season rainfall reductions in several regions comparable to those of the ”dust bowl” era and inexorable sea level rise.¶ I guess this is what President Obama meant when he warned today of “irreversible catastrophe” from climate change. The NOAA press release is here. An excellent video interview of the lead author is here.¶ The Proceedings of the National Academies of Science paper gives the lie to the notion that it is a moral choice not to do everything humanly possible to prevent this tragedy, a lie to the notion that we can “adapt” to climate change, unless by “adapt” you mean “force the next 50 generations to endure endless misery because we were too damn greedy to give up 0.1% of our GDP each year” (see, for instance, McKinsey: Stabilizing at 450 ppm has a net cost near zero or the 2007 IPCC report).¶ The **most important finding concerns the irreversible precipitation changes** we will be forcing on the next 50 generations in the U.S. Southwest, Southeast Asia, Eastern South America, Western Australia, Southern Europe, Southern Africa, and northern Africa (see also US Geological Survey stunner: SW faces “permanent drying” by 2050 and links below)¶ On our current emissions path, we are headed toward 1000 ppm by century’s end, as a close reading of the IPCC report makes clear (see my 2008 recent Nature online article). That would put essentially every at risk region into conditions worse than the Dust Bowl for a long, long, long time. Clearly we must peak no higher than 450 ppm.¶ The authors include an important admonition to economists, who, as we’ve seen, invariably underestimate the cost of inaction (see Voodoo economists, Part 2 and Part 3):¶ **Discount rates** used in some estimates of economic trade-offs **assume** that more efficient **climate mitigation can occur in a future richer world**, but **neglect** the **irreversibility** shown here.¶ This is also an important admonition to reporters who cover the climate economics debate (see “How the press bungles its coverage of climate economics“).¶ The lead author, NOAA senior scientist Susan Solomon, spoke to reporters this morning:¶ Asked whether current efforts by some scientists and engineers to invent ways to suck excess CO2 straight out of the air would mean global warming could in fact be reversed after all, she agreed it would, “if by some miracle” such engineering feats could ever be realized.¶ Otherwise, she said, her study was only further proof of the urgency of the need for humanity to drastically reduce its greenhouse emissions worldwide.¶ Precisely.¶ Heck, I say, let’s do some geo-engineering research, but let’s not be deluded into thinking that pursuing research is the same thing as having any reason to believe that research will lead to anything practical or affordable — or any more successful than the billions we have flushed down the toilet trying to build a practical and affordable hydrogen car (see “The car of the perpetual future”).¶ If geo-engineering CO2 out of the air is plausible and affordable at a large scale, it is only after serious mitigation, to go from, say, a brief peak at 450 ppm, back to 400 ppm or lower. Going from 1000 ppm down to below 400 ppm is not only a staggering task to imagine — where the heck would you put the hundreds of billions of tons of carbon? — but **it would be too late to save the ocean from becoming one large, acidic dead zone, and, in any case, we probably would have crossed carbon cycle tipping points that unleash the methane in the peatlands and permafrost.**

**Warming Inevitable, NOAA report**

**Solomon et. al. 09** (Susan Solomon a,1, Gian-Kasper Plattner b, Reto Knutti c, and Pierre Friedlingstein d Chemical Sciences Division, Earth System Research Laboratory, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Boulder, CO 80305; b Institute of Biogeochemistry and Pollutant Dynamics and c Institute for Atmospheric and Climate Science, ETH CH-8092, Zurich, Switzerland; and d Institut Pierre Simon Laplace/Laboratoire des Sciences du Climat et de l’Environnement, Unité Mixte de Recherche 1572 Commissariat a` l’Energie Atomique–Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique–Université Versailles Saint-Quentin, Commissariat a l’Energie Atomique-Saclay, l’Orme des Merisiers, 91191 Gif sur Yvette, France, “Irreversible climate change due to carbon dioxide emissions,” p 6-7, http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2009/01/28/0812721106.full.pdf+html)))))SEC))))

**Global average temperatures increase** while CO2 is increasing and then remain approximately constant (within 0.5 °C) until the end of the millennium **despite zero further emissions** in all of the test cases shown in Fig. 1. This important result is **due to** a near **balance between** the long-term **decrease of radiative forcing** due to CO2 concentration decay and **reduced cooling through** **heat loss to the oceans**. It arises because long-term carbon dioxide removal and ocean heat uptake are both dependent on the same physics of deep-ocean mixing. Sea level rise due to thermal expansion accompanies mixing of heat into the ocean long after carbon dioxide emissions have stopped. For larger carbon dioxide concentrations, **warming and thermal sea level rise show greater increases and display transient changes that can be very rapid** (i.e., the rapid changes in Fig. 1 Middle), mainly because of changes in ocean circulation (18). Paleoclimatic evidence suggests that **additional contributions from melting of glaciers and ice sheets may be comparable to or greater than thermal expansion** (discussed further below), but these are not included in Fig. 1. Fig. 2 explores how close the modeled temperature changes are to thermal equilibrium with respect to the changing carbon dioxide concentration over time, sometimes called the realized warming fraction (19) (shown for the different peak CO2 cases). Fig. 2 Left shows how the calculated warmings compare to those expected if temperatures were in equilibrium with the carbon dioxide concentrations vs. time, while Fig. 2 Right shows the ratio of these calculated time-dependent and equilibrium temperatures. During the period when carbon dioxide is increasing, the realized global warming fraction is 50–60% of the equilibrium warming, close to values obtained in other models (5, 19). **After emissions cease**, the **temperature change approaches equilibrium with respect to the slowly decreasing carbon dioxide concentrations** (cyan lines in Fig. 2 Right). **The continuing warming through year 3000** is maintained at 40–60% of the equilibrium warming corresponding to the peak CO2 concentration (magenta lines in Fig. 2 Right). Related changes in fast-responding atmospheric climate variables such as precipitation, water vapor, heat waves, cloudiness, etc., are expected to occur largely simultaneously with the temperature changes.

**Global warming inevitable: carbon stays in the atmosphere for prolonged periods of time**

**CIS, Jul 3 2012(Carnegie Institution for Science Department of Global Ecology was established in 2002 to help build the scientific foundations for a sustainable future. The department is part of the campus of Stanford University, "Counting Carbon: pre-industrial emissions make a difference", http://carnegiescience.edu/news/counting\_carbon\_preindustrial\_emissions\_make\_difference )**

**When evaluating the historic contributions made by different countries to the greenhouse gasses found in Earth's atmosphere, calculations generally go back no further than the year 1840**. **New** **research** from Carnegie's Julia Pongratz and Ken Caldeira **shows that carbon dioxide contributions from the pre-industrial era still have an impact on our climate today**. Their work is published in Environmental ¶ **The burning of fossil fuels that came with industrialization released massive amounts of carbon dioxide emissions into the atmosphere, which has caused global warming.** But clearing forests and other wild areas for agricultural purposes also contribute to atmospheric carbon dioxide, and **that has been happening since before industrialization.¶** When unmanaged land is cleared for farming, part of the carbon is released immediately into the atmosphere as a result of burning. The rest of the carbon, including that from roots and wood products, releases carbon as the wood decays over years and centuries, meaning that **carbon from pre-industrial activities is still being emitted into the atmosphere**. Furthermore, a part **of carbon dioxide emissions remain in the atmosphere for many centuries**, **because** the **ocean** **and** **vegetation** **on** **land** **absorb** **carbon** **dioxide** only **slowly** **over** **time**. As a result, **there is a warming effect long after the initial clearing** of land.**¶** "The relatively small amounts of carbon dioxide emitted many centuries ago continue to affect atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations and our climate today, though only to a relatively small extent," Pongratz, who is now at the Max Planck Institute for Meteorology, said. "But looking into the past illustrates that **the relatively large amount of carbon dioxide that we are emitting today will continue to have** relatively **large impacts on the atmosphere and climate for many centuries into the future."**

**Can’t stop it**

**Romm** 3/17**/13** (Joe Romm is a Fellow at American Progress and is the Founding Editor of Climate Progress, “The Dangerous Myth That Climate Change Is Reversible,” http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2013/03/17/1731591/the-dangerous-myth-that-climate-change-is-reversible/)))SEC))))

The CMO (Chief Misinformation Officer) of the climate ignorati, Joe Nocera, has a new piece, “A Real Carbon Solution.” The biggest of its many errors comes in this line:¶ A reduction of carbon emissions from Chinese power plants would do far more to help reverse climate change than — dare I say it? — blocking the Keystone XL oil pipeline.¶ Memo to Nocera: As a NOAA-led paper explained 4 years ago, **climate change is “largely irreversible for 1000 years**.”¶ This **notion that** **we can reverse climate change by cutting emissions is one of the most commonly held myths** — and one of the most dangerous, as explained in this 2007 MIT study, “Understanding Public Complacency About Climate Change: Adults’ **mental models of climate change violate conservation of matter**.”¶ The fact is that, as RealClimate has explained, we would need “an immediate cut of around 60 to 70% globally and continued further cuts over time” merely to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of CO2 – and that would still leave us with a **radiative imbalance** that **would lead to** “an **additional** 0.3 to 0.8ºC **warming** over the 21st Century.” **And** **that assumes no major carbon cycle feedbacks** kick in, **which seems highly unlikely**.¶ We’d have to drop total global emissions to zero now and for the rest of the century just to lower concentrations enough to stop temperatures from rising. Again, even in this implausible scenario, we still aren’t talking about reversing climate change, just stopping it — or, more technically, stopping the temperature rise. The great ice sheets might well continue to disintegrate, albeit slowly.¶ This doesn’t mean climate change is unstoppable — only that we are stuck with whatever climate change we cause before we get desperate and go all WWII on emissions. That’s why delay is so dangerous and immoral. For instance, if we don’t act quickly, we are likely to be stuck with permanent Dust Bowls in the Southwest and around the globe. I’ll discuss the irreversibility myth further below the jump.¶ First, though, Nocera’s piece has many other pieces of misinformation. He leaves people with the impression that coal with carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a practical, affordable means of reducing emissions from existing power plants that will be available soon. In fact, most demonstration projects around the world have been shut down, the technology Nocera focuses on would not work on the vast majority of existing coal plants, and CCS is going to be incredibly expensive compared to other low-carbon technologies — see Harvard stunner: “Realistic” first-generation CCS costs a whopping $150 per ton of CO2 (20 cents per kWh)! And that’s in the unlikely event it proves to be practical, permanent, and verifiable (see “Feasibility, Permanence and Safety Issues Remain Unresolved”).¶ Heck, the guy who debated me on The Economist‘s website conceded things are going very slowly, writing “The idea is that CCS then becomes a commercial reality and begins to make deep cuts in emissions during the 2030s.” And he’s a CCS advocate!!¶ Of course, we simply don’t have until the 2030s to wait for deep cuts in emissions. No wonder people who misunderstand the irreversible nature of climate change, like Nocera, tend to be far more complacent about emissions reductions than those who understand climate science.¶ The point of Nocera’s piece seems to be to mock Bill McKibben for opposing the idea of using captured carbon for enhanced oil recovery (EOR): “his answer suggests that his crusade has blinded him to the real problem.”¶ It is Nocera who has been blinded. He explains in the piece:¶ Using carbon emissions to recover previously ungettable oil has the potential to unlock vast untapped American reserves. Last year, ExxonMobil reported that enhanced oil recovery would allow it to extend the life of a single oil field in West Texas by 20 years.¶ McKibben’s effort to stop the Keystone XL pipeline is based on the fact that we have to leave the vast majority of carbon in the ground. Sure, it wouldn’t matter if you built one coal CCS plant and used that for EOR. But we need a staggering amount of CCS, as Vaclav Smil explained in “Energy at the Crossroads“:¶ “Sequestering a mere 1/10 of today’s global CO2 emissions (less than 3 Gt CO2) would thus call for putting in place an industry that would have to force underground every year the volume of compressed gas larger than or (with higher compression) equal to the volume of crude oil extracted globally by [the] petroleum industry whose infrastructures and capacities have been put in place over a century of development. Needless to say, such a technical feat could not be accomplished within a single generation.”¶ D’oh! What precisely would be the point of “sequestering” all that CO2 to extract previously “ungettable oil” whose emissions, when burned, would just about equal the CO2 that you supposedly sequestered?¶ Remember, we have to get total global emissions of CO2 to near zero just to stop temperatures from continuing their inexorable march toward humanity’s self-destruction. And yes, this ain’t easy. But it is impossible if we don’t start slashing emissions soon and stop opening up vast new sources of carbon.¶ For those who are confused on this point, I recommend reading the entire MIT study, whose lead author is John Sterman. Here is the abstract:¶ Public attitudes about climate change reveal a contradiction. Surveys show **most Americans believe climate change poses serious risks but also that reductions in greenhouse gas** (GHG) **emissions sufficient to stabilize** atmospheric GHG **concentrations** or net radiative forcing can be deferred until there is greater evidence that climate change is harmful. US policymakers likewise argue it is prudent to wait and see whether climate change will cause substantial economic harm before undertaking policies to reduce emissions. Such **wait-and-see policies erroneously presume climate change can be reversed** quickly should harm become evident, underestimating substantial delays in the climate’s response to anthropogenic forcing. We report experiments with highly educated adults–graduate students at MIT–showing widespread misunderstanding of the fundamental stock and flow relationships, including mass balance principles, that lead to long response delays. GHG emissions are now about twice the rate of GHG removal from the atmosphere.¶ **GHG concentrations will therefore continue to rise even if emissions fall, stabilizing only when emissions equal removal**. In contrast, results show most subjects believe atmospheric GHG concentrations can be stabilized while emissions into the atmosphere continuously exceed the removal of GHGs from it. These beliefs-analogous to arguing a bathtub filled faster than it drains will never overflow-support wait-and-see policies but violate conservation of matter. Low public support for mitigation policies may be based more on misconceptions of climate dynamics than high discount rates or uncertainty about the risks of harmful climate change.¶ Again, zero emissions merely stops climate change, and obviously, thanks to fossil-fuel funded Tea Party politicians along with the deniers and the ignorati, we won’t be going to zero anytime soon.¶ Finally, I recommend RealClimate’s 2009 post, “Irreversible Does Not Mean Unstoppable“:¶ But you have to remember that the climate changes so far, both observed and committed to, are minor compared with the business-as-usual forecast for the end of the century. It’s further emissions we need to worry about. Climate change is like a ratchet, which we wind up by releasing CO2. Once we turn the crank, **there’s no easy turning back to the natural climate**. But we can still decide to stop turning the crank, and the sooner the better.¶ Indeed, we are only committed to about 2°C total warming so far, which is a probably manageable — and even more probably, if we did keep CO2 concentrations from peaking below 450 ppm, the small amount of CO2 we are likely to be able to remove from the atmosphere this century could well take us below the danger zone.¶ But if we don’t reverse emissions trends soon, we will at least double and probably triple that temperature rise, most likely negating any practical strategy to undo the impacts for hundreds of years.

**Can't solve warming: CO2 stays in the atmosphere**

**Ramanathan and Ramanthan, Dec 2011 (Prof. Veerabhadran Ramanathan is a Distinguished Professor of Atmospheric and Climate Science at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography and the University of California at San Diego Dr Nithya Ramanathan is a Fellow at the Centre of Embedded Networked Sensing at the University of California at Los Angeles and Presiden Nexleaf Analytics, "An Unprecedented Opportunity",** [**http://www.unep.org/ourplanet/2011/dec/en/article8.asp**](http://www.unep.org/ourplanet/2011/dec/en/article8.asp)**)**

Rapid and meaningful progress on slowing global warming is achievable if world leaders and policy makers are willing to rethink and broaden their strategy, in view of recent findings. It turns out that **global warming is caused by two different types of pollutants**. **The first is the long-lived gases**, which we have known about for decades. and **which, stay in the atmosphere for a century or longer** — **most notoriously carbon dioxide (CO2) released by fossil fuel combustion**. Most climate policies have focused on CO2, but **it will take decades and trillions of dollars to reduce emissions significantly**. **The world cannot afford to lose such decades. The planet has already warmed by more than 0.8°C and the resulting symptoms are being perceived in rising sea levels**, melting mountain glaciers, including in the Himalayas and the Alps, large scale retreat of the Arctic sea ice and warming of the ocean waters penetrating to a depth of 1000 meters or more, and such extreme weather as droughts, floods and heat waves. **Worse, humans have already dumped enough greenhouse gases** (almost 1000 billion tons of CO2 alone**) in the atmosphere to warm the planet by more than 20°C** . So**, even if we were to replace half of all fossil fuel use with renewables, the warming will continue to increase for decades, because CO2 molecules live for a century or more once released.**

#### We have passed the tipping point for catastrophic feedback – the Global Carbon Budget1 estimates within +/- 1 sigma error that in 2013 humanity emitted almost 10 Gigatons – NOAA scientists2 say this puts the atmospheric CO2 growth rate at 5.36% at a variable uncertainty of .18 GtC/yr – the most rigorous scientific conclusions are that the entire allotted carbon budget to avoid tipping points in 2050 will be spent by 2024, and that’s without factoring in an upward trend in emissions since 2006

#### Bagley 13

(Katherine, Inside Climate News, “The Most Influential Climate Science Paper Today Remains Unknown to Most People”, 2.14.13, <http://insideclimatenews.org/news/20140213/climate-change-science-carbon-budget-nature-global-warming-2-degrees-bill-mckibben-fossil-fuels-keystone-xl-oil>, [CL])

Though just six pages long, its dense, technical writing makes it largely incomprehensible to non-experts. And yet this paper is transforming the climate change debate—prompting the financial world to rethink the value of the world's fossil fuel reserves and giving environmental activists a moral argument for action. That's because behind its complicated terminology is a simple question that affects every aspect of society and business: How much time do we have before the burning of fossil fuels pushes the climate system past tipping points? In a worst-case scenario, about 11 years at current rates of fossil fuel use, according to the paper. "Once you hear the numbers, at least for me, there is no more room for wishful thinking, for speculation or for doubt," said Bill McKibben, founder of the activist group 350.org. Last year, McKibben plucked the science from popular obscurity and used it in a Rolling Stone article and speaking tour to stoke the moral case for carbon controls. The paper, "Greenhouse-Gas Emission Targets for Limiting Global Warming to 2C," was published in April 2009 in Nature, the prestigious science journal. It was the work of researchers from Germany, the UK and Switzerland, led by Malte Meinshausen, a climatologist at Germany's Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact. The study filled a factual void in a simmering debate over climate change. By 2006, the year the scientists began their research, many world governments had endorsed the scientific consensus that global temperature rise should be kept below 2 degrees Celsius in this century. But governments didn't know how far down the path of global warming they had already gone—and how much further they could safely go. Meinshausen and his team, which included his brother Nicolai, a statistician at the University of Oxford, took up the puzzle. "It seemed the obvious thing to do with so many governments asking the question," Meinshausen said. The scientists created what is called a global "carbon budget," which details how much carbon countries have emitted in the atmosphere from burning coal, oil and natural gas—and how much more they can "spend" before crossing 2 degrees. They didn't invent the concept—many others had crunched carbon budgets. But none were as rigorous. The paper's methodology was groundbreaking. It was the first to incorporate hundreds of uncertainties in the climate system into a single climate model—factors that had never been modeled together or that hadn't been given proper weight in previous studies, such as radiative forcing or unknowns in the carbon cycle like how much carbon is stored in the deep ocean. In total, 400 environmental parameters were run under 1,000 different emissions scenarios. What they found was stark: To have a 50-50 chance of keeping temperature rise below 2 degrees, humans would have to stick to a carbon budget that allowed the release of no more than 1,437 gigatons of carbon dioxide from 2000 to 2050. To have an 80 percent chance of avoiding that threshold, they would have to follow a stricter budget and emit just 886 gigatons. The paper found that by 2006, nations had already spent a quarter of that amount, or 234 gigatons. Meaning, the planet's carbon budget would be exhausted by 2024—11 years from now— if emissions levels stayed the same, or even earlier if they continue their upward trend.

#### Permafrost is a hard tipping point and mathematically irreversible – this is the newest Ice Science

#### Shankman 4/23/15

(Sabrina, Inside Climate News, “Thawing Permafrost: The Arctic’s Slow, Giant Carbon Release”, 4.23.15, <http://insideclimatenews.org/news/23042015/thawing-permafrost-arctic-slow-giant-carbon-release>, [CL])

Permafrost—a vast, frozen subsurface layer of soil—covers nearly a quarter of the land in the northern hemisphere. It contains centuries worth of carbon in the form of plants that have died since the last ice age but remained frozen rather than decomposing. Now scientists are learning that the "perma" part of its name may no longer be accurate. As the Arctic heats up at a rate twice that of the rest of the globe and as sea ice and glaciers turn to water, the permafrost is also thawing. A recent review article in the journal Nature found that as the unfrozen organic matter decays, vast stores of carbon in the permafrost could be released into the atmosphere. This will trigger an irreversible feedback system and nullify existing calculations of just how much carbon humans can burn and keep the globe within a relatively safe degree of warming. Kevin Schaefer, a permafrost scientist with the National Snow and Ice Data Center at the University of Colorado in Boulder and an author of the article, calls the thawing of the permafrost a "true climatic tipping point." Scientists are still trying to pinpoint when it will happen, but Schaefer said that a likely point is around the middle of this century, when the Arctic changes from a carbon sink to a carbon source. When that happens, it will trigger a centuries-long, unstoppable feedback system, in which warming will release carbon, which will trigger more warming, which will release more carbon. The authors of the Nature article found that if humans continue on the current path of energy use, the permafrost could release 92 gigatons of carbon into the atmosphere by the end of this century. That represents nearly 18 percent of what the world has emitted since the start of the Industrial Revolution—or more than one third of what can be safely burned and still keep global warming within 2 degrees Celsius. And that's only part of it. The authors reported that 59 percent of total permafrost emissions would occur after 2100. The scientific understanding of the permafrost is new—so new, in fact, that it wasn't ready in time for the latest round of climate assessment reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the world's largest scientific body on global warming. The 2014 IPCC report estimated that to hold global warming below 2 degrees Celsius, worldwide carbon dioxide emissions would have to be cut by 40 percent to 70 percent by 2050, and then drop to nearly zero by the end of the century. This is a tall order on its own, and it does not take into account additional emissions from permafrost thawing.

### 2NR – Optimism/Hope Bad

Roelvink & Zolkos 2k11 (Gerda & Magdalena, Both are staff at the Centre for Citizenship and Public Policy and are Prof. at the University of Western Sydney, Climate Change as Experience of Affect, Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities, 16:4, pg. 48 [EB])

Optimism is another affective force that produces temporal disjunction between the present and the future in dominant environmental discourse. The reference to optimism in this context is highly counter-intuitive since the prospects of irreversible and all-encompassing ecological destruction leave little ground for sanguine attitudes. What is notable, however, is that the present is defined in terms of the avoidability or even, paradoxically, reversibility of the coming catastrophe (the present is positioned in a curious temporal relation of ‘‘undoing’’ vis-a`-vis what is only to materialize in the future). As a result, optimism emerges as an operative discursive principle which folds into humanist ideas of progress – and its ‘‘continuing grip [. . .] on contemporary consciousness’’ (Dienstag 5; Bailey). Z ˇ izˇek’s distinction between the position of enunciation and what is enunciated is helpful here: ‘‘the more those who predict a catastrophe insist on it, the more they secretly hope the catastrophe will not occur’’ (In Defense 439). This tension illuminates how the apparent internal inconsistency between ‘‘fear’’ and ‘‘optimism’’ is negotiated and resolved in dominant environmental discourses. The repetitive naming of the fear object (the future catastrophe) coincides with and cross-fuels a covert position of optimism that the catastrophe will not come to pass. In (post-)Freudian psychoanalysis, this relation is approximated by the concept of ‘‘undoing’’ (Ungeschehenmachen), where compulsive acts are structured in successive stages and where they pacify and neutralize each other. The repetitive verbalization of the fear object seeks to reduce its affective capital and generate optimism. The etymology of the word ‘‘optimism’’ is connected to the classical Latin word optimus (meaning ‘‘best’’), which is derived from the suffix op- or ops- (meaning ‘‘power,’’ ‘‘ability,’’ or ‘‘aid’’). In so far as optimism implies that human agency and reason are central to the avoidance (or undoing) of the future environmental catastrophe, they risk being tied to anthropocentric reasoning. The position of optimism asserts that the ‘‘application of reason to [. . .] social and political conditions’’ (here, regarding environmental degradation) will eventually bring about ‘‘melioration of these conditions’’ (Dienstag 18). Optimism ‘‘projects perfection elsewhere’’ (41) by imagining the future as a time-place when the feared catastrophe is avoided. Analogously to the affective workings of fear, the human subject and agency (in its asserted ability to prevent catastrophe) are marked as distinctive, isolated from and prior to any connection to earth others.

### AT: Alt No Solvo

**1. The alternative isn’t supposed to solve the anthropocene, there is no way to solve it – that’s Cohen. The alternative is a question of how we position ourselves towards the inevitable end that is right in front of us. The affirmative says we ought to avoid extinction now so we can deal with it later, the neg rejects this and refuses to subordinate what little life we have left to fear. This is key to authentic living with precedes any of their moral claims because the lives they save mean nothing if the way we live is meaningless.**

**2. The notion of solvency is what I critique, searching for solution where there are none only supports the modern life of humanist excellence that created the anthropocene in the first place. We must now focus on the legacy we leave behind, our story is over but we can still preserve a future for at least some of the natural world, this is our foremost obligation – that’s Swyngedouw**

### AT: Heidegger

**Heidegger’s ontological view that things can only come into being if they are apprehended by humans is problematic and rejects the inherent value of nature – this reifies dualism. Zimmerman 93**

Michael Zimmerman (professor of philosophy at Tulane University), “Rethinking the Heidegger-Deep Ecology Relationship” Environmental Ethics v. 15, no. 3. 1993.

**Deep ecologists are sometimes suspicious of Heidegger’s claims about the uniqueness of humanity’s capacity for understanding being, for Western society has always justified its domination of nature by portraying it as inferior to what is “uniquely” human**: soul, rationality, spirit, language. Such suspicions are fueled by **Heidegger’s claim that there is something worse than the destruction of all life on Earth by nuclear war. Supposedly worse would be material “happiness”** (associated with Nietzsche’s “last man”), **which stems from a one-dimensional, technological disclosure of things.** Presumably, in such a constricted world, **entities could show so little of themselves that they would virtually not “be” at all. Contented survival is worse than nuclear annihilation because in the former condition humanity has lost its relation to being.** Here, one may recall the biblical teaching that it is better to forfeit the world than to lose one’s soul. Preserving openness for being is more important than preserving entities, for the latter can only manifest themselves or “be” within that openness. Early **Heidegger once remarked:** “Over against the duration of the starry world of the cosmos in general, **human existence and its history are certainly only the most fleeting,** only a ‘moment’—**but this fleetingness** [if authentic] **is nevertheless the highest mode of being”** Conceived as a tiny lump of matter in the universe, **we are told**, humanity is insignificant; but conceived as the clearing through which the cosmos in all its beauty and worth can manifest itself, **human existence has immeasurable significance. Deep ecologists generally argue**, however, **that the worth of things holds independently of whether they happen to be apprehended by humans.** Moreover, **the view that things can “be” only insofar as they manifest themselves through human existence, would seem difficult to reconcile with the view of** some **deep ecologists** that humans are Leopoldian “plain citizens” of the land.

**Just because he hates technology doesn’t mean he isn’t a humanist, Heidegger created a dualism based on human/nature finitude. In terms of the Anthropocene, that’s ridiculous. Critchley 09:**

Simon Critchley (professor of philosophy at the New School in New York City), “Being and Time part 6: Death” The Guardian. July 13, 2009. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/jul/13/heidegger-being-time

**Also, there is a surprisingly traditional humanism at work in Heidegger's approach to death. In his view, only human beings die, whereas plants and animals simply perish**. I can't speak with any expertise about the death of plants, but **empirical research would** certainly **seem to show that the higher mammal**s – whales, dolphins, elephants, but also cats and dogs – **also have an experience of mortality**, of both their own and of those around them. **We are not the only creatures in the universe who are touched by the sentiment of mortality.**

## Misc.

#### FYI – what is an RCP? What do the numbers mean?

#### IPCC 2014

(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, it’s where all of your statistics come from, 2014 Synthesis Report, <http://ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full.pdf>, [CL])

The Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) describe four different 21st century pathways of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and atmospheric concentrations, air pollutant emissions and land use. The RCPs have been developed using Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) as input to a wide range of climate model simulations to project their consequences for the climate system. These climate projections, in turn, are used for impacts and adaptation assessment. The RCPs are consistent with the wide range of scenarios in the mitigation literature assessed by WGIII2820. The scenarios are used to assess the costs associated with emission reductions consistent with particular concentration pathways. The RCPs represent the range of GHG emissions in the wider literature well (Box 2.2, Figure 1); they include a stringent mitigation scenario (RCP2.6), two intermediate scenarios (RCP4.5 and RCP6.0), and one scenario with very high GHG emissions (RCP8.5). Scenarios without additional efforts to constrain emissions (‘baseline scenarios’) lead to pathways ranging between RCP6.0 and RCP8.5. RCP2.6 is representative of a scenario that aims to keep global warming likely below 2°C above pre-industrial temperatures. The majority of models indicate that scenarios meeting forcing levels similar to RCP2.6 are characterized by substantial net negative emissions by 2100, on average around 2 GtCO2/yr. The land use scenarios of RCPs, together, show a wide range of possible futures, ranging from a net reforestation to further deforestation, consistent with projections in the full scenario literature. For air pollutants such as sulfur dioxide (SO2), the RCP scenarios assume a consistent decrease in emissions as a consequence of assumed air pollution control and GHG mitigation policy (Box 2.2, Figure 1). Importantly, these future scenario do not account for possible changes in natural forcings (e.g., volcanic eruptions) (see Box 1.1). {WGI Box SPM.1, 6.4, 8.5.3, 12.3, Annex II, WGII 19, 21, WGIII 6.3.2, 6.3.6}

#### The aff’s try-or-die logic of optimism in the face of overwhelming scientific analysis that has deemed Industrial Civilization incompatible with the planet is the perfect example of the Anthropocene’s compression of time – the apocalyptic consumption of the future by the present renders us undead – we never have time for reflection or speculation, but only for an action that will ease the anxiety of the modern subject – the anxiety that we know that the growth of modernity is eating the Earth alive and the complete powerlessness that accompanies it – the Anthropocene has gained so much momentum that to even begin to think outside of its parameters it has become a matter of epistemically ending the World – never compromise, even in the face of Armageddon

#### Ziarek 12

Krzysztof Ziarek, Professor of Comparative Literature at SUNY-Buffalo, “The Global Unworld: A Meditative Manifesto”, Impasses of the Post-Global: Theory in the Era of Climate Change, Vol. 2/,

The apparent urgency of the situation appears to preempt any such thinking/being that I have proposed to weave out of Heidegger’s critique of technicity. We appear to have no time to waste on idle philosophical speculation or non-technicist and in-effective action, on collecting our thoughts in a meditative thinking, as we need to produce and possibly effect a solution to a crisis which it may be already too late to avert anyway. The urgency of the crisis seems to nullify in advance any possibility of deciding between calculative thinking and meditative thinking the way Heidegger outlines it in, among other places, the already quoted Discourse on Thinking. We cannot afford to attend to this possible, if elusive, difference. What we need to find, that is, to calculate, is a better way of calculatively grasping our situation, predicting various possible outcomes, and effecting or producing a result which would minimize the negative effects of the multiple threats attending humankind’s existence in the age of globalization. In short, we need to increase the power, scope, and grasp of calculative (techno-scientific) thinking and do it as fast as possible. In Heidegger’s terms, the only available possibilities which unfold in the planetary operations of power (Machenschaft) serve to trans-power power, to increase its scope and efficiency. Any other ways of thinking are inefficient (to say the least), idle, escapist, unreal, and, given the situation, perhaps even dangerously trivial. And yet this is precisely the context in which I would insist we need to heed Heidegger’s provocation, namely that we do not yet think precisely in the sense that calculative thinking which pervades, shapes, and animates our reality is not thinking that is attentive to being and to our mortal way of being. As Heidegger remarks in a seminar following his 1962 lecture “Time and Being,” technicity is Janus-faced (53). It is the frantic acceleration of its calculatively effective power that opens the space and possibility for a potential turn in technicity, an attendant flip in the way that technicity allows and disallows us to face existence. It is when we are confronted with nuclear annihilation or extinction due to global climate change, that we might have an opportunity not just to increase our capacity to calculate, predict, and effect solutions, but also to attend to the question of what it means to be as mortals on this earth, in a finite, each time singular and each time always one time, event of being. We could think about it perhaps as technicity reaching a point of letting itself be called into question and thus possibly initiating an opening onto a transformation. This is what Heidegger is letting thinking prepare for: for the possibility that might open itself up within the frantically technicist acceleration of being’s availability, availability perhaps to the point of self-destruction, at least of humans. Heidegger’s position is that we need to let being, its singular and one-time happening, take center stage, and thus to redirect our questioning of all beings: humans, animals, things, climate, capital, economy, etc., through this perspective of the finite play of time-space. It is precisely this heightened situation of threat and danger, danger which in Heidegger’s time manifested itself as the devastating aftermath of World War II and the threat of nuclear conflict, and which today speaks to us perhaps more in the language of global climate change, world-wide economic instability, and genetic and informational possibilities and threats. If Heidegger is right, then this is precisely the opportunity to open thinking to a questioning otherwise foreclosed to it, downplayed if not banished by the proliferating effectiveness and effects of calculative thinking we associate most easily with techno-science, but whose effectiveness, Heidegger suggests, reaches further into the very way in which being unfolds into reality, disallowing the worlding of the world. To recall an earlier quote, there is only effecting and no worlding of the world. The age of globalization tends to perpetuate and intensify precisely the global or planetary unworlding, and to such an extent that the very issue of world is no longer experienced as an issue or a question. What obscures and covers it over is the urgency of calculative and calculated acting, whose importance only an unthinking, that is, calculatively unthinking, human being could question. And yet, this is precisely what Heidegger dared to question, and for which, largely misunderstood and/or unread, he has been repeatedly rebuked by the Frankfurt School and many others. What I am suggesting is that today, even more so than fifty or so years ago, this question needs perhaps to be dared again. It is not I or us, that is, whatever individuals or communities we propose to invoke in the name of our discourses, that need this question. At issue is what Heidegger ventures to rethink through the meaning of being, namely, the indispose-ability of its event, which each time has always already given the play of time-space in its singular unfolding. But if being in its indispose-ability is at issue, so is Da-sein as the way for mortals to be attentive to their finite and singular, each time given to me, way of being. When reality transpires, that is, folds out into a global unworld, humans come to be the undead—or, more precisely, the undying, no longer open to or capable of being towards death. They flee mortality not simply into religions or atheism, into moral stringency or relativism, into asceticism or pleasure, but also into the technicist visions of undying existence by way of perpetuated electronic downloads of consciousness and informational undeath. They forget that it is only from within being towards death, through mortality, that humans come to exist and thus have the possibility of letting the world world and of letting themselves inhabit the world. The Janus-face of technicity could then be a modern memento mori, but a highly ambiguous one, a memento mori in crisis, opening to deciding what dying means. Not just facing the possibility of death on a historically unprecedented scale, a techno-climactically enforced mass disappearance of population. For this specter of planetary death all too easily closes us to mortality, renders us undead or, to be precise, undying, forgetful of the opportunity of being mortal and of the possibilities unfolding in being towards death. A Janus-faced memento mori: undead death or mortality

#### As we reach the end we will feel driven to ask “what do we do?” – voting negative is a refusal of the very terms of the question – we allow the question to echo with increasing desperation as a frustration of the epistemic grounds of the Anthropocene – you’re waiting for an alternative text but there is no happy ending to this film – the human narrative is not a hopeful story – our rhetoric of eco-pessimism invites you to encounter a new worlding, to think and feel differently – our over-determination of the apocalypse denies all attempts to repair the myth of human progress and pride that comforts the complacent neoliberal subject and replaces it only with the irretrievable, unthinkable loss of the world-as-we-know-it

#### Ginn 15

(Franklin Ginn, lecturer in human geography at the University of Edinburgh, PhD from King’s College in London, 2015, “When Horses Won’t Eat: Apocalypse and the Anthropocene,” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* publication in forthcoming issue) gz

If the anxieties of Anthropocene apocalypse in this film take shape through the geological and biological dimensions of life, these are in turn overshadowed by the film's peculiar temporality. Time is crucial to Tarr's film. The director is famed for long shots, and indeed there are only thirty cuts in the whole film. This warps the viewer's perception of time, demanding patience and a slower form of engagement that retrains perception and flirts with boredom (MacDonald 2004). As in other apocalyptic worlds, life in The Turin Horse is slow. This is a double juxtaposition: first to the snappy, energetic style of Hollywood disaster movies (a contemporary Hollywood film has a cut on average every four to six seconds), and second to the accelerated, globally networked world of the Anthropocene. In The Turin Horse there are two main temporalities at work. The first is the repetitive time of the everyday, which wears the characters down. The second is cosmic time, as the antigenesis narrative arc moves slowly to day seven and the end of everything. The film thus juxtaposes the embodied, lived experience of apocalypse against prophetic eschatology. Much as the Anthropocene names a disaster that has already occurred (Morton 2013), the cosmic temporality in The Turin Horse encompasses a slow unravelling after some undisclosed, past calamity. On one hand, this could be read as a postpolitical shrug, a deep cynicism about any creatures’ capacities to influence events and forces operating on vast scales (as the narrative of the film shows the wind, darkness, and end of fire overwhelming the characters, who remain unable to break of their repeated daily routines). This would be a circumscribed reading, though. The film does not encourage us to welcome the void. Rather, we want the characters, amid their geologic and biologic commitments, to act differently than they do in the film: to act, that is, despite the inevitability of the end by breaking out of their repetitive loops. In other words, if the creatures in The Turin Horse seem bent to their fate and the world's unravelling, their placidity makes us desire them to act otherwise. We want them to wake up, to assert their honor and dignity in the face of the wind and darkness. They do not, which challenges the audience to think about how they themselves might achieve a less fatalistic relation between the temporality of the everyday and the time of geologic inevitability. The film's ecology, in other words, overflows the film world into our own, and mirrors the predicament of the Anthropocene: Both asking how we should best respond to deep time and intractable Earth Forces (Clark 2014). Conclusion Tarr (2012) is convinced the world can be changed for the better, but confesses that he is “just a poor filmmaker,” who wants to “show you something, some pictures, just some human eyes, something that is close to you. … Just listen to your heart and trust your eyes. That's enough.” Tarr's film shows us characters downtrodden by forces vast and alien on the one hand (the wind and dark), intimate and fleshy on the other (unraveling bodies and animal agencies). The absence of the sun brings about the end of carbon modernity, their stockpile of oil useless and unburnable, and bereft of ideas the characters stumble to bed. An animal offers a line of escape from the encroaching gloom: an old horse that could, if it were able or wanted to, help the man and daughter escape. The horse shows the need for a desire that overflows the self and seeks connections, ways to feel more deeply our debts and obligations to nonhuman others. The Turin Horse is not a hopeful film. It shows the destruction of a version of the human that has been elevated into a planetary agent as the anthropos of the Anthropocene. The film enjoins us to imagine the characters doing things differently, breaking out of the law of rain and misery, seeking [alternatives to their repeated daily routines. In this article I have been suggesting that apocalyptic cinema, with its portrayals of collapse and of what might come after, is a kind of ‘earth dreaming’ that constructs the Anthropocene (along with scientific measurement, carbon emissions, etc.). Such earth dreaming does not work the same way as other knowledge. It is more open, its test of verification is not the “transport of indisputable necessities,” but its capacity to create “beings of fiction” that are carried along and transformed by their dreaming (Latour 2013b, 112). We encounter cinema as an open ecology, a provocation to feel something different, and as a relativization of current political power; cinema does not instruct us with its knowledge claims, nor need it reinforce apathy, helplessness, and postpolitical impasse. I have stressed that, following the ecological model of Ivakhiv (2013), cinema works along spectacular, narrative, and exo-referential vectors that reconfigure the relation among audience, film, and world. We are not spectators of apocalyptic films, we are participants; their ecology is an invitation to feel the condition of the Anthropocene and what might lie beyond. If the earth-dreamers watching apocalyptic cinema are parochial, they are no less parochial than the legislators of sound science, the technocrats of earth systems governance, or the salespeople of shiny futures, and their version of the Anthropocene requires scrutiny in good faith, not just dismissal as vicarious indulgence or postpolitical passivity. Anthropocene apocalypse does not therefore demand action or politics in the traditional sense. Instead, apocalypse undercuts the familiar modern narrative of progress. It shows that our projected future will be rudely interrupted by more-than-human forces; that, really, our collective myth of progress, of a humanity reaching ever upward toward great feats of rational management, will collapse as surely as global fish stocks. Thus the political charge of apocalypse is that it destroys the future—specifically, the future as a field in which the present human will endure unchanged. For some this is liberating: “Moderns always had a future … but never a chance, until recently that is, to turn to what I could call their prospect: the shape of things to come” (Latour 2010, 486). Or as Colebrook (2012) puts it, “any truly futural future is apocalyptic, which is to say that it is destructive of the present, and certainly cannot be contained by any thought of saving, surviving, enduring, or maintaining life as cosmos or oikos” (205). The dark geographies of apocalyptic life demand possibilities for other ways of being human, for a people to come after carbon humans. Anthropocene apocalypse might not be exactly hopeful, but it demands a kind of depressing redemption: realizing that the question is not how to continue present ways of life, but the deeper challenge of crafting new ways to respond with honor and dignity to unruly earth forces.

**Learning to die is the only way to achieve wisdom—even though it’s difficult, the process of the alternative in rejecting hope-based politics is key**

**Scranton 15**

Roy Scranton. Learning to Die in the Anthropocene: Reflections on the End of a Civilization. 2015. Google Books, pp. 90-92.

**Accepting the truth of our end is the beginning of wisdom**. When Montaigne wrote that "To philosophize is to learn how to die," he was working in and with a philosophi- cal tradition that was already centuries old. Citing one of his key predecessors, the Roman orator Cicero, Mon- taigne wrote: "Cicero says that **to philosophize is nothing else but to prepare for death**. This is because study and contemplation draw our soul out of us to some extent and keep it busy outside the body; which is a sort of appren- ticeship and semblance of death. Or else it is because all the wisdom and reasoning in this world boils down finally to this point: **to teach us not to be afraid to die**. "102 Cicero was in his turn reworking Plato’s account of the death of Socrates in the Phaedo, where Socrates argues that philoso- phy is the practice of learning how to separate the soul from the body.103 Philosophical humanism in its most radical practice is the disciplined interruption of somatic and social flows, the detachment of consciousness from impulse, and the con- densation of conceptual truths out of the granular data of experience. **It is the study of "dying and being dead," a divestment from this life in favor of deeper investments in a life beyond ourselves**. In recognizing the dominion of death and the transience of individual existences, we affirm a web of being that connects past to future, them to us, me to you. "One is responsible to life," wrote James Baldwin. "It is the small beacon in that terrifying darkness from which we come and to which we return. One must negotiate this passage as nobly as possible, for the sake of those who are coming after us." 10\* Learning to die is hard. It takes practice. There is no royal road, no first-class lane. Learning to die demands **daily cultivation of detachment** and daily reminders of mortality. It requires long communion with the dead. And since we can't ever really know how to do something until we do it, learning to die also means accepting the impossibility of achieving that knowledge as long as we live. We will always be practicing, failing, trying again and failing again, until our final day'. **Yet the practice itself is the wisdom**. In the words of Zen master Dögen: “To practice the way single- heartedly is, in itself, Enlightenment.” As I learned in Iraq and have had to learn again and again, the practice of learning to die is the practice of learn- ing to let go: Learning to die means **learning to let go of the ego, the idea of the self, the future, certainty, attachment, the pursuit of pleasure, permanence, and stability**. Learning to let go of salvation. **Learning to let go of hope**. Learning to let go of death. It means realizing with the Stoic philoso- pher Marcus Aurelius that Of human life the time is a point, and the sub- stance is in a flux, and the perception dull, and the composition of the whole body subject to putre- faction, and the soul a whirl, and fortune hard to divine, and fame a thing devoid of judgment. And, to say all in a word, everything which belongs to the body is a stream, and what belongs to the soul is a dream and vapor, and life is a warfare and a strangerk sojourn, and after-fame is oblivion.106

**The 1ac failure to attend to our relationship as debaters, judges and coaches beyond the human sphere makes them a part of an educational practice that sustains anthropocentric ordering of world despite the “empowerment” offered by the affirmative**

Bell and Russell 2K (Anne C. by graduate students in the Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University and Constance L. a graduate student at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto, Beyond Human, Beyond Words: Anthropocentrism, Critical Pedagogy, and the Poststructuralist Turn, http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-bell.pdf)//RSW

So far, however, such queries in critical pedagogy have been limited by their neglect of the ecological contexts of which students are a part and of relationships extending beyond the human sphere. The gravity of this oversight is brought sharply into focus by writers interested in environ-mental thought, particularly in the cultural and historical dimensions of the environmental crisis. For example, Nelson (1993) contends that our inability to acknowledge our human embeddedness in nature results in our failure to understand what sustains us. We become inattentive to our very real dependence on others and to the ways our actions affect them. Educators, therefore, would do well to draw on the literature of environ-mental thought in order to come to grips with the misguided sense of independence, premised on freedom from nature, that informs such no-tions as “empowerment.” Further, calls for educational practices situated in the life-worlds of students go hand in hand with critiques of disembodied approaches to education. In both cases, **critical pedagogy challenges the liberal notion of education whose sole aim is the development of the individual, rational mind** (Giroux, 1991, p. 24; McKenna, 1991, p. 121; Shapiro, 1994). Theorists draw attention to the importance of nonverbal discourse (e.g., Lewis & Simon, 1986, p. 465) and to the somatic character of learning (e.g., Shapiro, 1994, p. 67), both overshadowed by the intellectual authority long granted to rationality and science (Giroux, 1995; Peters, 1995; S. Taylor, 1991). Describing an “emerging discourse of the body” that looks at how bodies are represented and inserted into the social order, S. Taylor (1991) cites as examples the work of Peter McLaren, Michelle Fine, and Philip Corrigan. A complementary vein of enquiry is being pursued by environmental researchers and educators critical of the privileging of science and abstract thinking in education. They understand learning to be mediated not only through our minds but also through our bodies. Seeking to acknowledge and create space for sensual, emotional, tacit, and communal knowledge, they advocate approaches to education grounded in, for example, nature experience and environmental practice (Bell, 1997; Brody, 1997; Weston, 1996). Thus, whereas both critical pedagogy and environmental education offer a critique of disembodied thought, one draws attention to the ways in which the body is situated in culture (Shapiro, 1994) and to “the social construction of bodies as they are constituted within discourses of race, class, gender, age and other forms of oppression” (S. Taylor, 1991, p. 61). The other emphasizes and celebrates our embodied relatedness to the more-than-human world and to the myriad life forms of which it is comprised (Payne, 1997; Russell & Bell, 1996). Given their different foci, each stream of enquiry stands to be enriched by a sharing of insights. Finally, with regard to the poststructuralist turn in educational theory, ongoing investigations stand to greatly enhance a revisioning of environ-mental education. A growing number of environmental educators question the empirical-analytical tradition and its focus on technical and behavioural aspects of curriculum (A. Gough, 1997; Robottom, 1991). **Advocating more interpretive, critical approaches, these educators contest the discursive frameworks** (e.g., positivism, empiricism, rationalism) **that mask the values, beliefs, and assumptions underlying information, and thus the cultural and political dimensions of the problems being considered** (A. Gough, 1997; Huckle, 1999; Lousley, 1999). Teaching about ecological processes and environmental hazards in a supposedly objective and rational manner is understood to belie the fact that knowledge is socially constructed and therefore partial (A. Gough, 1997; Robertson, 1994; Robottom, 1991; Stevenson, 1993). N. Gough (1999) explicitly goes beyond critical approaches to advocate poststructuralist positions in environmental education. He asks science and environmental educators to adopt skepticism towards metanarratives, an attitude that characterizes poststructuralist discourses. Working from the assumption that science and environmental education are story-telling practices, he suggests that the adequacy of narrative strategies be examined in terms of how they represent and render problematic “human trans-actions with the phenomenal world” (N. Gough, 1993, p. 607). Narrative strategies, he asserts, should not create an illusion of neutrality, objectivity, and anonymity, but rather draw attention to our kinship with nature and to “the personal participation of the knower in all acts of understanding” (N. Gough, 1993, p. 621). We contend, of course, that Gough’s proposal should extend beyond the work of science and environmental educators. The societal narratives that legitimize the domination of nature, like those that underlie racism, sexism, classism, heterosexism, and so on, merit everyone’s concern. And since the ecological crisis threatens especially those most marginalized and vulnerable (Running-Grass, 1996; D. Taylor, 1996), proponents of critical pedagogy in particular need to come to terms with the humancentred frameworks that structure their endeavours. No doubt poststructuralist theory will be indispensable in this regard. Nevertheless, **anthropocentric assumptions about language, meaning, and agency will need to be revisited**. In the meantime, perhaps we can ponder the spontaneous creativity of spiders and the life-worlds of woodticks. Such wondrous possibilities should cause even the most committed of humanists to pause for a moment at least.